| /openbmc/linux/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/pxp/ |
| H A D | intel_pxp_tee.h | cbbd3764 Fri Sep 24 14:14:42 CDT 2021 Huang, Sean Z <sean.z.huang@intel.com> drm/i915/pxp: Create the arbitrary session after boot
Create the arbitrary session, with the fixed session id 0xf, after
system boot, for the case that application allocates the protected
buffer without establishing any protection session. Because the
hardware requires at least one alive session for protected buffer
creation. This arbitrary session will need to be re-created after
teardown or power event because hardware encryption key won't be
valid after such cases.
The session ID is exposed as part of the uapi so it can be used as part
of userspace commands.
v2: use gt->uncore->rpm (Chris)
v3: s/arb_is_in_play/arb_is_valid (Chris), move set-up to the new
init_hw function
v4: move interface defs to separate header, set arb_is valid to false
on fini (Rodrigo)
v5: handle async component binding
Signed-off-by: Huang, Sean Z <sean.z.huang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniele Ceraolo Spurio <daniele.ceraolospurio@intel.com>
Cc: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
Cc: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20210924191452.1539378-8-alan.previn.teres.alexis@intel.com
|
| H A D | intel_pxp_session.h | cbbd3764 Fri Sep 24 14:14:42 CDT 2021 Huang, Sean Z <sean.z.huang@intel.com> drm/i915/pxp: Create the arbitrary session after boot
Create the arbitrary session, with the fixed session id 0xf, after
system boot, for the case that application allocates the protected
buffer without establishing any protection session. Because the
hardware requires at least one alive session for protected buffer
creation. This arbitrary session will need to be re-created after
teardown or power event because hardware encryption key won't be
valid after such cases.
The session ID is exposed as part of the uapi so it can be used as part
of userspace commands.
v2: use gt->uncore->rpm (Chris)
v3: s/arb_is_in_play/arb_is_valid (Chris), move set-up to the new
init_hw function
v4: move interface defs to separate header, set arb_is valid to false
on fini (Rodrigo)
v5: handle async component binding
Signed-off-by: Huang, Sean Z <sean.z.huang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniele Ceraolo Spurio <daniele.ceraolospurio@intel.com>
Cc: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
Cc: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20210924191452.1539378-8-alan.previn.teres.alexis@intel.com
|
| H A D | intel_pxp.h | cbbd3764 Fri Sep 24 14:14:42 CDT 2021 Huang, Sean Z <sean.z.huang@intel.com> drm/i915/pxp: Create the arbitrary session after boot
Create the arbitrary session, with the fixed session id 0xf, after
system boot, for the case that application allocates the protected
buffer without establishing any protection session. Because the
hardware requires at least one alive session for protected buffer
creation. This arbitrary session will need to be re-created after
teardown or power event because hardware encryption key won't be
valid after such cases.
The session ID is exposed as part of the uapi so it can be used as part
of userspace commands.
v2: use gt->uncore->rpm (Chris)
v3: s/arb_is_in_play/arb_is_valid (Chris), move set-up to the new
init_hw function
v4: move interface defs to separate header, set arb_is valid to false
on fini (Rodrigo)
v5: handle async component binding
Signed-off-by: Huang, Sean Z <sean.z.huang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniele Ceraolo Spurio <daniele.ceraolospurio@intel.com>
Cc: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
Cc: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20210924191452.1539378-8-alan.previn.teres.alexis@intel.com
|
| H A D | intel_pxp_types.h | cbbd3764 Fri Sep 24 14:14:42 CDT 2021 Huang, Sean Z <sean.z.huang@intel.com> drm/i915/pxp: Create the arbitrary session after boot
Create the arbitrary session, with the fixed session id 0xf, after
system boot, for the case that application allocates the protected
buffer without establishing any protection session. Because the
hardware requires at least one alive session for protected buffer
creation. This arbitrary session will need to be re-created after
teardown or power event because hardware encryption key won't be
valid after such cases.
The session ID is exposed as part of the uapi so it can be used as part
of userspace commands.
v2: use gt->uncore->rpm (Chris)
v3: s/arb_is_in_play/arb_is_valid (Chris), move set-up to the new
init_hw function
v4: move interface defs to separate header, set arb_is valid to false
on fini (Rodrigo)
v5: handle async component binding
Signed-off-by: Huang, Sean Z <sean.z.huang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniele Ceraolo Spurio <daniele.ceraolospurio@intel.com>
Cc: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
Cc: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20210924191452.1539378-8-alan.previn.teres.alexis@intel.com
|
| H A D | intel_pxp_session.c | cbbd3764 Fri Sep 24 14:14:42 CDT 2021 Huang, Sean Z <sean.z.huang@intel.com> drm/i915/pxp: Create the arbitrary session after boot
Create the arbitrary session, with the fixed session id 0xf, after
system boot, for the case that application allocates the protected
buffer without establishing any protection session. Because the
hardware requires at least one alive session for protected buffer
creation. This arbitrary session will need to be re-created after
teardown or power event because hardware encryption key won't be
valid after such cases.
The session ID is exposed as part of the uapi so it can be used as part
of userspace commands.
v2: use gt->uncore->rpm (Chris)
v3: s/arb_is_in_play/arb_is_valid (Chris), move set-up to the new
init_hw function
v4: move interface defs to separate header, set arb_is valid to false
on fini (Rodrigo)
v5: handle async component binding
Signed-off-by: Huang, Sean Z <sean.z.huang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniele Ceraolo Spurio <daniele.ceraolospurio@intel.com>
Cc: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
Cc: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20210924191452.1539378-8-alan.previn.teres.alexis@intel.com
|
| H A D | intel_pxp.c | cbbd3764 Fri Sep 24 14:14:42 CDT 2021 Huang, Sean Z <sean.z.huang@intel.com> drm/i915/pxp: Create the arbitrary session after boot
Create the arbitrary session, with the fixed session id 0xf, after
system boot, for the case that application allocates the protected
buffer without establishing any protection session. Because the
hardware requires at least one alive session for protected buffer
creation. This arbitrary session will need to be re-created after
teardown or power event because hardware encryption key won't be
valid after such cases.
The session ID is exposed as part of the uapi so it can be used as part
of userspace commands.
v2: use gt->uncore->rpm (Chris)
v3: s/arb_is_in_play/arb_is_valid (Chris), move set-up to the new
init_hw function
v4: move interface defs to separate header, set arb_is valid to false
on fini (Rodrigo)
v5: handle async component binding
Signed-off-by: Huang, Sean Z <sean.z.huang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniele Ceraolo Spurio <daniele.ceraolospurio@intel.com>
Cc: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
Cc: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20210924191452.1539378-8-alan.previn.teres.alexis@intel.com
|
| H A D | intel_pxp_tee.c | cbbd3764 Fri Sep 24 14:14:42 CDT 2021 Huang, Sean Z <sean.z.huang@intel.com> drm/i915/pxp: Create the arbitrary session after boot
Create the arbitrary session, with the fixed session id 0xf, after
system boot, for the case that application allocates the protected
buffer without establishing any protection session. Because the
hardware requires at least one alive session for protected buffer
creation. This arbitrary session will need to be re-created after
teardown or power event because hardware encryption key won't be
valid after such cases.
The session ID is exposed as part of the uapi so it can be used as part
of userspace commands.
v2: use gt->uncore->rpm (Chris)
v3: s/arb_is_in_play/arb_is_valid (Chris), move set-up to the new
init_hw function
v4: move interface defs to separate header, set arb_is valid to false
on fini (Rodrigo)
v5: handle async component binding
Signed-off-by: Huang, Sean Z <sean.z.huang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniele Ceraolo Spurio <daniele.ceraolospurio@intel.com>
Cc: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
Cc: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20210924191452.1539378-8-alan.previn.teres.alexis@intel.com
|
| /openbmc/linux/include/uapi/drm/ |
| H A D | i915_drm.h | cbbd3764 Fri Sep 24 14:14:42 CDT 2021 Huang, Sean Z <sean.z.huang@intel.com> drm/i915/pxp: Create the arbitrary session after boot
Create the arbitrary session, with the fixed session id 0xf, after
system boot, for the case that application allocates the protected
buffer without establishing any protection session. Because the
hardware requires at least one alive session for protected buffer
creation. This arbitrary session will need to be re-created after
teardown or power event because hardware encryption key won't be
valid after such cases.
The session ID is exposed as part of the uapi so it can be used as part
of userspace commands.
v2: use gt->uncore->rpm (Chris)
v3: s/arb_is_in_play/arb_is_valid (Chris), move set-up to the new
init_hw function
v4: move interface defs to separate header, set arb_is valid to false
on fini (Rodrigo)
v5: handle async component binding
Signed-off-by: Huang, Sean Z <sean.z.huang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniele Ceraolo Spurio <daniele.ceraolospurio@intel.com>
Cc: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
Cc: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20210924191452.1539378-8-alan.previn.teres.alexis@intel.com
|
| /openbmc/linux/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/ |
| H A D | Makefile | cbbd3764 Fri Sep 24 14:14:42 CDT 2021 Huang, Sean Z <sean.z.huang@intel.com> drm/i915/pxp: Create the arbitrary session after boot
Create the arbitrary session, with the fixed session id 0xf, after
system boot, for the case that application allocates the protected
buffer without establishing any protection session. Because the
hardware requires at least one alive session for protected buffer
creation. This arbitrary session will need to be re-created after
teardown or power event because hardware encryption key won't be
valid after such cases.
The session ID is exposed as part of the uapi so it can be used as part
of userspace commands.
v2: use gt->uncore->rpm (Chris)
v3: s/arb_is_in_play/arb_is_valid (Chris), move set-up to the new
init_hw function
v4: move interface defs to separate header, set arb_is valid to false
on fini (Rodrigo)
v5: handle async component binding
Signed-off-by: Huang, Sean Z <sean.z.huang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniele Ceraolo Spurio <daniele.ceraolospurio@intel.com>
Cc: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
Cc: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20210924191452.1539378-8-alan.previn.teres.alexis@intel.com
|