| /openbmc/linux/arch/arm/include/asm/ |
| H A D | traps.h | diff 247055aa21ffef1c49dd64710d5e94c2aee19b58 Mon Sep 13 10:03:21 CDT 2010 Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> ARM: 6384/1: Remove the domain switching on ARMv6k/v7 CPUs
This patch removes the domain switching functionality via the set_fs and
__switch_to functions on cores that have a TLS register.
Currently, the ioremap and vmalloc areas share the same level 1 page
tables and therefore have the same domain (DOMAIN_KERNEL). When the
kernel domain is modified from Client to Manager (via the __set_fs or in
the __switch_to function), the XN (eXecute Never) bit is overridden and
newer CPUs can speculatively prefetch the ioremap'ed memory.
Linux performs the kernel domain switching to allow user-specific
functions (copy_to/from_user, get/put_user etc.) to access kernel
memory. In order for these functions to work with the kernel domain set
to Client, the patch modifies the LDRT/STRT and related instructions to
the LDR/STR ones.
The user pages access rights are also modified for kernel read-only
access rather than read/write so that the copy-on-write mechanism still
works. CPU_USE_DOMAINS gets disabled only if the hardware has a TLS register
(CPU_32v6K is defined) since writing the TLS value to the high vectors page
isn't possible.
The user addresses passed to the kernel are checked by the access_ok()
function so that they do not point to the kernel space.
Tested-by: Anton Vorontsov <cbouatmailru@gmail.com>
Cc: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
|
| H A D | domain.h | diff 247055aa21ffef1c49dd64710d5e94c2aee19b58 Mon Sep 13 10:03:21 CDT 2010 Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> ARM: 6384/1: Remove the domain switching on ARMv6k/v7 CPUs
This patch removes the domain switching functionality via the set_fs and
__switch_to functions on cores that have a TLS register.
Currently, the ioremap and vmalloc areas share the same level 1 page
tables and therefore have the same domain (DOMAIN_KERNEL). When the
kernel domain is modified from Client to Manager (via the __set_fs or in
the __switch_to function), the XN (eXecute Never) bit is overridden and
newer CPUs can speculatively prefetch the ioremap'ed memory.
Linux performs the kernel domain switching to allow user-specific
functions (copy_to/from_user, get/put_user etc.) to access kernel
memory. In order for these functions to work with the kernel domain set
to Client, the patch modifies the LDRT/STRT and related instructions to
the LDR/STR ones.
The user pages access rights are also modified for kernel read-only
access rather than read/write so that the copy-on-write mechanism still
works. CPU_USE_DOMAINS gets disabled only if the hardware has a TLS register
(CPU_32v6K is defined) since writing the TLS value to the high vectors page
isn't possible.
The user addresses passed to the kernel are checked by the access_ok()
function so that they do not point to the kernel space.
Tested-by: Anton Vorontsov <cbouatmailru@gmail.com>
Cc: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
|
| H A D | futex.h | diff 247055aa21ffef1c49dd64710d5e94c2aee19b58 Mon Sep 13 10:03:21 CDT 2010 Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> ARM: 6384/1: Remove the domain switching on ARMv6k/v7 CPUs
This patch removes the domain switching functionality via the set_fs and
__switch_to functions on cores that have a TLS register.
Currently, the ioremap and vmalloc areas share the same level 1 page
tables and therefore have the same domain (DOMAIN_KERNEL). When the
kernel domain is modified from Client to Manager (via the __set_fs or in
the __switch_to function), the XN (eXecute Never) bit is overridden and
newer CPUs can speculatively prefetch the ioremap'ed memory.
Linux performs the kernel domain switching to allow user-specific
functions (copy_to/from_user, get/put_user etc.) to access kernel
memory. In order for these functions to work with the kernel domain set
to Client, the patch modifies the LDRT/STRT and related instructions to
the LDR/STR ones.
The user pages access rights are also modified for kernel read-only
access rather than read/write so that the copy-on-write mechanism still
works. CPU_USE_DOMAINS gets disabled only if the hardware has a TLS register
(CPU_32v6K is defined) since writing the TLS value to the high vectors page
isn't possible.
The user addresses passed to the kernel are checked by the access_ok()
function so that they do not point to the kernel space.
Tested-by: Anton Vorontsov <cbouatmailru@gmail.com>
Cc: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
|
| H A D | uaccess.h | diff 247055aa21ffef1c49dd64710d5e94c2aee19b58 Mon Sep 13 10:03:21 CDT 2010 Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> ARM: 6384/1: Remove the domain switching on ARMv6k/v7 CPUs
This patch removes the domain switching functionality via the set_fs and
__switch_to functions on cores that have a TLS register.
Currently, the ioremap and vmalloc areas share the same level 1 page
tables and therefore have the same domain (DOMAIN_KERNEL). When the
kernel domain is modified from Client to Manager (via the __set_fs or in
the __switch_to function), the XN (eXecute Never) bit is overridden and
newer CPUs can speculatively prefetch the ioremap'ed memory.
Linux performs the kernel domain switching to allow user-specific
functions (copy_to/from_user, get/put_user etc.) to access kernel
memory. In order for these functions to work with the kernel domain set
to Client, the patch modifies the LDRT/STRT and related instructions to
the LDR/STR ones.
The user pages access rights are also modified for kernel read-only
access rather than read/write so that the copy-on-write mechanism still
works. CPU_USE_DOMAINS gets disabled only if the hardware has a TLS register
(CPU_32v6K is defined) since writing the TLS value to the high vectors page
isn't possible.
The user addresses passed to the kernel are checked by the access_ok()
function so that they do not point to the kernel space.
Tested-by: Anton Vorontsov <cbouatmailru@gmail.com>
Cc: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
|
| H A D | assembler.h | diff 247055aa21ffef1c49dd64710d5e94c2aee19b58 Mon Sep 13 10:03:21 CDT 2010 Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> ARM: 6384/1: Remove the domain switching on ARMv6k/v7 CPUs
This patch removes the domain switching functionality via the set_fs and
__switch_to functions on cores that have a TLS register.
Currently, the ioremap and vmalloc areas share the same level 1 page
tables and therefore have the same domain (DOMAIN_KERNEL). When the
kernel domain is modified from Client to Manager (via the __set_fs or in
the __switch_to function), the XN (eXecute Never) bit is overridden and
newer CPUs can speculatively prefetch the ioremap'ed memory.
Linux performs the kernel domain switching to allow user-specific
functions (copy_to/from_user, get/put_user etc.) to access kernel
memory. In order for these functions to work with the kernel domain set
to Client, the patch modifies the LDRT/STRT and related instructions to
the LDR/STR ones.
The user pages access rights are also modified for kernel read-only
access rather than read/write so that the copy-on-write mechanism still
works. CPU_USE_DOMAINS gets disabled only if the hardware has a TLS register
(CPU_32v6K is defined) since writing the TLS value to the high vectors page
isn't possible.
The user addresses passed to the kernel are checked by the access_ok()
function so that they do not point to the kernel space.
Tested-by: Anton Vorontsov <cbouatmailru@gmail.com>
Cc: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
|
| /openbmc/linux/arch/arm/lib/ |
| H A D | putuser.S | diff 247055aa21ffef1c49dd64710d5e94c2aee19b58 Mon Sep 13 10:03:21 CDT 2010 Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> ARM: 6384/1: Remove the domain switching on ARMv6k/v7 CPUs
This patch removes the domain switching functionality via the set_fs and
__switch_to functions on cores that have a TLS register.
Currently, the ioremap and vmalloc areas share the same level 1 page
tables and therefore have the same domain (DOMAIN_KERNEL). When the
kernel domain is modified from Client to Manager (via the __set_fs or in
the __switch_to function), the XN (eXecute Never) bit is overridden and
newer CPUs can speculatively prefetch the ioremap'ed memory.
Linux performs the kernel domain switching to allow user-specific
functions (copy_to/from_user, get/put_user etc.) to access kernel
memory. In order for these functions to work with the kernel domain set
to Client, the patch modifies the LDRT/STRT and related instructions to
the LDR/STR ones.
The user pages access rights are also modified for kernel read-only
access rather than read/write so that the copy-on-write mechanism still
works. CPU_USE_DOMAINS gets disabled only if the hardware has a TLS register
(CPU_32v6K is defined) since writing the TLS value to the high vectors page
isn't possible.
The user addresses passed to the kernel are checked by the access_ok()
function so that they do not point to the kernel space.
Tested-by: Anton Vorontsov <cbouatmailru@gmail.com>
Cc: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
|
| H A D | getuser.S | diff 247055aa21ffef1c49dd64710d5e94c2aee19b58 Mon Sep 13 10:03:21 CDT 2010 Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> ARM: 6384/1: Remove the domain switching on ARMv6k/v7 CPUs
This patch removes the domain switching functionality via the set_fs and
__switch_to functions on cores that have a TLS register.
Currently, the ioremap and vmalloc areas share the same level 1 page
tables and therefore have the same domain (DOMAIN_KERNEL). When the
kernel domain is modified from Client to Manager (via the __set_fs or in
the __switch_to function), the XN (eXecute Never) bit is overridden and
newer CPUs can speculatively prefetch the ioremap'ed memory.
Linux performs the kernel domain switching to allow user-specific
functions (copy_to/from_user, get/put_user etc.) to access kernel
memory. In order for these functions to work with the kernel domain set
to Client, the patch modifies the LDRT/STRT and related instructions to
the LDR/STR ones.
The user pages access rights are also modified for kernel read-only
access rather than read/write so that the copy-on-write mechanism still
works. CPU_USE_DOMAINS gets disabled only if the hardware has a TLS register
(CPU_32v6K is defined) since writing the TLS value to the high vectors page
isn't possible.
The user addresses passed to the kernel are checked by the access_ok()
function so that they do not point to the kernel space.
Tested-by: Anton Vorontsov <cbouatmailru@gmail.com>
Cc: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
|
| /openbmc/linux/arch/arm/kernel/ |
| H A D | fiq.c | diff 247055aa21ffef1c49dd64710d5e94c2aee19b58 Mon Sep 13 10:03:21 CDT 2010 Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> ARM: 6384/1: Remove the domain switching on ARMv6k/v7 CPUs
This patch removes the domain switching functionality via the set_fs and
__switch_to functions on cores that have a TLS register.
Currently, the ioremap and vmalloc areas share the same level 1 page
tables and therefore have the same domain (DOMAIN_KERNEL). When the
kernel domain is modified from Client to Manager (via the __set_fs or in
the __switch_to function), the XN (eXecute Never) bit is overridden and
newer CPUs can speculatively prefetch the ioremap'ed memory.
Linux performs the kernel domain switching to allow user-specific
functions (copy_to/from_user, get/put_user etc.) to access kernel
memory. In order for these functions to work with the kernel domain set
to Client, the patch modifies the LDRT/STRT and related instructions to
the LDR/STR ones.
The user pages access rights are also modified for kernel read-only
access rather than read/write so that the copy-on-write mechanism still
works. CPU_USE_DOMAINS gets disabled only if the hardware has a TLS register
(CPU_32v6K is defined) since writing the TLS value to the high vectors page
isn't possible.
The user addresses passed to the kernel are checked by the access_ok()
function so that they do not point to the kernel space.
Tested-by: Anton Vorontsov <cbouatmailru@gmail.com>
Cc: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
|
| H A D | traps.c | diff 247055aa21ffef1c49dd64710d5e94c2aee19b58 Mon Sep 13 10:03:21 CDT 2010 Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> ARM: 6384/1: Remove the domain switching on ARMv6k/v7 CPUs
This patch removes the domain switching functionality via the set_fs and
__switch_to functions on cores that have a TLS register.
Currently, the ioremap and vmalloc areas share the same level 1 page
tables and therefore have the same domain (DOMAIN_KERNEL). When the
kernel domain is modified from Client to Manager (via the __set_fs or in
the __switch_to function), the XN (eXecute Never) bit is overridden and
newer CPUs can speculatively prefetch the ioremap'ed memory.
Linux performs the kernel domain switching to allow user-specific
functions (copy_to/from_user, get/put_user etc.) to access kernel
memory. In order for these functions to work with the kernel domain set
to Client, the patch modifies the LDRT/STRT and related instructions to
the LDR/STR ones.
The user pages access rights are also modified for kernel read-only
access rather than read/write so that the copy-on-write mechanism still
works. CPU_USE_DOMAINS gets disabled only if the hardware has a TLS register
(CPU_32v6K is defined) since writing the TLS value to the high vectors page
isn't possible.
The user addresses passed to the kernel are checked by the access_ok()
function so that they do not point to the kernel space.
Tested-by: Anton Vorontsov <cbouatmailru@gmail.com>
Cc: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
|
| H A D | entry-armv.S | diff 247055aa21ffef1c49dd64710d5e94c2aee19b58 Mon Sep 13 10:03:21 CDT 2010 Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> ARM: 6384/1: Remove the domain switching on ARMv6k/v7 CPUs
This patch removes the domain switching functionality via the set_fs and
__switch_to functions on cores that have a TLS register.
Currently, the ioremap and vmalloc areas share the same level 1 page
tables and therefore have the same domain (DOMAIN_KERNEL). When the
kernel domain is modified from Client to Manager (via the __set_fs or in
the __switch_to function), the XN (eXecute Never) bit is overridden and
newer CPUs can speculatively prefetch the ioremap'ed memory.
Linux performs the kernel domain switching to allow user-specific
functions (copy_to/from_user, get/put_user etc.) to access kernel
memory. In order for these functions to work with the kernel domain set
to Client, the patch modifies the LDRT/STRT and related instructions to
the LDR/STR ones.
The user pages access rights are also modified for kernel read-only
access rather than read/write so that the copy-on-write mechanism still
works. CPU_USE_DOMAINS gets disabled only if the hardware has a TLS register
(CPU_32v6K is defined) since writing the TLS value to the high vectors page
isn't possible.
The user addresses passed to the kernel are checked by the access_ok()
function so that they do not point to the kernel space.
Tested-by: Anton Vorontsov <cbouatmailru@gmail.com>
Cc: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
|
| /openbmc/linux/arch/arm/mm/ |
| H A D | proc-macros.S | diff 247055aa21ffef1c49dd64710d5e94c2aee19b58 Mon Sep 13 10:03:21 CDT 2010 Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> ARM: 6384/1: Remove the domain switching on ARMv6k/v7 CPUs
This patch removes the domain switching functionality via the set_fs and
__switch_to functions on cores that have a TLS register.
Currently, the ioremap and vmalloc areas share the same level 1 page
tables and therefore have the same domain (DOMAIN_KERNEL). When the
kernel domain is modified from Client to Manager (via the __set_fs or in
the __switch_to function), the XN (eXecute Never) bit is overridden and
newer CPUs can speculatively prefetch the ioremap'ed memory.
Linux performs the kernel domain switching to allow user-specific
functions (copy_to/from_user, get/put_user etc.) to access kernel
memory. In order for these functions to work with the kernel domain set
to Client, the patch modifies the LDRT/STRT and related instructions to
the LDR/STR ones.
The user pages access rights are also modified for kernel read-only
access rather than read/write so that the copy-on-write mechanism still
works. CPU_USE_DOMAINS gets disabled only if the hardware has a TLS register
(CPU_32v6K is defined) since writing the TLS value to the high vectors page
isn't possible.
The user addresses passed to the kernel are checked by the access_ok()
function so that they do not point to the kernel space.
Tested-by: Anton Vorontsov <cbouatmailru@gmail.com>
Cc: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
|
| H A D | proc-v7.S | diff 247055aa21ffef1c49dd64710d5e94c2aee19b58 Mon Sep 13 10:03:21 CDT 2010 Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> ARM: 6384/1: Remove the domain switching on ARMv6k/v7 CPUs
This patch removes the domain switching functionality via the set_fs and
__switch_to functions on cores that have a TLS register.
Currently, the ioremap and vmalloc areas share the same level 1 page
tables and therefore have the same domain (DOMAIN_KERNEL). When the
kernel domain is modified from Client to Manager (via the __set_fs or in
the __switch_to function), the XN (eXecute Never) bit is overridden and
newer CPUs can speculatively prefetch the ioremap'ed memory.
Linux performs the kernel domain switching to allow user-specific
functions (copy_to/from_user, get/put_user etc.) to access kernel
memory. In order for these functions to work with the kernel domain set
to Client, the patch modifies the LDRT/STRT and related instructions to
the LDR/STR ones.
The user pages access rights are also modified for kernel read-only
access rather than read/write so that the copy-on-write mechanism still
works. CPU_USE_DOMAINS gets disabled only if the hardware has a TLS register
(CPU_32v6K is defined) since writing the TLS value to the high vectors page
isn't possible.
The user addresses passed to the kernel are checked by the access_ok()
function so that they do not point to the kernel space.
Tested-by: Anton Vorontsov <cbouatmailru@gmail.com>
Cc: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
|
| H A D | Kconfig | diff 247055aa21ffef1c49dd64710d5e94c2aee19b58 Mon Sep 13 10:03:21 CDT 2010 Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> ARM: 6384/1: Remove the domain switching on ARMv6k/v7 CPUs
This patch removes the domain switching functionality via the set_fs and
__switch_to functions on cores that have a TLS register.
Currently, the ioremap and vmalloc areas share the same level 1 page
tables and therefore have the same domain (DOMAIN_KERNEL). When the
kernel domain is modified from Client to Manager (via the __set_fs or in
the __switch_to function), the XN (eXecute Never) bit is overridden and
newer CPUs can speculatively prefetch the ioremap'ed memory.
Linux performs the kernel domain switching to allow user-specific
functions (copy_to/from_user, get/put_user etc.) to access kernel
memory. In order for these functions to work with the kernel domain set
to Client, the patch modifies the LDRT/STRT and related instructions to
the LDR/STR ones.
The user pages access rights are also modified for kernel read-only
access rather than read/write so that the copy-on-write mechanism still
works. CPU_USE_DOMAINS gets disabled only if the hardware has a TLS register
(CPU_32v6K is defined) since writing the TLS value to the high vectors page
isn't possible.
The user addresses passed to the kernel are checked by the access_ok()
function so that they do not point to the kernel space.
Tested-by: Anton Vorontsov <cbouatmailru@gmail.com>
Cc: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
|
| H A D | mmu.c | diff 247055aa21ffef1c49dd64710d5e94c2aee19b58 Mon Sep 13 10:03:21 CDT 2010 Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> ARM: 6384/1: Remove the domain switching on ARMv6k/v7 CPUs
This patch removes the domain switching functionality via the set_fs and
__switch_to functions on cores that have a TLS register.
Currently, the ioremap and vmalloc areas share the same level 1 page
tables and therefore have the same domain (DOMAIN_KERNEL). When the
kernel domain is modified from Client to Manager (via the __set_fs or in
the __switch_to function), the XN (eXecute Never) bit is overridden and
newer CPUs can speculatively prefetch the ioremap'ed memory.
Linux performs the kernel domain switching to allow user-specific
functions (copy_to/from_user, get/put_user etc.) to access kernel
memory. In order for these functions to work with the kernel domain set
to Client, the patch modifies the LDRT/STRT and related instructions to
the LDR/STR ones.
The user pages access rights are also modified for kernel read-only
access rather than read/write so that the copy-on-write mechanism still
works. CPU_USE_DOMAINS gets disabled only if the hardware has a TLS register
(CPU_32v6K is defined) since writing the TLS value to the high vectors page
isn't possible.
The user addresses passed to the kernel are checked by the access_ok()
function so that they do not point to the kernel space.
Tested-by: Anton Vorontsov <cbouatmailru@gmail.com>
Cc: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
|