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H A Dbase.c35a35046 Mon Apr 07 17:38:36 CDT 2014 Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@opendz.org> procfs: make /proc/*/{stack,syscall,personality} 0400

These procfs files contain sensitive information and currently their
mode is 0444. Change this to 0400, so the VFS will be able to block
unprivileged processes from getting file descriptors on arbitrary
privileged /proc/*/{stack,syscall,personality} files.

This reduces the scope of ASLR leaking and bypasses by protecting already
running processes.

Signed-off-by: Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@opendz.org>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
35a35046 Mon Apr 07 17:38:36 CDT 2014 Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@opendz.org> procfs: make /proc/*/{stack,syscall,personality} 0400

These procfs files contain sensitive information and currently their
mode is 0444. Change this to 0400, so the VFS will be able to block
unprivileged processes from getting file descriptors on arbitrary
privileged /proc/*/{stack,syscall,personality} files.

This reduces the scope of ASLR leaking and bypasses by protecting already
running processes.

Signed-off-by: Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@opendz.org>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>