Searched hist:"8 e4ff6f228e4722cac74db716e308d1da33d744f" (Results 1 – 2 of 2) sorted by relevance
| /openbmc/linux/security/selinux/include/ |
| H A D | classmap.h | diff 8e4ff6f228e4722cac74db716e308d1da33d744f Fri Apr 08 12:52:00 CDT 2016 Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> selinux: distinguish non-init user namespace capability checks
Distinguish capability checks against a target associated
with the init user namespace versus capability checks against
a target associated with a non-init user namespace by defining
and using separate security classes for the latter.
This is needed to support e.g. Chrome usage of user namespaces
for the Chrome sandbox without needing to allow Chrome to also
exercise capabilities on targets in the init user namespace.
Suggested-by: Dan Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
| /openbmc/linux/security/selinux/ |
| H A D | hooks.c | diff 8e4ff6f228e4722cac74db716e308d1da33d744f Fri Apr 08 12:52:00 CDT 2016 Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> selinux: distinguish non-init user namespace capability checks
Distinguish capability checks against a target associated
with the init user namespace versus capability checks against
a target associated with a non-init user namespace by defining
and using separate security classes for the latter.
This is needed to support e.g. Chrome usage of user namespaces
for the Chrome sandbox without needing to allow Chrome to also
exercise capabilities on targets in the init user namespace.
Suggested-by: Dan Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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