xref: /openbmc/linux/security/safesetid/lsm.c (revision 970ebb8a)
1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
2 /*
3  * SafeSetID Linux Security Module
4  *
5  * Author: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>
6  *
7  * Copyright (C) 2018 The Chromium OS Authors.
8  *
9  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
10  * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2, as
11  * published by the Free Software Foundation.
12  *
13  */
14 
15 #define pr_fmt(fmt) "SafeSetID: " fmt
16 
17 #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
18 #include <linux/module.h>
19 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
20 #include <linux/sched/task_stack.h>
21 #include <linux/security.h>
22 #include "lsm.h"
23 
24 /* Flag indicating whether initialization completed */
25 int safesetid_initialized __initdata;
26 
27 struct setid_ruleset __rcu *safesetid_setuid_rules;
28 struct setid_ruleset __rcu *safesetid_setgid_rules;
29 
30 
31 /* Compute a decision for a transition from @src to @dst under @policy. */
_setid_policy_lookup(struct setid_ruleset * policy,kid_t src,kid_t dst)32 enum sid_policy_type _setid_policy_lookup(struct setid_ruleset *policy,
33 		kid_t src, kid_t dst)
34 {
35 	struct setid_rule *rule;
36 	enum sid_policy_type result = SIDPOL_DEFAULT;
37 
38 	if (policy->type == UID) {
39 		hash_for_each_possible(policy->rules, rule, next, __kuid_val(src.uid)) {
40 			if (!uid_eq(rule->src_id.uid, src.uid))
41 				continue;
42 			if (uid_eq(rule->dst_id.uid, dst.uid))
43 				return SIDPOL_ALLOWED;
44 			result = SIDPOL_CONSTRAINED;
45 		}
46 	} else if (policy->type == GID) {
47 		hash_for_each_possible(policy->rules, rule, next, __kgid_val(src.gid)) {
48 			if (!gid_eq(rule->src_id.gid, src.gid))
49 				continue;
50 			if (gid_eq(rule->dst_id.gid, dst.gid)){
51 				return SIDPOL_ALLOWED;
52 			}
53 			result = SIDPOL_CONSTRAINED;
54 		}
55 	} else {
56 		/* Should not reach here, report the ID as contrainsted */
57 		result = SIDPOL_CONSTRAINED;
58 	}
59 	return result;
60 }
61 
62 /*
63  * Compute a decision for a transition from @src to @dst under the active
64  * policy.
65  */
setid_policy_lookup(kid_t src,kid_t dst,enum setid_type new_type)66 static enum sid_policy_type setid_policy_lookup(kid_t src, kid_t dst, enum setid_type new_type)
67 {
68 	enum sid_policy_type result = SIDPOL_DEFAULT;
69 	struct setid_ruleset *pol;
70 
71 	rcu_read_lock();
72 	if (new_type == UID)
73 		pol = rcu_dereference(safesetid_setuid_rules);
74 	else if (new_type == GID)
75 		pol = rcu_dereference(safesetid_setgid_rules);
76 	else { /* Should not reach here */
77 		result = SIDPOL_CONSTRAINED;
78 		rcu_read_unlock();
79 		return result;
80 	}
81 
82 	if (pol) {
83 		pol->type = new_type;
84 		result = _setid_policy_lookup(pol, src, dst);
85 	}
86 	rcu_read_unlock();
87 	return result;
88 }
89 
safesetid_security_capable(const struct cred * cred,struct user_namespace * ns,int cap,unsigned int opts)90 static int safesetid_security_capable(const struct cred *cred,
91 				      struct user_namespace *ns,
92 				      int cap,
93 				      unsigned int opts)
94 {
95 	/* We're only interested in CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID. */
96 	if (cap != CAP_SETUID && cap != CAP_SETGID)
97 		return 0;
98 
99 	/*
100 	 * If CAP_SET{U/G}ID is currently used for a setid or setgroups syscall, we
101 	 * want to let it go through here; the real security check happens later, in
102 	 * the task_fix_set{u/g}id or task_fix_setgroups hooks.
103 	 */
104 	if ((opts & CAP_OPT_INSETID) != 0)
105 		return 0;
106 
107 	switch (cap) {
108 	case CAP_SETUID:
109 		/*
110 		* If no policy applies to this task, allow the use of CAP_SETUID for
111 		* other purposes.
112 		*/
113 		if (setid_policy_lookup((kid_t){.uid = cred->uid}, INVALID_ID, UID) == SIDPOL_DEFAULT)
114 			return 0;
115 		/*
116 		 * Reject use of CAP_SETUID for functionality other than calling
117 		 * set*uid() (e.g. setting up userns uid mappings).
118 		 */
119 		pr_warn("Operation requires CAP_SETUID, which is not available to UID %u for operations besides approved set*uid transitions\n",
120 			__kuid_val(cred->uid));
121 		return -EPERM;
122 	case CAP_SETGID:
123 		/*
124 		* If no policy applies to this task, allow the use of CAP_SETGID for
125 		* other purposes.
126 		*/
127 		if (setid_policy_lookup((kid_t){.gid = cred->gid}, INVALID_ID, GID) == SIDPOL_DEFAULT)
128 			return 0;
129 		/*
130 		 * Reject use of CAP_SETUID for functionality other than calling
131 		 * set*gid() (e.g. setting up userns gid mappings).
132 		 */
133 		pr_warn("Operation requires CAP_SETGID, which is not available to GID %u for operations besides approved set*gid transitions\n",
134 			__kgid_val(cred->gid));
135 		return -EPERM;
136 	default:
137 		/* Error, the only capabilities were checking for is CAP_SETUID/GID */
138 		return 0;
139 	}
140 	return 0;
141 }
142 
143 /*
144  * Check whether a caller with old credentials @old is allowed to switch to
145  * credentials that contain @new_id.
146  */
id_permitted_for_cred(const struct cred * old,kid_t new_id,enum setid_type new_type)147 static bool id_permitted_for_cred(const struct cred *old, kid_t new_id, enum setid_type new_type)
148 {
149 	bool permitted;
150 
151 	/* If our old creds already had this ID in it, it's fine. */
152 	if (new_type == UID) {
153 		if (uid_eq(new_id.uid, old->uid) || uid_eq(new_id.uid, old->euid) ||
154 			uid_eq(new_id.uid, old->suid))
155 			return true;
156 	} else if (new_type == GID){
157 		if (gid_eq(new_id.gid, old->gid) || gid_eq(new_id.gid, old->egid) ||
158 			gid_eq(new_id.gid, old->sgid))
159 			return true;
160 	} else /* Error, new_type is an invalid type */
161 		return false;
162 
163 	/*
164 	 * Transitions to new UIDs require a check against the policy of the old
165 	 * RUID.
166 	 */
167 	permitted =
168 	    setid_policy_lookup((kid_t){.uid = old->uid}, new_id, new_type) != SIDPOL_CONSTRAINED;
169 
170 	if (!permitted) {
171 		if (new_type == UID) {
172 			pr_warn("UID transition ((%d,%d,%d) -> %d) blocked\n",
173 				__kuid_val(old->uid), __kuid_val(old->euid),
174 				__kuid_val(old->suid), __kuid_val(new_id.uid));
175 		} else if (new_type == GID) {
176 			pr_warn("GID transition ((%d,%d,%d) -> %d) blocked\n",
177 				__kgid_val(old->gid), __kgid_val(old->egid),
178 				__kgid_val(old->sgid), __kgid_val(new_id.gid));
179 		} else /* Error, new_type is an invalid type */
180 			return false;
181 	}
182 	return permitted;
183 }
184 
185 /*
186  * Check whether there is either an exception for user under old cred struct to
187  * set*uid to user under new cred struct, or the UID transition is allowed (by
188  * Linux set*uid rules) even without CAP_SETUID.
189  */
safesetid_task_fix_setuid(struct cred * new,const struct cred * old,int flags)190 static int safesetid_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new,
191 				     const struct cred *old,
192 				     int flags)
193 {
194 
195 	/* Do nothing if there are no setuid restrictions for our old RUID. */
196 	if (setid_policy_lookup((kid_t){.uid = old->uid}, INVALID_ID, UID) == SIDPOL_DEFAULT)
197 		return 0;
198 
199 	if (id_permitted_for_cred(old, (kid_t){.uid = new->uid}, UID) &&
200 	    id_permitted_for_cred(old, (kid_t){.uid = new->euid}, UID) &&
201 	    id_permitted_for_cred(old, (kid_t){.uid = new->suid}, UID) &&
202 	    id_permitted_for_cred(old, (kid_t){.uid = new->fsuid}, UID))
203 		return 0;
204 
205 	/*
206 	 * Kill this process to avoid potential security vulnerabilities
207 	 * that could arise from a missing allowlist entry preventing a
208 	 * privileged process from dropping to a lesser-privileged one.
209 	 */
210 	force_sig(SIGKILL);
211 	return -EACCES;
212 }
213 
safesetid_task_fix_setgid(struct cred * new,const struct cred * old,int flags)214 static int safesetid_task_fix_setgid(struct cred *new,
215 				     const struct cred *old,
216 				     int flags)
217 {
218 
219 	/* Do nothing if there are no setgid restrictions for our old RGID. */
220 	if (setid_policy_lookup((kid_t){.gid = old->gid}, INVALID_ID, GID) == SIDPOL_DEFAULT)
221 		return 0;
222 
223 	if (id_permitted_for_cred(old, (kid_t){.gid = new->gid}, GID) &&
224 	    id_permitted_for_cred(old, (kid_t){.gid = new->egid}, GID) &&
225 	    id_permitted_for_cred(old, (kid_t){.gid = new->sgid}, GID) &&
226 	    id_permitted_for_cred(old, (kid_t){.gid = new->fsgid}, GID))
227 		return 0;
228 
229 	/*
230 	 * Kill this process to avoid potential security vulnerabilities
231 	 * that could arise from a missing allowlist entry preventing a
232 	 * privileged process from dropping to a lesser-privileged one.
233 	 */
234 	force_sig(SIGKILL);
235 	return -EACCES;
236 }
237 
safesetid_task_fix_setgroups(struct cred * new,const struct cred * old)238 static int safesetid_task_fix_setgroups(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
239 {
240 	int i;
241 
242 	/* Do nothing if there are no setgid restrictions for our old RGID. */
243 	if (setid_policy_lookup((kid_t){.gid = old->gid}, INVALID_ID, GID) == SIDPOL_DEFAULT)
244 		return 0;
245 
246 	get_group_info(new->group_info);
247 	for (i = 0; i < new->group_info->ngroups; i++) {
248 		if (!id_permitted_for_cred(old, (kid_t){.gid = new->group_info->gid[i]}, GID)) {
249 			put_group_info(new->group_info);
250 			/*
251 			 * Kill this process to avoid potential security vulnerabilities
252 			 * that could arise from a missing allowlist entry preventing a
253 			 * privileged process from dropping to a lesser-privileged one.
254 			 */
255 			force_sig(SIGKILL);
256 			return -EACCES;
257 		}
258 	}
259 
260 	put_group_info(new->group_info);
261 	return 0;
262 }
263 
264 static struct security_hook_list safesetid_security_hooks[] = {
265 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_fix_setuid, safesetid_task_fix_setuid),
266 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_fix_setgid, safesetid_task_fix_setgid),
267 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_fix_setgroups, safesetid_task_fix_setgroups),
268 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, safesetid_security_capable)
269 };
270 
safesetid_security_init(void)271 static int __init safesetid_security_init(void)
272 {
273 	security_add_hooks(safesetid_security_hooks,
274 			   ARRAY_SIZE(safesetid_security_hooks), "safesetid");
275 
276 	/* Report that SafeSetID successfully initialized */
277 	safesetid_initialized = 1;
278 
279 	return 0;
280 }
281 
282 DEFINE_LSM(safesetid_security_init) = {
283 	.init = safesetid_security_init,
284 	.name = "safesetid",
285 };
286