Merge branch 'linus' into smp/urgent

Ensure that all usage sites of get/put_online_cpus() except for the
struggler in drivers/thermal are gone. So the last user and the deprecated
inlines can be rem

Merge branch 'linus' into smp/urgent

Ensure that all usage sites of get/put_online_cpus() except for the
struggler in drivers/thermal are gone. So the last user and the deprecated
inlines can be removed.

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Merge branch 'next' into for-linus

Prepare input updates for 5.15 merge window.

Merge tag 'integrity-v5.15' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity

Pull integrity subsystem updates from Mimi Zohar:

- Limit the allowed hash algorithms when writin

Merge tag 'integrity-v5.15' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity

Pull integrity subsystem updates from Mimi Zohar:

- Limit the allowed hash algorithms when writing security.ima xattrs or
verifying them, based on the IMA policy and the configured hash
algorithms.

- Return the calculated "critical data" measurement hash and size to
avoid code duplication. (Preparatory change for a proposed LSM.)

- and a single patch to address a compiler warning.

* tag 'integrity-v5.15' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
IMA: reject unknown hash algorithms in ima_get_hash_algo
IMA: prevent SETXATTR_CHECK policy rules with unavailable algorithms
IMA: introduce a new policy option func=SETXATTR_CHECK
IMA: add a policy option to restrict xattr hash algorithms on appraisal
IMA: add support to restrict the hash algorithms used for file appraisal
IMA: block writes of the security.ima xattr with unsupported algorithms
IMA: remove the dependency on CRYPTO_MD5
ima: Add digest and digest_len params to the functions to measure a buffer
ima: Return int in the functions to measure a buffer
ima: Introduce ima_get_current_hash_algo()
IMA: remove -Wmissing-prototypes warning

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Merge branch 'perf/urgent' into perf/core, to pick up fixes

Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

IMA: reject unknown hash algorithms in ima_get_hash_algo

The new function validate_hash_algo() assumed that ima_get_hash_algo()
always return a valid 'enum hash_algo', but it returned the
user-suppl

IMA: reject unknown hash algorithms in ima_get_hash_algo

The new function validate_hash_algo() assumed that ima_get_hash_algo()
always return a valid 'enum hash_algo', but it returned the
user-supplied value present in the digital signature without
any bounds checks.

Update ima_get_hash_algo() to always return a valid hash algorithm,
defaulting on 'ima_hash_algo' when the user-supplied value inside
the xattr is invalid.

Signed-off-by: THOBY Simon <Simon.THOBY@viveris.fr>
Reported-by: syzbot+e8bafe7b82c739eaf153@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 50f742dd9147 ("IMA: block writes of the security.ima xattr with unsupported algorithms")
Reviewed-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>

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Merge branch 'restrict-digest-alg-v8' into next-integrity

Taken from the cover letter "IMA: restrict the accepted digest
algorithms for the security.ima xattr":

Provide users the ability to restric

Merge branch 'restrict-digest-alg-v8' into next-integrity

Taken from the cover letter "IMA: restrict the accepted digest
algorithms for the security.ima xattr":

Provide users the ability to restrict the algorithms accepted by
their system, both when writing/updating xattrs, and when appraising
files, while retaining a permissive behavior by default to preserve
backward compatibility.

To provide these features, alter the behavior of setxattr to
only accept hashes built in the kernel, instead of any hash listed
in the kernel (complete list crypto/hash_info.c). In addition, the
user can define in his IMA policy the list of digest algorithms
allowed for writing to the security.ima xattr. In that case,
only algorithms present in that list are accepted for writing.

In addition, users may opt-in to allowlist hash algorithms for
appraising thanks to the new 'appraise_algos' IMA policy option.
By default IMA will keep accepting any hash algorithm, but specifying
that option will make appraisal of files hashed with another algorithm
fail.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/20210816081056.24530-1-Simon.THOBY@viveris.fr/

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Merge tag 'v5.14-rc6' into locking/core, to pick up fixes

Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

IMA: introduce a new policy option func=SETXATTR_CHECK

While users can restrict the accepted hash algorithms for the
security.ima xattr file signature when appraising said file, users
cannot restric

IMA: introduce a new policy option func=SETXATTR_CHECK

While users can restrict the accepted hash algorithms for the
security.ima xattr file signature when appraising said file, users
cannot restrict the algorithms that can be set on that attribute:
any algorithm built in the kernel is accepted on a write.

Define a new value for the ima policy option 'func' that restricts
globally the hash algorithms accepted when writing the security.ima
xattr.

When a policy contains a rule of the form
appraise func=SETXATTR_CHECK appraise_algos=sha256,sha384,sha512
only values corresponding to one of these three digest algorithms
will be accepted for writing the security.ima xattr. Attempting to
write the attribute using another algorithm (or "free-form" data)
will be denied with an audit log message. In the absence of such a
policy rule, the default is still to only accept hash algorithms
built in the kernel (with all the limitations that entails).

Signed-off-by: THOBY Simon <Simon.THOBY@viveris.fr>
Reviewed-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>

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IMA: add support to restrict the hash algorithms used for file appraisal

The kernel accepts any hash algorithm as a value for the security.ima
xattr. Users may wish to restrict the accepted algorith

IMA: add support to restrict the hash algorithms used for file appraisal

The kernel accepts any hash algorithm as a value for the security.ima
xattr. Users may wish to restrict the accepted algorithms to only
support strong cryptographic ones.

Provide the plumbing to restrict the permitted set of hash algorithms
used for verifying file hashes and signatures stored in security.ima
xattr.

Signed-off-by: THOBY Simon <Simon.THOBY@viveris.fr>
Reviewed-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>

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IMA: block writes of the security.ima xattr with unsupported algorithms

By default, writes to the extended attributes security.ima will be
allowed even if the hash algorithm used for the xattr is no

IMA: block writes of the security.ima xattr with unsupported algorithms

By default, writes to the extended attributes security.ima will be
allowed even if the hash algorithm used for the xattr is not compiled
in the kernel (which does not make sense because the kernel would not
be able to appraise that file as it lacks support for validating the
hash).

Prevent and audit writes to the security.ima xattr if the hash algorithm
used in the new value is not available in the current kernel.

Signed-off-by: THOBY Simon <Simon.THOBY@viveris.fr>
Reviewed-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>

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Backmerge remote-tracking branch 'drm/drm-next' into drm-misc-next

Required bump from v5.13-rc3 to v5.14-rc3, and to pick up sysfb compilation fixes.

Signed-off-by: Maarten Lankhorst <maarten.lankh

Backmerge remote-tracking branch 'drm/drm-next' into drm-misc-next

Required bump from v5.13-rc3 to v5.14-rc3, and to pick up sysfb compilation fixes.

Signed-off-by: Maarten Lankhorst <maarten.lankhorst@linux.intel.com>

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Merge branch 'fixes-v5.14' into fixes

Merge branch 'ima-buffer-measurement-changes-v4' into next-integrity

Based on cover letter "ima: Provide more info about buffer measurement":

Providing more information about buffer measurements re

Merge branch 'ima-buffer-measurement-changes-v4' into next-integrity

Based on cover letter "ima: Provide more info about buffer measurement":

Providing more information about buffer measurements requires
modification of the existing functions ima_measure_critical_data()
and process_buffer_measurement(). Unlike for file measurements,
there is no integrity_iint_cache structure for storing and retrieving
buffer measurements.

With these changes, kernel subsystems relying on IMA to measure
critical data don't have to duplicate the function to calculate the
buffer digest but, instead, can get directly the one that IMA would
insert, depending on the policy, in the new measurement list entry.

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ima: Add digest and digest_len params to the functions to measure a buffer

This patch performs the final modification necessary to pass the buffer
measurement to callers, so that they provide a func

ima: Add digest and digest_len params to the functions to measure a buffer

This patch performs the final modification necessary to pass the buffer
measurement to callers, so that they provide a functionality similar to
ima_file_hash(). It adds the 'digest' and 'digest_len' parameters to
ima_measure_critical_data() and process_buffer_measurement().

These functions calculate the digest even if there is no suitable rule in
the IMA policy and, in this case, they simply return 1 before generating a
new measurement entry.

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>

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Merge tag 'v5.13' into next

Sync up with the mainline to get the latest parport API.

Merge drm/drm-next into drm-intel-gt-next

Catching up with 5.14-rc1 and also preparing for a
needed common topic branch for the "Minor revid/stepping
and workaround cleanup"

Reference: https://patc

Merge drm/drm-next into drm-intel-gt-next

Catching up with 5.14-rc1 and also preparing for a
needed common topic branch for the "Minor revid/stepping
and workaround cleanup"

Reference: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/series/92299/
Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>

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Merge drm/drm-next into drm-intel-next

Catching up with 5.14-rc1

Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>

Merge branch 'cpufreq/cppc-fie' into cpufreq/arm/linux-next

Merge remote-tracking branch 'torvalds/master' into perf/core

To pick up fixes.

Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>

Merge tag 'integrity-v5.14' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity

Pull integrity subsystem updates from Mimi Zohar:
"The large majority of the changes are EVM porta

Merge tag 'integrity-v5.14' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity

Pull integrity subsystem updates from Mimi Zohar:
"The large majority of the changes are EVM portable & immutable
signature related: removing a dependency on loading an HMAC key,
safely allowing file metadata included in the EVM portable & immutable
signatures to be modified, allowing EVM signatures to fulfill IMA file
signature policy requirements, including the EVM file metadata
signature in lieu of an IMA file data signature in the measurement
list, and adding dynamic debugging of EVM file metadata.

In addition, in order to detect critical data or file change
reversions, duplicate measurement records are permitted in the IMA
measurement list.

The remaining patches address compiler, sparse, and doc warnings"

* tag 'integrity-v5.14' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity: (31 commits)
evm: Check xattr size discrepancy between kernel and user
evm: output EVM digest calculation info
IMA: support for duplicate measurement records
ima: Fix warning: no previous prototype for function 'ima_add_kexec_buffer'
ima: differentiate between EVM failures in the audit log
ima: Fix fall-through warning for Clang
ima: Pass NULL instead of 0 to ima_get_action() in ima_file_mprotect()
ima: Include header defining ima_post_key_create_or_update()
ima/evm: Fix type mismatch
ima: Set correct casting types
doc: Fix warning in Documentation/security/IMA-templates.rst
evm: Don't return an error in evm_write_xattrs() if audit is not enabled
ima: Define new template evm-sig
ima: Define new template fields xattrnames, xattrlengths and xattrvalues
evm: Verify portable signatures against all protected xattrs
ima: Define new template field imode
ima: Define new template fields iuid and igid
ima: Add ima_show_template_uint() template library function
ima: Don't remove security.ima if file must not be appraised
ima: Introduce template field evmsig and write to field sig as fallback
...

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ima: differentiate between EVM failures in the audit log

Differentiate between an invalid EVM portable signature failure
from other EVM HMAC/signature failures.

Reviewed-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.

ima: differentiate between EVM failures in the audit log

Differentiate between an invalid EVM portable signature failure
from other EVM HMAC/signature failures.

Reviewed-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>

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Merge tag 'v5.13-rc3' into asoc-5.13

Linux 5.13-rc3

Merge drm/drm-next into drm-intel-gt-next

Pulling in -rc2 fixes and TTM changes that next upcoming patches depend
on.

Signed-off-by: Joonas Lahtinen <joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com>

Merge branch 'misc-evm-v7' into next-integrity

From cover letter:

EVM portable signatures are particularly suitable for the protection of
metadata of immutable files where metadata is signed by a s

Merge branch 'misc-evm-v7' into next-integrity

From cover letter:

EVM portable signatures are particularly suitable for the protection of
metadata of immutable files where metadata is signed by a software vendor.
They can be used for example in conjunction with an IMA policy that
appraises only executed and memory mapped files.

However, until now portable signatures can be properly installed only if
the EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES initialization flag is also set, which
disables metadata verification until an HMAC key is loaded. This will cause
metadata writes to be allowed even in the situations where they shouldn't
(metadata protected by a portable signature is immutable).

The main reason why setting the flag is necessary is that the operations
necessary to install portable signatures and protected metadata would be
otherwise denied, despite being legitimate, due to the fact that the
decision logic has to avoid an unsafe recalculation of the HMAC that would
make the unsuccessfully verified metadata valid. However, the decision
logic is too coarse, and does not fully take into account all the possible
situations where metadata operations could be allowed.

For example, if the HMAC key is not loaded and it cannot be loaded in the
future due the EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE flag being set, it wouldn't be a problem
to allow metadata operations, as they wouldn't result in an HMAC being
recalculated.

This patch set extends the decision logic and adds the necessary exceptions
to use portable signatures without turning off metadata verification and
deprecates the EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES flag.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/20210514152753.982958-1-roberto.sassu@huawei.com/

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ima: Don't remove security.ima if file must not be appraised

Files might come from a remote source and might have xattrs, including
security.ima. It should not be IMA task to decide whether security

ima: Don't remove security.ima if file must not be appraised

Files might come from a remote source and might have xattrs, including
security.ima. It should not be IMA task to decide whether security.ima
should be kept or not. This patch removes the removexattr() system
call in ima_inode_post_setattr().

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>

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