History log of /openbmc/linux/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c (Results 701 – 709 of 709)
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# bf08867f9 19-Jun-2005 Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

[IPSEC] Turn km_event.data into a union

This patch turns km_event.data into a union. This makes code that
uses it clearer.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.a

[IPSEC] Turn km_event.data into a union

This patch turns km_event.data into a union. This makes code that
uses it clearer.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

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# 26b15dad 19-Jun-2005 Jamal Hadi Salim <hadi@cyberus.ca>

[IPSEC] Add complete xfrm event notification

Heres the final patch.
What this patch provides

- netlink xfrm events
- ability to have events generated by netlink propagated t

[IPSEC] Add complete xfrm event notification

Heres the final patch.
What this patch provides

- netlink xfrm events
- ability to have events generated by netlink propagated to pfkey
and vice versa.
- fixes the acquire lets-be-happy-with-one-success issue

Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <hadi@cyberus.ca>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

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Revision tags: v2.6.12, v2.6.12-rc6, v2.6.12-rc5
# 31c26852 19-May-2005 Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

[IPSEC]: Verify key payload in verify_one_algo

We need to verify that the payload contains enough data so that
attach_one_algo can copy alg_key_len bits from the payload.

Signed

[IPSEC]: Verify key payload in verify_one_algo

We need to verify that the payload contains enough data so that
attach_one_algo can copy alg_key_len bits from the payload.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

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# b9e9dead 19-May-2005 Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

[IPSEC]: Fixed alg_key_len usage in attach_one_algo

The variable alg_key_len is in bits and not bytes. The function
attach_one_algo is currently using it as if it were in bytes.
Thi

[IPSEC]: Fixed alg_key_len usage in attach_one_algo

The variable alg_key_len is in bits and not bytes. The function
attach_one_algo is currently using it as if it were in bytes.
This causes it to read memory which may not be there.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

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Revision tags: v2.6.12-rc4
# 0f4821e7 03-May-2005 David S. Miller <davem@sunset.davemloft.net>

[XFRM/RTNETLINK]: Decrement qlen properly in {xfrm_,rt}netlink_rcv().

If we free up a partially processed packet because it's
skb->len dropped to zero, we need to decrement qlen because

[XFRM/RTNETLINK]: Decrement qlen properly in {xfrm_,rt}netlink_rcv().

If we free up a partially processed packet because it's
skb->len dropped to zero, we need to decrement qlen because
we are dropping out of the top-level loop so it will do
the decrement for us.

Spotted by Herbert Xu.

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

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# 09e14305 03-May-2005 David S. Miller <davem@sunset.davemloft.net>

[NETLINK]: Fix infinite loops in synchronous netlink changes.

The qlen should continue to decrement, even if we
pop partially processed SKBs back onto the receive queue.

Signed-

[NETLINK]: Fix infinite loops in synchronous netlink changes.

The qlen should continue to decrement, even if we
pop partially processed SKBs back onto the receive queue.

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

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# 2a0a6ebe 03-May-2005 Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

[NETLINK]: Synchronous message processing.

Let's recap the problem. The current asynchronous netlink kernel
message processing is vulnerable to these attacks:

1) Hit and run: A

[NETLINK]: Synchronous message processing.

Let's recap the problem. The current asynchronous netlink kernel
message processing is vulnerable to these attacks:

1) Hit and run: Attacker sends one or more messages and then exits
before they're processed. This may confuse/disable the next netlink
user that gets the netlink address of the attacker since it may
receive the responses to the attacker's messages.

Proposed solutions:

a) Synchronous processing.
b) Stream mode socket.
c) Restrict/prohibit binding.

2) Starvation: Because various netlink rcv functions were written
to not return until all messages have been processed on a socket,
it is possible for these functions to execute for an arbitrarily
long period of time. If this is successfully exploited it could
also be used to hold rtnl forever.

Proposed solutions:

a) Synchronous processing.
b) Stream mode socket.

Firstly let's cross off solution c). It only solves the first
problem and it has user-visible impacts. In particular, it'll
break user space applications that expect to bind or communicate
with specific netlink addresses (pid's).

So we're left with a choice of synchronous processing versus
SOCK_STREAM for netlink.

For the moment I'm sticking with the synchronous approach as
suggested by Alexey since it's simpler and I'd rather spend
my time working on other things.

However, it does have a number of deficiencies compared to the
stream mode solution:

1) User-space to user-space netlink communication is still vulnerable.

2) Inefficient use of resources. This is especially true for rtnetlink
since the lock is shared with other users such as networking drivers.
The latter could hold the rtnl while communicating with hardware which
causes the rtnetlink user to wait when it could be doing other things.

3) It is still possible to DoS all netlink users by flooding the kernel
netlink receive queue. The attacker simply fills the receive socket
with a single netlink message that fills up the entire queue. The
attacker then continues to call sendmsg with the same message in a loop.

Point 3) can be countered by retransmissions in user-space code, however
it is pretty messy.

In light of these problems (in particular, point 3), we should implement
stream mode netlink at some point. In the mean time, here is a patch
that implements synchronous processing.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

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# 492b558b 03-May-2005 Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>

[XFRM]: Cleanup xfrm_msg_min and xfrm_dispatch

Converts xfrm_msg_min and xfrm_dispatch to use c99 designated
initializers to make greping a little bit easier. Also replaces
two hardc

[XFRM]: Cleanup xfrm_msg_min and xfrm_dispatch

Converts xfrm_msg_min and xfrm_dispatch to use c99 designated
initializers to make greping a little bit easier. Also replaces
two hardcoded message type with meaningful names.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

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Revision tags: v2.6.12-rc3, v2.6.12-rc2
# 1da177e4 16-Apr-2005 Linus Torvalds <torvalds@ppc970.osdl.org>

Linux-2.6.12-rc2

Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history,
even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git
archive of that later if we

Linux-2.6.12-rc2

Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history,
even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git
archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about
3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early
git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good
infrastructure for it.

Let it rip!

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