// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only /* * linux/fs/exec.c * * Copyright (C) 1991, 1992 Linus Torvalds */ /* * #!-checking implemented by tytso. */ /* * Demand-loading implemented 01.12.91 - no need to read anything but * the header into memory. The inode of the executable is put into * "current->executable", and page faults do the actual loading. Clean. * * Once more I can proudly say that linux stood up to being changed: it * was less than 2 hours work to get demand-loading completely implemented. * * Demand loading changed July 1993 by Eric Youngdale. Use mmap instead, * current->executable is only used by the procfs. This allows a dispatch * table to check for several different types of binary formats. We keep * trying until we recognize the file or we run out of supported binary * formats. */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "internal.h" #include static int bprm_creds_from_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm); int suid_dumpable = 0; static LIST_HEAD(formats); static DEFINE_RWLOCK(binfmt_lock); void __register_binfmt(struct linux_binfmt * fmt, int insert) { write_lock(&binfmt_lock); insert ? list_add(&fmt->lh, &formats) : list_add_tail(&fmt->lh, &formats); write_unlock(&binfmt_lock); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(__register_binfmt); void unregister_binfmt(struct linux_binfmt * fmt) { write_lock(&binfmt_lock); list_del(&fmt->lh); write_unlock(&binfmt_lock); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(unregister_binfmt); static inline void put_binfmt(struct linux_binfmt * fmt) { module_put(fmt->module); } bool path_noexec(const struct path *path) { return (path->mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOEXEC) || (path->mnt->mnt_sb->s_iflags & SB_I_NOEXEC); } #ifdef CONFIG_USELIB /* * Note that a shared library must be both readable and executable due to * security reasons. * * Also note that we take the address to load from the file itself. */ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(uselib, const char __user *, library) { struct linux_binfmt *fmt; struct file *file; struct filename *tmp = getname(library); int error = PTR_ERR(tmp); static const struct open_flags uselib_flags = { .open_flag = O_LARGEFILE | O_RDONLY | __FMODE_EXEC, .acc_mode = MAY_READ | MAY_EXEC, .intent = LOOKUP_OPEN, .lookup_flags = LOOKUP_FOLLOW, }; if (IS_ERR(tmp)) goto out; file = do_filp_open(AT_FDCWD, tmp, &uselib_flags); putname(tmp); error = PTR_ERR(file); if (IS_ERR(file)) goto out; /* * may_open() has already checked for this, so it should be * impossible to trip now. But we need to be extra cautious * and check again at the very end too. */ error = -EACCES; if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!S_ISREG(file_inode(file)->i_mode) || path_noexec(&file->f_path))) goto exit; fsnotify_open(file); error = -ENOEXEC; read_lock(&binfmt_lock); list_for_each_entry(fmt, &formats, lh) { if (!fmt->load_shlib) continue; if (!try_module_get(fmt->module)) continue; read_unlock(&binfmt_lock); error = fmt->load_shlib(file); read_lock(&binfmt_lock); put_binfmt(fmt); if (error != -ENOEXEC) break; } read_unlock(&binfmt_lock); exit: fput(file); out: return error; } #endif /* #ifdef CONFIG_USELIB */ #ifdef CONFIG_MMU /* * The nascent bprm->mm is not visible until exec_mmap() but it can * use a lot of memory, account these pages in current->mm temporary * for oom_badness()->get_mm_rss(). Once exec succeeds or fails, we * change the counter back via acct_arg_size(0). */ static void acct_arg_size(struct linux_binprm *bprm, unsigned long pages) { struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm; long diff = (long)(pages - bprm->vma_pages); if (!mm || !diff) return; bprm->vma_pages = pages; add_mm_counter(mm, MM_ANONPAGES, diff); } static struct page *get_arg_page(struct linux_binprm *bprm, unsigned long pos, int write) { struct page *page; int ret; unsigned int gup_flags = 0; #ifdef CONFIG_STACK_GROWSUP if (write) { ret = expand_downwards(bprm->vma, pos); if (ret < 0) return NULL; } #endif if (write) gup_flags |= FOLL_WRITE; /* * We are doing an exec(). 'current' is the process * doing the exec and bprm->mm is the new process's mm. */ mmap_read_lock(bprm->mm); ret = get_user_pages_remote(bprm->mm, pos, 1, gup_flags, &page, NULL, NULL); mmap_read_unlock(bprm->mm); if (ret <= 0) return NULL; if (write) acct_arg_size(bprm, vma_pages(bprm->vma)); return page; } static void put_arg_page(struct page *page) { put_page(page); } static void free_arg_pages(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { } static void flush_arg_page(struct linux_binprm *bprm, unsigned long pos, struct page *page) { flush_cache_page(bprm->vma, pos, page_to_pfn(page)); } static int __bprm_mm_init(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { int err; struct vm_area_struct *vma = NULL; struct mm_struct *mm = bprm->mm; bprm->vma = vma = vm_area_alloc(mm); if (!vma) return -ENOMEM; vma_set_anonymous(vma); if (mmap_write_lock_killable(mm)) { err = -EINTR; goto err_free; } /* * Place the stack at the largest stack address the architecture * supports. Later, we'll move this to an appropriate place. We don't * use STACK_TOP because that can depend on attributes which aren't * configured yet. */ BUILD_BUG_ON(VM_STACK_FLAGS & VM_STACK_INCOMPLETE_SETUP); vma->vm_end = STACK_TOP_MAX; vma->vm_start = vma->vm_end - PAGE_SIZE; vm_flags_init(vma, VM_SOFTDIRTY | VM_STACK_FLAGS | VM_STACK_INCOMPLETE_SETUP); vma->vm_page_prot = vm_get_page_prot(vma->vm_flags); err = insert_vm_struct(mm, vma); if (err) goto err; mm->stack_vm = mm->total_vm = 1; mmap_write_unlock(mm); bprm->p = vma->vm_end - sizeof(void *); return 0; err: mmap_write_unlock(mm); err_free: bprm->vma = NULL; vm_area_free(vma); return err; } static bool valid_arg_len(struct linux_binprm *bprm, long len) { return len <= MAX_ARG_STRLEN; } #else static inline void acct_arg_size(struct linux_binprm *bprm, unsigned long pages) { } static struct page *get_arg_page(struct linux_binprm *bprm, unsigned long pos, int write) { struct page *page; page = bprm->page[pos / PAGE_SIZE]; if (!page && write) { page = alloc_page(GFP_HIGHUSER|__GFP_ZERO); if (!page) return NULL; bprm->page[pos / PAGE_SIZE] = page; } return page; } static void put_arg_page(struct page *page) { } static void free_arg_page(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int i) { if (bprm->page[i]) { __free_page(bprm->page[i]); bprm->page[i] = NULL; } } static void free_arg_pages(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { int i; for (i = 0; i < MAX_ARG_PAGES; i++) free_arg_page(bprm, i); } static void flush_arg_page(struct linux_binprm *bprm, unsigned long pos, struct page *page) { } static int __bprm_mm_init(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { bprm->p = PAGE_SIZE * MAX_ARG_PAGES - sizeof(void *); return 0; } static bool valid_arg_len(struct linux_binprm *bprm, long len) { return len <= bprm->p; } #endif /* CONFIG_MMU */ /* * Create a new mm_struct and populate it with a temporary stack * vm_area_struct. We don't have enough context at this point to set the stack * flags, permissions, and offset, so we use temporary values. We'll update * them later in setup_arg_pages(). */ static int bprm_mm_init(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { int err; struct mm_struct *mm = NULL; bprm->mm = mm = mm_alloc(); err = -ENOMEM; if (!mm) goto err; /* Save current stack limit for all calculations made during exec. */ task_lock(current->group_leader); bprm->rlim_stack = current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_STACK]; task_unlock(current->group_leader); err = __bprm_mm_init(bprm); if (err) goto err; return 0; err: if (mm) { bprm->mm = NULL; mmdrop(mm); } return err; } struct user_arg_ptr { #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT bool is_compat; #endif union { const char __user *const __user *native; #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT const compat_uptr_t __user *compat; #endif } ptr; }; static const char __user *get_user_arg_ptr(struct user_arg_ptr argv, int nr) { const char __user *native; #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT if (unlikely(argv.is_compat)) { compat_uptr_t compat; if (get_user(compat, argv.ptr.compat + nr)) return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT); return compat_ptr(compat); } #endif if (get_user(native, argv.ptr.native + nr)) return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT); return native; } /* * count() counts the number of strings in array ARGV. */ static int count(struct user_arg_ptr argv, int max) { int i = 0; if (argv.ptr.native != NULL) { for (;;) { const char __user *p = get_user_arg_ptr(argv, i); if (!p) break; if (IS_ERR(p)) return -EFAULT; if (i >= max) return -E2BIG; ++i; if (fatal_signal_pending(current)) return -ERESTARTNOHAND; cond_resched(); } } return i; } static int count_strings_kernel(const char *const *argv) { int i; if (!argv) return 0; for (i = 0; argv[i]; ++i) { if (i >= MAX_ARG_STRINGS) return -E2BIG; if (fatal_signal_pending(current)) return -ERESTARTNOHAND; cond_resched(); } return i; } static int bprm_stack_limits(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { unsigned long limit, ptr_size; /* * Limit to 1/4 of the max stack size or 3/4 of _STK_LIM * (whichever is smaller) for the argv+env strings. * This ensures that: * - the remaining binfmt code will not run out of stack space, * - the program will have a reasonable amount of stack left * to work from. */ limit = _STK_LIM / 4 * 3; limit = min(limit, bprm->rlim_stack.rlim_cur / 4); /* * We've historically supported up to 32 pages (ARG_MAX) * of argument strings even with small stacks */ limit = max_t(unsigned long, limit, ARG_MAX); /* * We must account for the size of all the argv and envp pointers to * the argv and envp strings, since they will also take up space in * the stack. They aren't stored until much later when we can't * signal to the parent that the child has run out of stack space. * Instead, calculate it here so it's possible to fail gracefully. * * In the case of argc = 0, make sure there is space for adding a * empty string (which will bump argc to 1), to ensure confused * userspace programs don't start processing from argv[1], thinking * argc can never be 0, to keep them from walking envp by accident. * See do_execveat_common(). */ ptr_size = (max(bprm->argc, 1) + bprm->envc) * sizeof(void *); if (limit <= ptr_size) return -E2BIG; limit -= ptr_size; bprm->argmin = bprm->p - limit; return 0; } /* * 'copy_strings()' copies argument/environment strings from the old * processes's memory to the new process's stack. The call to get_user_pages() * ensures the destination page is created and not swapped out. */ static int copy_strings(int argc, struct user_arg_ptr argv, struct linux_binprm *bprm) { struct page *kmapped_page = NULL; char *kaddr = NULL; unsigned long kpos = 0; int ret; while (argc-- > 0) { const char __user *str; int len; unsigned long pos; ret = -EFAULT; str = get_user_arg_ptr(argv, argc); if (IS_ERR(str)) goto out; len = strnlen_user(str, MAX_ARG_STRLEN); if (!len) goto out; ret = -E2BIG; if (!valid_arg_len(bprm, len)) goto out; /* We're going to work our way backwards. */ pos = bprm->p; str += len; bprm->p -= len; #ifdef CONFIG_MMU if (bprm->p < bprm->argmin) goto out; #endif while (len > 0) { int offset, bytes_to_copy; if (fatal_signal_pending(current)) { ret = -ERESTARTNOHAND; goto out; } cond_resched(); offset = pos % PAGE_SIZE; if (offset == 0) offset = PAGE_SIZE; bytes_to_copy = offset; if (bytes_to_copy > len) bytes_to_copy = len; offset -= bytes_to_copy; pos -= bytes_to_copy; str -= bytes_to_copy; len -= bytes_to_copy; if (!kmapped_page || kpos != (pos & PAGE_MASK)) { struct page *page; page = get_arg_page(bprm, pos, 1); if (!page) { ret = -E2BIG; goto out; } if (kmapped_page) { flush_dcache_page(kmapped_page); kunmap_local(kaddr); put_arg_page(kmapped_page); } kmapped_page = page; kaddr = kmap_local_page(kmapped_page); kpos = pos & PAGE_MASK; flush_arg_page(bprm, kpos, kmapped_page); } if (copy_from_user(kaddr+offset, str, bytes_to_copy)) { ret = -EFAULT; goto out; } } } ret = 0; out: if (kmapped_page) { flush_dcache_page(kmapped_page); kunmap_local(kaddr); put_arg_page(kmapped_page); } return ret; } /* * Copy and argument/environment string from the kernel to the processes stack. */ int copy_string_kernel(const char *arg, struct linux_binprm *bprm) { int len = strnlen(arg, MAX_ARG_STRLEN) + 1 /* terminating NUL */; unsigned long pos = bprm->p; if (len == 0) return -EFAULT; if (!valid_arg_len(bprm, len)) return -E2BIG; /* We're going to work our way backwards. */ arg += len; bprm->p -= len; if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MMU) && bprm->p < bprm->argmin) return -E2BIG; while (len > 0) { unsigned int bytes_to_copy = min_t(unsigned int, len, min_not_zero(offset_in_page(pos), PAGE_SIZE)); struct page *page; pos -= bytes_to_copy; arg -= bytes_to_copy; len -= bytes_to_copy; page = get_arg_page(bprm, pos, 1); if (!page) return -E2BIG; flush_arg_page(bprm, pos & PAGE_MASK, page); memcpy_to_page(page, offset_in_page(pos), arg, bytes_to_copy); put_arg_page(page); } return 0; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(copy_string_kernel); static int copy_strings_kernel(int argc, const char *const *argv, struct linux_binprm *bprm) { while (argc-- > 0) { int ret = copy_string_kernel(argv[argc], bprm); if (ret < 0) return ret; if (fatal_signal_pending(current)) return -ERESTARTNOHAND; cond_resched(); } return 0; } #ifdef CONFIG_MMU /* * During bprm_mm_init(), we create a temporary stack at STACK_TOP_MAX. Once * the binfmt code determines where the new stack should reside, we shift it to * its final location. The process proceeds as follows: * * 1) Use shift to calculate the new vma endpoints. * 2) Extend vma to cover both the old and new ranges. This ensures the * arguments passed to subsequent functions are consistent. * 3) Move vma's page tables to the new range. * 4) Free up any cleared pgd range. * 5) Shrink the vma to cover only the new range. */ static int shift_arg_pages(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long shift) { struct mm_struct *mm = vma->vm_mm; unsigned long old_start = vma->vm_start; unsigned long old_end = vma->vm_end; unsigned long length = old_end - old_start; unsigned long new_start = old_start - shift; unsigned long new_end = old_end - shift; VMA_ITERATOR(vmi, mm, new_start); struct vm_area_struct *next; struct mmu_gather tlb; BUG_ON(new_start > new_end); /* * ensure there are no vmas between where we want to go * and where we are */ if (vma != vma_next(&vmi)) return -EFAULT; /* * cover the whole range: [new_start, old_end) */ if (vma_expand(&vmi, vma, new_start, old_end, vma->vm_pgoff, NULL)) return -ENOMEM; /* * move the page tables downwards, on failure we rely on * process cleanup to remove whatever mess we made. */ if (length != move_page_tables(vma, old_start, vma, new_start, length, false)) return -ENOMEM; lru_add_drain(); tlb_gather_mmu(&tlb, mm); next = vma_next(&vmi); if (new_end > old_start) { /* * when the old and new regions overlap clear from new_end. */ free_pgd_range(&tlb, new_end, old_end, new_end, next ? next->vm_start : USER_PGTABLES_CEILING); } else { /* * otherwise, clean from old_start; this is done to not touch * the address space in [new_end, old_start) some architectures * have constraints on va-space that make this illegal (IA64) - * for the others its just a little faster. */ free_pgd_range(&tlb, old_start, old_end, new_end, next ? next->vm_start : USER_PGTABLES_CEILING); } tlb_finish_mmu(&tlb); vma_prev(&vmi); /* Shrink the vma to just the new range */ return vma_shrink(&vmi, vma, new_start, new_end, vma->vm_pgoff); } /* * Finalizes the stack vm_area_struct. The flags and permissions are updated, * the stack is optionally relocated, and some extra space is added. */ int setup_arg_pages(struct linux_binprm *bprm, unsigned long stack_top, int executable_stack) { unsigned long ret; unsigned long stack_shift; struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm; struct vm_area_struct *vma = bprm->vma; struct vm_area_struct *prev = NULL; unsigned long vm_flags; unsigned long stack_base; unsigned long stack_size; unsigned long stack_expand; unsigned long rlim_stack; struct mmu_gather tlb; struct vma_iterator vmi; #ifdef CONFIG_STACK_GROWSUP /* Limit stack size */ stack_base = bprm->rlim_stack.rlim_max; stack_base = calc_max_stack_size(stack_base); /* Add space for stack randomization. */ stack_base += (STACK_RND_MASK << PAGE_SHIFT); /* Make sure we didn't let the argument array grow too large. */ if (vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start > stack_base) return -ENOMEM; stack_base = PAGE_ALIGN(stack_top - stack_base); stack_shift = vma->vm_start - stack_base; mm->arg_start = bprm->p - stack_shift; bprm->p = vma->vm_end - stack_shift; #else stack_top = arch_align_stack(stack_top); stack_top = PAGE_ALIGN(stack_top); if (unlikely(stack_top < mmap_min_addr) || unlikely(vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start >= stack_top - mmap_min_addr)) return -ENOMEM; stack_shift = vma->vm_end - stack_top; bprm->p -= stack_shift; mm->arg_start = bprm->p; #endif if (bprm->loader) bprm->loader -= stack_shift; bprm->exec -= stack_shift; if (mmap_write_lock_killable(mm)) return -EINTR; vm_flags = VM_STACK_FLAGS; /* * Adjust stack execute permissions; explicitly enable for * EXSTACK_ENABLE_X, disable for EXSTACK_DISABLE_X and leave alone * (arch default) otherwise. */ if (unlikely(executable_stack == EXSTACK_ENABLE_X)) vm_flags |= VM_EXEC; else if (executable_stack == EXSTACK_DISABLE_X) vm_flags &= ~VM_EXEC; vm_flags |= mm->def_flags; vm_flags |= VM_STACK_INCOMPLETE_SETUP; vma_iter_init(&vmi, mm, vma->vm_start); tlb_gather_mmu(&tlb, mm); ret = mprotect_fixup(&vmi, &tlb, vma, &prev, vma->vm_start, vma->vm_end, vm_flags); tlb_finish_mmu(&tlb); if (ret) goto out_unlock; BUG_ON(prev != vma); if (unlikely(vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) { pr_warn_once("process '%pD4' started with executable stack\n", bprm->file); } /* Move stack pages down in memory. */ if (stack_shift) { ret = shift_arg_pages(vma, stack_shift); if (ret) goto out_unlock; } /* mprotect_fixup is overkill to remove the temporary stack flags */ vm_flags_clear(vma, VM_STACK_INCOMPLETE_SETUP); stack_expand = 131072UL; /* randomly 32*4k (or 2*64k) pages */ stack_size = vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start; /* * Align this down to a page boundary as expand_stack * will align it up. */ rlim_stack = bprm->rlim_stack.rlim_cur & PAGE_MASK; stack_expand = min(rlim_stack, stack_size + stack_expand); #ifdef CONFIG_STACK_GROWSUP stack_base = vma->vm_start + stack_expand; #else stack_base = vma->vm_end - stack_expand; #endif current->mm->start_stack = bprm->p; ret = expand_stack(vma, stack_base); if (ret) ret = -EFAULT; out_unlock: mmap_write_unlock(mm); return ret; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(setup_arg_pages); #else /* * Transfer the program arguments and environment from the holding pages * onto the stack. The provided stack pointer is adjusted accordingly. */ int transfer_args_to_stack(struct linux_binprm *bprm, unsigned long *sp_location) { unsigned long index, stop, sp; int ret = 0; stop = bprm->p >> PAGE_SHIFT; sp = *sp_location; for (index = MAX_ARG_PAGES - 1; index >= stop; index--) { unsigned int offset = index == stop ? bprm->p & ~PAGE_MASK : 0; char *src = kmap_local_page(bprm->page[index]) + offset; sp -= PAGE_SIZE - offset; if (copy_to_user((void *) sp, src, PAGE_SIZE - offset) != 0) ret = -EFAULT; kunmap_local(src); if (ret) goto out; } *sp_location = sp; out: return ret; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(transfer_args_to_stack); #endif /* CONFIG_MMU */ static struct file *do_open_execat(int fd, struct filename *name, int flags) { struct file *file; int err; struct open_flags open_exec_flags = { .open_flag = O_LARGEFILE | O_RDONLY | __FMODE_EXEC, .acc_mode = MAY_EXEC, .intent = LOOKUP_OPEN, .lookup_flags = LOOKUP_FOLLOW, }; if ((flags & ~(AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW | AT_EMPTY_PATH)) != 0) return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); if (flags & AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) open_exec_flags.lookup_flags &= ~LOOKUP_FOLLOW; if (flags & AT_EMPTY_PATH) open_exec_flags.lookup_flags |= LOOKUP_EMPTY; file = do_filp_open(fd, name, &open_exec_flags); if (IS_ERR(file)) goto out; /* * may_open() has already checked for this, so it should be * impossible to trip now. But we need to be extra cautious * and check again at the very end too. */ err = -EACCES; if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!S_ISREG(file_inode(file)->i_mode) || path_noexec(&file->f_path))) goto exit; err = deny_write_access(file); if (err) goto exit; if (name->name[0] != '\0') fsnotify_open(file); out: return file; exit: fput(file); return ERR_PTR(err); } struct file *open_exec(const char *name) { struct filename *filename = getname_kernel(name); struct file *f = ERR_CAST(filename); if (!IS_ERR(filename)) { f = do_open_execat(AT_FDCWD, filename, 0); putname(filename); } return f; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(open_exec); #if defined(CONFIG_BINFMT_FLAT) || defined(CONFIG_BINFMT_ELF_FDPIC) ssize_t read_code(struct file *file, unsigned long addr, loff_t pos, size_t len) { ssize_t res = vfs_read(file, (void __user *)addr, len, &pos); if (res > 0) flush_icache_user_range(addr, addr + len); return res; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(read_code); #endif /* * Maps the mm_struct mm into the current task struct. * On success, this function returns with exec_update_lock * held for writing. */ static int exec_mmap(struct mm_struct *mm) { struct task_struct *tsk; struct mm_struct *old_mm, *active_mm; int ret; /* Notify parent that we're no longer interested in the old VM */ tsk = current; old_mm = current->mm; exec_mm_release(tsk, old_mm); if (old_mm) sync_mm_rss(old_mm); ret = down_write_killable(&tsk->signal->exec_update_lock); if (ret) return ret; if (old_mm) { /* * If there is a pending fatal signal perhaps a signal * whose default action is to create a coredump get * out and die instead of going through with the exec. */ ret = mmap_read_lock_killable(old_mm); if (ret) { up_write(&tsk->signal->exec_update_lock); return ret; } } task_lock(tsk); membarrier_exec_mmap(mm); local_irq_disable(); active_mm = tsk->active_mm; tsk->active_mm = mm; tsk->mm = mm; mm_init_cid(mm); /* * This prevents preemption while active_mm is being loaded and * it and mm are being updated, which could cause problems for * lazy tlb mm refcounting when these are updated by context * switches. Not all architectures can handle irqs off over * activate_mm yet. */ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARCH_WANT_IRQS_OFF_ACTIVATE_MM)) local_irq_enable(); activate_mm(active_mm, mm); if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARCH_WANT_IRQS_OFF_ACTIVATE_MM)) local_irq_enable(); lru_gen_add_mm(mm); task_unlock(tsk); lru_gen_use_mm(mm); if (old_mm) { mmap_read_unlock(old_mm); BUG_ON(active_mm != old_mm); setmax_mm_hiwater_rss(&tsk->signal->maxrss, old_mm); mm_update_next_owner(old_mm); mmput(old_mm); return 0; } mmdrop(active_mm); return 0; } static int de_thread(struct task_struct *tsk) { struct signal_struct *sig = tsk->signal; struct sighand_struct *oldsighand = tsk->sighand; spinlock_t *lock = &oldsighand->siglock; if (thread_group_empty(tsk)) goto no_thread_group; /* * Kill all other threads in the thread group. */ spin_lock_irq(lock); if ((sig->flags & SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT) || sig->group_exec_task) { /* * Another group action in progress, just * return so that the signal is processed. */ spin_unlock_irq(lock); return -EAGAIN; } sig->group_exec_task = tsk; sig->notify_count = zap_other_threads(tsk); if (!thread_group_leader(tsk)) sig->notify_count--; while (sig->notify_count) { __set_current_state(TASK_KILLABLE); spin_unlock_irq(lock); schedule(); if (__fatal_signal_pending(tsk)) goto killed; spin_lock_irq(lock); } spin_unlock_irq(lock); /* * At this point all other threads have exited, all we have to * do is to wait for the thread group leader to become inactive, * and to assume its PID: */ if (!thread_group_leader(tsk)) { struct task_struct *leader = tsk->group_leader; for (;;) { cgroup_threadgroup_change_begin(tsk); write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock); /* * Do this under tasklist_lock to ensure that * exit_notify() can't miss ->group_exec_task */ sig->notify_count = -1; if (likely(leader->exit_state)) break; __set_current_state(TASK_KILLABLE); write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock); cgroup_threadgroup_change_end(tsk); schedule(); if (__fatal_signal_pending(tsk)) goto killed; } /* * The only record we have of the real-time age of a * process, regardless of execs it's done, is start_time. * All the past CPU time is accumulated in signal_struct * from sister threads now dead. But in this non-leader * exec, nothing survives from the original leader thread, * whose birth marks the true age of this process now. * When we take on its identity by switching to its PID, we * also take its birthdate (always earlier than our own). */ tsk->start_time = leader->start_time; tsk->start_boottime = leader->start_boottime; BUG_ON(!same_thread_group(leader, tsk)); /* * An exec() starts a new thread group with the * TGID of the previous thread group. Rehash the * two threads with a switched PID, and release * the former thread group leader: */ /* Become a process group leader with the old leader's pid. * The old leader becomes a thread of the this thread group. */ exchange_tids(tsk, leader); transfer_pid(leader, tsk, PIDTYPE_TGID); transfer_pid(leader, tsk, PIDTYPE_PGID); transfer_pid(leader, tsk, PIDTYPE_SID); list_replace_rcu(&leader->tasks, &tsk->tasks); list_replace_init(&leader->sibling, &tsk->sibling); tsk->group_leader = tsk; leader->group_leader = tsk; tsk->exit_signal = SIGCHLD; leader->exit_signal = -1; BUG_ON(leader->exit_state != EXIT_ZOMBIE); leader->exit_state = EXIT_DEAD; /* * We are going to release_task()->ptrace_unlink() silently, * the tracer can sleep in do_wait(). EXIT_DEAD guarantees * the tracer won't block again waiting for this thread. */ if (unlikely(leader->ptrace)) __wake_up_parent(leader, leader->parent); write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock); cgroup_threadgroup_change_end(tsk); release_task(leader); } sig->group_exec_task = NULL; sig->notify_count = 0; no_thread_group: /* we have changed execution domain */ tsk->exit_signal = SIGCHLD; BUG_ON(!thread_group_leader(tsk)); return 0; killed: /* protects against exit_notify() and __exit_signal() */ read_lock(&tasklist_lock); sig->group_exec_task = NULL; sig->notify_count = 0; read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); return -EAGAIN; } /* * This function makes sure the current process has its own signal table, * so that flush_signal_handlers can later reset the handlers without * disturbing other processes. (Other processes might share the signal * table via the CLONE_SIGHAND option to clone().) */ static int unshare_sighand(struct task_struct *me) { struct sighand_struct *oldsighand = me->sighand; if (refcount_read(&oldsighand->count) != 1) { struct sighand_struct *newsighand; /* * This ->sighand is shared with the CLONE_SIGHAND * but not CLONE_THREAD task, switch to the new one. */ newsighand = kmem_cache_alloc(sighand_cachep, GFP_KERNEL); if (!newsighand) return -ENOMEM; refcount_set(&newsighand->count, 1); write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock); spin_lock(&oldsighand->siglock); memcpy(newsighand->action, oldsighand->action, sizeof(newsighand->action)); rcu_assign_pointer(me->sighand, newsighand); spin_unlock(&oldsighand->siglock); write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock); __cleanup_sighand(oldsighand); } return 0; } char *__get_task_comm(char *buf, size_t buf_size, struct task_struct *tsk) { task_lock(tsk); /* Always NUL terminated and zero-padded */ strscpy_pad(buf, tsk->comm, buf_size); task_unlock(tsk); return buf; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__get_task_comm); /* * These functions flushes out all traces of the currently running executable * so that a new one can be started */ void __set_task_comm(struct task_struct *tsk, const char *buf, bool exec) { task_lock(tsk); trace_task_rename(tsk, buf); strscpy_pad(tsk->comm, buf, sizeof(tsk->comm)); task_unlock(tsk); perf_event_comm(tsk, exec); } /* * Calling this is the point of no return. None of the failures will be * seen by userspace since either the process is already taking a fatal * signal (via de_thread() or coredump), or will have SEGV raised * (after exec_mmap()) by search_binary_handler (see below). */ int begin_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm) { struct task_struct *me = current; int retval; /* Once we are committed compute the creds */ retval = bprm_creds_from_file(bprm); if (retval) return retval; /* * Ensure all future errors are fatal. */ bprm->point_of_no_return = true; /* * Make this the only thread in the thread group. */ retval = de_thread(me); if (retval) goto out; /* * Cancel any io_uring activity across execve */ io_uring_task_cancel(); /* Ensure the files table is not shared. */ retval = unshare_files(); if (retval) goto out; /* * Must be called _before_ exec_mmap() as bprm->mm is * not visible until then. This also enables the update * to be lockless. */ retval = set_mm_exe_file(bprm->mm, bprm->file); if (retval) goto out; /* If the binary is not readable then enforce mm->dumpable=0 */ would_dump(bprm, bprm->file); if (bprm->have_execfd) would_dump(bprm, bprm->executable); /* * Release all of the old mmap stuff */ acct_arg_size(bprm, 0); retval = exec_mmap(bprm->mm); if (retval) goto out; bprm->mm = NULL; retval = exec_task_namespaces(); if (retval) goto out_unlock; #ifdef CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS spin_lock_irq(&me->sighand->siglock); posix_cpu_timers_exit(me); spin_unlock_irq(&me->sighand->siglock); exit_itimers(me); flush_itimer_signals(); #endif /* * Make the signal table private. */ retval = unshare_sighand(me); if (retval) goto out_unlock; me->flags &= ~(PF_RANDOMIZE | PF_FORKNOEXEC | PF_NOFREEZE | PF_NO_SETAFFINITY); flush_thread(); me->personality &= ~bprm->per_clear; clear_syscall_work_syscall_user_dispatch(me); /* * We have to apply CLOEXEC before we change whether the process is * dumpable (in setup_new_exec) to avoid a race with a process in userspace * trying to access the should-be-closed file descriptors of a process * undergoing exec(2). */ do_close_on_exec(me->files); if (bprm->secureexec) { /* Make sure parent cannot signal privileged process. */ me->pdeath_signal = 0; /* * For secureexec, reset the stack limit to sane default to * avoid bad behavior from the prior rlimits. This has to * happen before arch_pick_mmap_layout(), which examines * RLIMIT_STACK, but after the point of no return to avoid * needing to clean up the change on failure. */ if (bprm->rlim_stack.rlim_cur > _STK_LIM) bprm->rlim_stack.rlim_cur = _STK_LIM; } me->sas_ss_sp = me->sas_ss_size = 0; /* * Figure out dumpability. Note that this checking only of current * is wrong, but userspace depends on it. This should be testing * bprm->secureexec instead. */ if (bprm->interp_flags & BINPRM_FLAGS_ENFORCE_NONDUMP || !(uid_eq(current_euid(), current_uid()) && gid_eq(current_egid(), current_gid()))) set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable); else set_dumpable(current->mm, SUID_DUMP_USER); perf_event_exec(); __set_task_comm(me, kbasename(bprm->filename), true); /* An exec changes our domain. We are no longer part of the thread group */ WRITE_ONCE(me->self_exec_id, me->self_exec_id + 1); flush_signal_handlers(me, 0); retval = set_cred_ucounts(bprm->cred); if (retval < 0) goto out_unlock; /* * install the new credentials for this executable */ security_bprm_committing_creds(bprm); commit_creds(bprm->cred); bprm->cred = NULL; /* * Disable monitoring for regular users * when executing setuid binaries. Must * wait until new credentials are committed * by commit_creds() above */ if (get_dumpable(me->mm) != SUID_DUMP_USER) perf_event_exit_task(me); /* * cred_guard_mutex must be held at least to this point to prevent * ptrace_attach() from altering our determination of the task's * credentials; any time after this it may be unlocked. */ security_bprm_committed_creds(bprm); /* Pass the opened binary to the interpreter. */ if (bprm->have_execfd) { retval = get_unused_fd_flags(0); if (retval < 0) goto out_unlock; fd_install(retval, bprm->executable); bprm->executable = NULL; bprm->execfd = retval; } return 0; out_unlock: up_write(&me->signal->exec_update_lock); out: return retval; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(begin_new_exec); void would_dump(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct file *file) { struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); struct mnt_idmap *idmap = file_mnt_idmap(file); if (inode_permission(idmap, inode, MAY_READ) < 0) { struct user_namespace *old, *user_ns; bprm->interp_flags |= BINPRM_FLAGS_ENFORCE_NONDUMP; /* Ensure mm->user_ns contains the executable */ user_ns = old = bprm->mm->user_ns; while ((user_ns != &init_user_ns) && !privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid(user_ns, idmap, inode)) user_ns = user_ns->parent; if (old != user_ns) { bprm->mm->user_ns = get_user_ns(user_ns); put_user_ns(old); } } } EXPORT_SYMBOL(would_dump); void setup_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm) { /* Setup things that can depend upon the personality */ struct task_struct *me = current; arch_pick_mmap_layout(me->mm, &bprm->rlim_stack); arch_setup_new_exec(); /* Set the new mm task size. We have to do that late because it may * depend on TIF_32BIT which is only updated in flush_thread() on * some architectures like powerpc */ me->mm->task_size = TASK_SIZE; up_write(&me->signal->exec_update_lock); mutex_unlock(&me->signal->cred_guard_mutex); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(setup_new_exec); /* Runs immediately before start_thread() takes over. */ void finalize_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { /* Store any stack rlimit changes before starting thread. */ task_lock(current->group_leader); current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_STACK] = bprm->rlim_stack; task_unlock(current->group_leader); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(finalize_exec); /* * Prepare credentials and lock ->cred_guard_mutex. * setup_new_exec() commits the new creds and drops the lock. * Or, if exec fails before, free_bprm() should release ->cred * and unlock. */ static int prepare_bprm_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { if (mutex_lock_interruptible(¤t->signal->cred_guard_mutex)) return -ERESTARTNOINTR; bprm->cred = prepare_exec_creds(); if (likely(bprm->cred)) return 0; mutex_unlock(¤t->signal->cred_guard_mutex); return -ENOMEM; } static void free_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { if (bprm->mm) { acct_arg_size(bprm, 0); mmput(bprm->mm); } free_arg_pages(bprm); if (bprm->cred) { mutex_unlock(¤t->signal->cred_guard_mutex); abort_creds(bprm->cred); } if (bprm->file) { allow_write_access(bprm->file); fput(bprm->file); } if (bprm->executable) fput(bprm->executable); /* If a binfmt changed the interp, free it. */ if (bprm->interp != bprm->filename) kfree(bprm->interp); kfree(bprm->fdpath); kfree(bprm); } static struct linux_binprm *alloc_bprm(int fd, struct filename *filename) { struct linux_binprm *bprm = kzalloc(sizeof(*bprm), GFP_KERNEL); int retval = -ENOMEM; if (!bprm) goto out; if (fd == AT_FDCWD || filename->name[0] == '/') { bprm->filename = filename->name; } else { if (filename->name[0] == '\0') bprm->fdpath = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "/dev/fd/%d", fd); else bprm->fdpath = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "/dev/fd/%d/%s", fd, filename->name); if (!bprm->fdpath) goto out_free; bprm->filename = bprm->fdpath; } bprm->interp = bprm->filename; retval = bprm_mm_init(bprm); if (retval) goto out_free; return bprm; out_free: free_bprm(bprm); out: return ERR_PTR(retval); } int bprm_change_interp(const char *interp, struct linux_binprm *bprm) { /* If a binfmt changed the interp, free it first. */ if (bprm->interp != bprm->filename) kfree(bprm->interp); bprm->interp = kstrdup(interp, GFP_KERNEL); if (!bprm->interp) return -ENOMEM; return 0; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(bprm_change_interp); /* * determine how safe it is to execute the proposed program * - the caller must hold ->cred_guard_mutex to protect against * PTRACE_ATTACH or seccomp thread-sync */ static void check_unsafe_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { struct task_struct *p = current, *t; unsigned n_fs; if (p->ptrace) bprm->unsafe |= LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE; /* * This isn't strictly necessary, but it makes it harder for LSMs to * mess up. */ if (task_no_new_privs(current)) bprm->unsafe |= LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS; /* * If another task is sharing our fs, we cannot safely * suid exec because the differently privileged task * will be able to manipulate the current directory, etc. * It would be nice to force an unshare instead... */ t = p; n_fs = 1; spin_lock(&p->fs->lock); rcu_read_lock(); while_each_thread(p, t) { if (t->fs == p->fs) n_fs++; } rcu_read_unlock(); if (p->fs->users > n_fs) bprm->unsafe |= LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE; else p->fs->in_exec = 1; spin_unlock(&p->fs->lock); } static void bprm_fill_uid(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct file *file) { /* Handle suid and sgid on files */ struct mnt_idmap *idmap; struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); unsigned int mode; vfsuid_t vfsuid; vfsgid_t vfsgid; if (!mnt_may_suid(file->f_path.mnt)) return; if (task_no_new_privs(current)) return; mode = READ_ONCE(inode->i_mode); if (!(mode & (S_ISUID|S_ISGID))) return; idmap = file_mnt_idmap(file); /* Be careful if suid/sgid is set */ inode_lock(inode); /* reload atomically mode/uid/gid now that lock held */ mode = inode->i_mode; vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(idmap, inode); vfsgid = i_gid_into_vfsgid(idmap, inode); inode_unlock(inode); /* We ignore suid/sgid if there are no mappings for them in the ns */ if (!vfsuid_has_mapping(bprm->cred->user_ns, vfsuid) || !vfsgid_has_mapping(bprm->cred->user_ns, vfsgid)) return; if (mode & S_ISUID) { bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID; bprm->cred->euid = vfsuid_into_kuid(vfsuid); } if ((mode & (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) == (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) { bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID; bprm->cred->egid = vfsgid_into_kgid(vfsgid); } } /* * Compute brpm->cred based upon the final binary. */ static int bprm_creds_from_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { /* Compute creds based on which file? */ struct file *file = bprm->execfd_creds ? bprm->executable : bprm->file; bprm_fill_uid(bprm, file); return security_bprm_creds_from_file(bprm, file); } /* * Fill the binprm structure from the inode. * Read the first BINPRM_BUF_SIZE bytes * * This may be called multiple times for binary chains (scripts for example). */ static int prepare_binprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { loff_t pos = 0; memset(bprm->buf, 0, BINPRM_BUF_SIZE); return kernel_read(bprm->file, bprm->buf, BINPRM_BUF_SIZE, &pos); } /* * Arguments are '\0' separated strings found at the location bprm->p * points to; chop off the first by relocating brpm->p to right after * the first '\0' encountered. */ int remove_arg_zero(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { int ret = 0; unsigned long offset; char *kaddr; struct page *page; if (!bprm->argc) return 0; do { offset = bprm->p & ~PAGE_MASK; page = get_arg_page(bprm, bprm->p, 0); if (!page) { ret = -EFAULT; goto out; } kaddr = kmap_local_page(page); for (; offset < PAGE_SIZE && kaddr[offset]; offset++, bprm->p++) ; kunmap_local(kaddr); put_arg_page(page); } while (offset == PAGE_SIZE); bprm->p++; bprm->argc--; ret = 0; out: return ret; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(remove_arg_zero); #define printable(c) (((c)=='\t') || ((c)=='\n') || (0x20<=(c) && (c)<=0x7e)) /* * cycle the list of binary formats handler, until one recognizes the image */ static int search_binary_handler(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { bool need_retry = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MODULES); struct linux_binfmt *fmt; int retval; retval = prepare_binprm(bprm); if (retval < 0) return retval; retval = security_bprm_check(bprm); if (retval) return retval; retval = -ENOENT; retry: read_lock(&binfmt_lock); list_for_each_entry(fmt, &formats, lh) { if (!try_module_get(fmt->module)) continue; read_unlock(&binfmt_lock); retval = fmt->load_binary(bprm); read_lock(&binfmt_lock); put_binfmt(fmt); if (bprm->point_of_no_return || (retval != -ENOEXEC)) { read_unlock(&binfmt_lock); return retval; } } read_unlock(&binfmt_lock); if (need_retry) { if (printable(bprm->buf[0]) && printable(bprm->buf[1]) && printable(bprm->buf[2]) && printable(bprm->buf[3])) return retval; if (request_module("binfmt-%04x", *(ushort *)(bprm->buf + 2)) < 0) return retval; need_retry = false; goto retry; } return retval; } /* binfmt handlers will call back into begin_new_exec() on success. */ static int exec_binprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { pid_t old_pid, old_vpid; int ret, depth; /* Need to fetch pid before load_binary changes it */ old_pid = current->pid; rcu_read_lock(); old_vpid = task_pid_nr_ns(current, task_active_pid_ns(current->parent)); rcu_read_unlock(); /* This allows 4 levels of binfmt rewrites before failing hard. */ for (depth = 0;; depth++) { struct file *exec; if (depth > 5) return -ELOOP; ret = search_binary_handler(bprm); if (ret < 0) return ret; if (!bprm->interpreter) break; exec = bprm->file; bprm->file = bprm->interpreter; bprm->interpreter = NULL; allow_write_access(exec); if (unlikely(bprm->have_execfd)) { if (bprm->executable) { fput(exec); return -ENOEXEC; } bprm->executable = exec; } else fput(exec); } audit_bprm(bprm); trace_sched_process_exec(current, old_pid, bprm); ptrace_event(PTRACE_EVENT_EXEC, old_vpid); proc_exec_connector(current); return 0; } /* * sys_execve() executes a new program. */ static int bprm_execve(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int fd, struct filename *filename, int flags) { struct file *file; int retval; retval = prepare_bprm_creds(bprm); if (retval) return retval; /* * Check for unsafe execution states before exec_binprm(), which * will call back into begin_new_exec(), into bprm_creds_from_file(), * where setuid-ness is evaluated. */ check_unsafe_exec(bprm); current->in_execve = 1; sched_mm_cid_before_execve(current); file = do_open_execat(fd, filename, flags); retval = PTR_ERR(file); if (IS_ERR(file)) goto out_unmark; sched_exec(); bprm->file = file; /* * Record that a name derived from an O_CLOEXEC fd will be * inaccessible after exec. This allows the code in exec to * choose to fail when the executable is not mmaped into the * interpreter and an open file descriptor is not passed to * the interpreter. This makes for a better user experience * than having the interpreter start and then immediately fail * when it finds the executable is inaccessible. */ if (bprm->fdpath && get_close_on_exec(fd)) bprm->interp_flags |= BINPRM_FLAGS_PATH_INACCESSIBLE; /* Set the unchanging part of bprm->cred */ retval = security_bprm_creds_for_exec(bprm); if (retval) goto out; retval = exec_binprm(bprm); if (retval < 0) goto out; sched_mm_cid_after_execve(current); /* execve succeeded */ current->fs->in_exec = 0; current->in_execve = 0; rseq_execve(current); user_events_execve(current); acct_update_integrals(current); task_numa_free(current, false); return retval; out: /* * If past the point of no return ensure the code never * returns to the userspace process. Use an existing fatal * signal if present otherwise terminate the process with * SIGSEGV. */ if (bprm->point_of_no_return && !fatal_signal_pending(current)) force_fatal_sig(SIGSEGV); out_unmark: sched_mm_cid_after_execve(current); current->fs->in_exec = 0; current->in_execve = 0; return retval; } static int do_execveat_common(int fd, struct filename *filename, struct user_arg_ptr argv, struct user_arg_ptr envp, int flags) { struct linux_binprm *bprm; int retval; if (IS_ERR(filename)) return PTR_ERR(filename); /* * We move the actual failure in case of RLIMIT_NPROC excess from * set*uid() to execve() because too many poorly written programs * don't check setuid() return code. Here we additionally recheck * whether NPROC limit is still exceeded. */ if ((current->flags & PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED) && is_rlimit_overlimit(current_ucounts(), UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC, rlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC))) { retval = -EAGAIN; goto out_ret; } /* We're below the limit (still or again), so we don't want to make * further execve() calls fail. */ current->flags &= ~PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED; bprm = alloc_bprm(fd, filename); if (IS_ERR(bprm)) { retval = PTR_ERR(bprm); goto out_ret; } retval = count(argv, MAX_ARG_STRINGS); if (retval == 0) pr_warn_once("process '%s' launched '%s' with NULL argv: empty string added\n", current->comm, bprm->filename); if (retval < 0) goto out_free; bprm->argc = retval; retval = count(envp, MAX_ARG_STRINGS); if (retval < 0) goto out_free; bprm->envc = retval; retval = bprm_stack_limits(bprm); if (retval < 0) goto out_free; retval = copy_string_kernel(bprm->filename, bprm); if (retval < 0) goto out_free; bprm->exec = bprm->p; retval = copy_strings(bprm->envc, envp, bprm); if (retval < 0) goto out_free; retval = copy_strings(bprm->argc, argv, bprm); if (retval < 0) goto out_free; /* * When argv is empty, add an empty string ("") as argv[0] to * ensure confused userspace programs that start processing * from argv[1] won't end up walking envp. See also * bprm_stack_limits(). */ if (bprm->argc == 0) { retval = copy_string_kernel("", bprm); if (retval < 0) goto out_free; bprm->argc = 1; } retval = bprm_execve(bprm, fd, filename, flags); out_free: free_bprm(bprm); out_ret: putname(filename); return retval; } int kernel_execve(const char *kernel_filename, const char *const *argv, const char *const *envp) { struct filename *filename; struct linux_binprm *bprm; int fd = AT_FDCWD; int retval; /* It is non-sense for kernel threads to call execve */ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(current->flags & PF_KTHREAD)) return -EINVAL; filename = getname_kernel(kernel_filename); if (IS_ERR(filename)) return PTR_ERR(filename); bprm = alloc_bprm(fd, filename); if (IS_ERR(bprm)) { retval = PTR_ERR(bprm); goto out_ret; } retval = count_strings_kernel(argv); if (WARN_ON_ONCE(retval == 0)) retval = -EINVAL; if (retval < 0) goto out_free; bprm->argc = retval; retval = count_strings_kernel(envp); if (retval < 0) goto out_free; bprm->envc = retval; retval = bprm_stack_limits(bprm); if (retval < 0) goto out_free; retval = copy_string_kernel(bprm->filename, bprm); if (retval < 0) goto out_free; bprm->exec = bprm->p; retval = copy_strings_kernel(bprm->envc, envp, bprm); if (retval < 0) goto out_free; retval = copy_strings_kernel(bprm->argc, argv, bprm); if (retval < 0) goto out_free; retval = bprm_execve(bprm, fd, filename, 0); out_free: free_bprm(bprm); out_ret: putname(filename); return retval; } static int do_execve(struct filename *filename, const char __user *const __user *__argv, const char __user *const __user *__envp) { struct user_arg_ptr argv = { .ptr.native = __argv }; struct user_arg_ptr envp = { .ptr.native = __envp }; return do_execveat_common(AT_FDCWD, filename, argv, envp, 0); } static int do_execveat(int fd, struct filename *filename, const char __user *const __user *__argv, const char __user *const __user *__envp, int flags) { struct user_arg_ptr argv = { .ptr.native = __argv }; struct user_arg_ptr envp = { .ptr.native = __envp }; return do_execveat_common(fd, filename, argv, envp, flags); } #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT static int compat_do_execve(struct filename *filename, const compat_uptr_t __user *__argv, const compat_uptr_t __user *__envp) { struct user_arg_ptr argv = { .is_compat = true, .ptr.compat = __argv, }; struct user_arg_ptr envp = { .is_compat = true, .ptr.compat = __envp, }; return do_execveat_common(AT_FDCWD, filename, argv, envp, 0); } static int compat_do_execveat(int fd, struct filename *filename, const compat_uptr_t __user *__argv, const compat_uptr_t __user *__envp, int flags) { struct user_arg_ptr argv = { .is_compat = true, .ptr.compat = __argv, }; struct user_arg_ptr envp = { .is_compat = true, .ptr.compat = __envp, }; return do_execveat_common(fd, filename, argv, envp, flags); } #endif void set_binfmt(struct linux_binfmt *new) { struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm; if (mm->binfmt) module_put(mm->binfmt->module); mm->binfmt = new; if (new) __module_get(new->module); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_binfmt); /* * set_dumpable stores three-value SUID_DUMP_* into mm->flags. */ void set_dumpable(struct mm_struct *mm, int value) { if (WARN_ON((unsigned)value > SUID_DUMP_ROOT)) return; set_mask_bits(&mm->flags, MMF_DUMPABLE_MASK, value); } SYSCALL_DEFINE3(execve, const char __user *, filename, const char __user *const __user *, argv, const char __user *const __user *, envp) { return do_execve(getname(filename), argv, envp); } SYSCALL_DEFINE5(execveat, int, fd, const char __user *, filename, const char __user *const __user *, argv, const char __user *const __user *, envp, int, flags) { return do_execveat(fd, getname_uflags(filename, flags), argv, envp, flags); } #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE3(execve, const char __user *, filename, const compat_uptr_t __user *, argv, const compat_uptr_t __user *, envp) { return compat_do_execve(getname(filename), argv, envp); } COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE5(execveat, int, fd, const char __user *, filename, const compat_uptr_t __user *, argv, const compat_uptr_t __user *, envp, int, flags) { return compat_do_execveat(fd, getname_uflags(filename, flags), argv, envp, flags); } #endif #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL static int proc_dointvec_minmax_coredump(struct ctl_table *table, int write, void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos) { int error = proc_dointvec_minmax(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos); if (!error) validate_coredump_safety(); return error; } static struct ctl_table fs_exec_sysctls[] = { { .procname = "suid_dumpable", .data = &suid_dumpable, .maxlen = sizeof(int), .mode = 0644, .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax_coredump, .extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO, .extra2 = SYSCTL_TWO, }, { } }; static int __init init_fs_exec_sysctls(void) { register_sysctl_init("fs", fs_exec_sysctls); return 0; } fs_initcall(init_fs_exec_sysctls); #endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */