History log of /openbmc/linux/fs/posix_acl.c (Results 151 – 175 of 219)
Revision (<<< Hide revision tags) (Show revision tags >>>) Date Author Comments
# 4e34e719 23-Jul-2011 Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>

fs: take the ACL checks to common code

Replace the ->check_acl method with a ->get_acl method that simply reads an
ACL from disk after having a cache miss. This means we can replace the ACL
checkin

fs: take the ACL checks to common code

Replace the ->check_acl method with a ->get_acl method that simply reads an
ACL from disk after having a cache miss. This means we can replace the ACL
checking boilerplate code with a single implementation in namei.c.

Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

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# edde854e 23-Jul-2011 Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

bury posix_acl_..._masq() variants

made static; no callers left outside of posix_acl.c. posix_acl_clone() also
has lost all external callers and became static...

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv

bury posix_acl_..._masq() variants

made static; no callers left outside of posix_acl.c. posix_acl_clone() also
has lost all external callers and became static...

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

show more ...


# 826cae2f 23-Jul-2011 Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

kill boilerplates around posix_acl_create_masq()

new helper: posix_acl_create(&acl, gfp, mode_p). Replaces acl with
modified clone, on failure releases acl and replaces with NULL.
Returns 0 or -ve

kill boilerplates around posix_acl_create_masq()

new helper: posix_acl_create(&acl, gfp, mode_p). Replaces acl with
modified clone, on failure releases acl and replaces with NULL.
Returns 0 or -ve on error. All callers of posix_acl_create_masq()
switched.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

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# bc26ab5f 22-Jul-2011 Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

kill boilerplate around posix_acl_chmod_masq()

new helper: posix_acl_chmod(&acl, gfp, mode). Replaces acl with modified
clone or with NULL if that has failed; returns 0 or -ve on error. All
caller

kill boilerplate around posix_acl_chmod_masq()

new helper: posix_acl_chmod(&acl, gfp, mode). Replaces acl with modified
clone or with NULL if that has failed; returns 0 or -ve on error. All
callers of posix_acl_chmod_masq() switched to that - they'd been doing
exactly the same thing.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

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Revision tags: v3.0, v3.0-rc7, v3.0-rc6, v3.0-rc5, v3.0-rc4, v3.0-rc3, v3.0-rc2, v3.0-rc1, v2.6.39, v2.6.39-rc7, v2.6.39-rc6, v2.6.39-rc5, v2.6.39-rc4, v2.6.39-rc3, v2.6.39-rc2, v2.6.39-rc1, v2.6.38, v2.6.38-rc8, v2.6.38-rc7, v2.6.38-rc6, v2.6.38-rc5, v2.6.38-rc4, v2.6.38-rc3, v2.6.38-rc2
# f61f6da0 20-Jan-2011 Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>

NFS: Prevent memory allocation failure in nfsacl_encode()

nfsacl_encode() allocates memory in certain cases. This of course
is not guaranteed to work.

Since commit 9f06c719 "SUNRPC: New xdr_stream

NFS: Prevent memory allocation failure in nfsacl_encode()

nfsacl_encode() allocates memory in certain cases. This of course
is not guaranteed to work.

Since commit 9f06c719 "SUNRPC: New xdr_streams XDR encoder API", the
kernel's XDR encoders can't return a result indicating possibly a
failure, so a memory allocation failure in nfsacl_encode() has become
fatal (ie, the XDR code Oopses) in some cases.

However, the allocated memory is a tiny fixed amount, on the order
of 40-50 bytes. We can easily use a stack-allocated buffer for
this, with only a wee bit of nose-holding.

Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

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Revision tags: v2.6.38-rc1, v2.6.37, v2.6.37-rc8, v2.6.37-rc7, v2.6.37-rc6, v2.6.37-rc5, v2.6.37-rc4, v2.6.37-rc3, v2.6.37-rc2, v2.6.37-rc1, v2.6.36, v2.6.36-rc8, v2.6.36-rc7, v2.6.36-rc6, v2.6.36-rc5, v2.6.36-rc4, v2.6.36-rc3, v2.6.36-rc2, v2.6.36-rc1, v2.6.35, v2.6.35-rc6, v2.6.35-rc5, v2.6.35-rc4, v2.6.35-rc3, v2.6.35-rc2, v2.6.35-rc1, v2.6.34, v2.6.34-rc7, v2.6.34-rc6, v2.6.34-rc5, v2.6.34-rc4, v2.6.34-rc3, v2.6.34-rc2, v2.6.34-rc1, v2.6.33, v2.6.33-rc8, v2.6.33-rc7, v2.6.33-rc6, v2.6.33-rc5, v2.6.33-rc4, v2.6.33-rc3, v2.6.33-rc2, v2.6.33-rc1, v2.6.32, v2.6.32-rc8, v2.6.32-rc7, v2.6.32-rc6, v2.6.32-rc5, v2.6.32-rc4, v2.6.32-rc3, v2.6.32-rc1, v2.6.32-rc2, v2.6.31, v2.6.31-rc9, v2.6.31-rc8, v2.6.31-rc7, v2.6.31-rc6, v2.6.31-rc5, v2.6.31-rc4, v2.6.31-rc3, v2.6.31-rc2, v2.6.31-rc1, v2.6.30, v2.6.30-rc8, v2.6.30-rc7, v2.6.30-rc6, v2.6.30-rc5, v2.6.30-rc4, v2.6.30-rc3, v2.6.30-rc2, v2.6.30-rc1, v2.6.29, v2.6.29-rc8, v2.6.29-rc7, v2.6.29-rc6, v2.6.29-rc5, v2.6.29-rc4, v2.6.29-rc3, v2.6.29-rc2, v2.6.29-rc1, v2.6.28, v2.6.28-rc9, v2.6.28-rc8, v2.6.28-rc7, v2.6.28-rc6, v2.6.28-rc5
# da9592ed 13-Nov-2008 David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>

CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the filesystem subsystem

Wrap access to task credentials so that they can be separated more easily from
the task_struct during the introduction of COW creds.

CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the filesystem subsystem

Wrap access to task credentials so that they can be separated more easily from
the task_struct during the introduction of COW creds.

Change most current->(|e|s|fs)[ug]id to current_(|e|s|fs)[ug]id().

Change some task->e?[ug]id to task_e?[ug]id(). In some places it makes more
sense to use RCU directly rather than a convenient wrapper; these will be
addressed by later patches.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

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Revision tags: v2.6.28-rc4, v2.6.28-rc3, v2.6.28-rc2, v2.6.28-rc1, v2.6.27, v2.6.27-rc9, v2.6.27-rc8, v2.6.27-rc7, v2.6.27-rc6, v2.6.27-rc5, v2.6.27-rc4, v2.6.27-rc3, v2.6.27-rc2, v2.6.27-rc1, v2.6.26, v2.6.26-rc9, v2.6.26-rc8, v2.6.26-rc7, v2.6.26-rc6, v2.6.26-rc5, v2.6.26-rc4, v2.6.26-rc3, v2.6.26-rc2, v2.6.26-rc1, v2.6.25, v2.6.25-rc9, v2.6.25-rc8, v2.6.25-rc7, v2.6.25-rc6, v2.6.25-rc5, v2.6.25-rc4, v2.6.25-rc3, v2.6.25-rc2, v2.6.25-rc1, v2.6.24, v2.6.24-rc8, v2.6.24-rc7, v2.6.24-rc6, v2.6.24-rc5, v2.6.24-rc4, v2.6.24-rc3, v2.6.24-rc2, v2.6.24-rc1, v2.6.23, v2.6.23-rc9, v2.6.23-rc8, v2.6.23-rc7, v2.6.23-rc6, v2.6.23-rc5, v2.6.23-rc4, v2.6.23-rc3, v2.6.23-rc2, v2.6.23-rc1, v2.6.22, v2.6.22-rc7, v2.6.22-rc6, v2.6.22-rc5, v2.6.22-rc4, v2.6.22-rc3, v2.6.22-rc2, v2.6.22-rc1, v2.6.21, v2.6.21-rc7, v2.6.21-rc6, v2.6.21-rc5, v2.6.21-rc4, v2.6.21-rc3, v2.6.21-rc2, v2.6.21-rc1, v2.6.20, v2.6.20-rc7, v2.6.20-rc6, v2.6.20-rc5, v2.6.20-rc4, v2.6.20-rc3, v2.6.20-rc2, v2.6.20-rc1, v2.6.19, v2.6.19-rc6, v2.6.19-rc5, v2.6.19-rc4, v2.6.19-rc3, v2.6.19-rc2, v2.6.19-rc1
# 52978be6 01-Oct-2006 Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>

[PATCH] kmemdup: some users

Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>


Revision tags: v2.6.18, v2.6.18-rc7, v2.6.18-rc6, v2.6.18-rc5, v2.6.18-rc4, v2.6.18-rc3, v2.6.18-rc2, v2.6.18-rc1, v2.6.17, v2.6.17-rc6, v2.6.17-rc5, v2.6.17-rc4, v2.6.17-rc3, v2.6.17-rc2, v2.6.17-rc1, v2.6.16, v2.6.16-rc6, v2.6.16-rc5, v2.6.16-rc4, v2.6.16-rc3, v2.6.16-rc2, v2.6.16-rc1, v2.6.15, v2.6.15-rc7, v2.6.15-rc6, v2.6.15-rc5, v2.6.15-rc4, v2.6.15-rc3, v2.6.15-rc2, v2.6.15-rc1, v2.6.14, v2.6.14-rc5, v2.6.14-rc4
# dd0fc66f 07-Oct-2005 Al Viro <viro@ftp.linux.org.uk>

[PATCH] gfp flags annotations - part 1

- added typedef unsigned int __nocast gfp_t;

- replaced __nocast uses for gfp flags with gfp_t - it gives exactly
the same warnings as far as sparse is c

[PATCH] gfp flags annotations - part 1

- added typedef unsigned int __nocast gfp_t;

- replaced __nocast uses for gfp flags with gfp_t - it gives exactly
the same warnings as far as sparse is concerned, doesn't change
generated code (from gcc point of view we replaced unsigned int with
typedef) and documents what's going on far better.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

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Revision tags: v2.6.14-rc3, v2.6.14-rc2, v2.6.14-rc1, v2.6.13, v2.6.13-rc7, v2.6.13-rc6, v2.6.13-rc5, v2.6.13-rc4, v2.6.13-rc3, v2.6.13-rc2, v2.6.13-rc1, v2.6.12, v2.6.12-rc6, v2.6.12-rc5, v2.6.12-rc4, v2.6.12-rc3, v2.6.12-rc2
# 1da177e4 16-Apr-2005 Linus Torvalds <torvalds@ppc970.osdl.org>

Linux-2.6.12-rc2

Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history,
even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git
archive of that later if we want to, and in

Linux-2.6.12-rc2

Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history,
even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git
archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about
3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early
git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good
infrastructure for it.

Let it rip!

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Revision tags: v5.10, v5.8.17, v5.8.16, v5.8.15, v5.9, v5.8.14, v5.8.13, v5.8.12, v5.8.11, v5.8.10, v5.8.9, v5.8.8, v5.8.7, v5.8.6, v5.4.62, v5.8.5, v5.8.4, v5.4.61, v5.8.3, v5.4.60, v5.8.2, v5.4.59, v5.8.1, v5.4.58, v5.4.57, v5.4.56, v5.8, v5.7.12, v5.4.55, v5.7.11, v5.4.54, v5.7.10, v5.4.53, v5.4.52, v5.7.9, v5.7.8, v5.4.51, v5.4.50, v5.7.7, v5.4.49, v5.7.6, v5.7.5, v5.4.48, v5.7.4, v5.7.3, v5.4.47, v5.4.46, v5.7.2
# 63d72b93 07-Jun-2020 Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

vfs: clean up posix_acl_permission() logic aroudn MAY_NOT_BLOCK

posix_acl_permission() does not care about MAY_NOT_BLOCK, and in fact
the permission logic internally must not check that

vfs: clean up posix_acl_permission() logic aroudn MAY_NOT_BLOCK

posix_acl_permission() does not care about MAY_NOT_BLOCK, and in fact
the permission logic internally must not check that bit (it's only for
upper layers to decide whether they can block to do IO to look up the
acl information or not).

But the way the code was written, it _looked_ like it cared, since the
function explicitly did not mask that bit off.

But it has exactly two callers: one for when that bit is set, which
first clears the bit before calling posix_acl_permission(), and the
other call site when that bit was clear.

So stop the silly games "saving" the MAY_NOT_BLOCK bit that must not be
used for the actual permission test, and that currently is pointlessly
cleared by the callers when the function itself should just not care.

Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

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Revision tags: v5.4.45, v5.7.1, v5.4.44, v5.7, v5.4.43, v5.4.42, v5.4.41, v5.4.40, v5.4.39, v5.4.38, v5.4.37, v5.4.36, v5.4.35, v5.4.34, v5.4.33, v5.4.32, v5.4.31, v5.4.30, v5.4.29, v5.6, v5.4.28, v5.4.27, v5.4.26, v5.4.25, v5.4.24, v5.4.23, v5.4.22, v5.4.21, v5.4.20, v5.4.19, v5.4.18, v5.4.17, v5.4.16, v5.5, v5.4.15, v5.4.14, v5.4.13, v5.4.12, v5.4.11, v5.4.10, v5.4.9
# e39e773a 04-Jan-2020 Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>

fs/posix_acl.c: fix kernel-doc warnings

Fix kernel-doc warnings in fs/posix_acl.c.
Also fix one typo (setgit -> setgid).

fs/posix_acl.c:647: warning: Function parameter or mem

fs/posix_acl.c: fix kernel-doc warnings

Fix kernel-doc warnings in fs/posix_acl.c.
Also fix one typo (setgit -> setgid).

fs/posix_acl.c:647: warning: Function parameter or member 'inode' not described in 'posix_acl_update_mode'
fs/posix_acl.c:647: warning: Function parameter or member 'mode_p' not described in 'posix_acl_update_mode'
fs/posix_acl.c:647: warning: Function parameter or member 'acl' not described in 'posix_acl_update_mode'

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/29b0dc46-1f28-a4e5-b1d0-ba2b65629779@infradead.org
Fixes: 073931017b49d ("posix_acl: Clear SGID bit when setting file permissions")

Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

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Revision tags: v5.4.8, v5.4.7, v5.4.6, v5.4.5, v5.4.4, v5.4.3, v5.3.15, v5.4.2, v5.4.1, v5.3.14, v5.4, v5.3.13, v5.3.12, v5.3.11, v5.3.10, v5.3.9, v5.3.8, v5.3.7, v5.3.6, v5.3.5, v5.3.4, v5.3.3, v5.3.2, v5.3.1, v5.3, v5.2.14, v5.3-rc8, v5.2.13, v5.2.12, v5.2.11, v5.2.10, v5.2.9, v5.2.8, v5.2.7, v5.2.6, v5.2.5, v5.2.4, v5.2.3, v5.2.2, v5.2.1, v5.2, v5.1.16, v5.1.15, v5.1.14, v5.1.13, v5.1.12, v5.1.11, v5.1.10, v5.1.9, v5.1.8, v5.1.7, v5.1.6, v5.1.5, v5.1.4
# 457c8996 19-May-2019 Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

treewide: Add SPDX license identifier for missed files

Add SPDX license identifiers to all files which:

- Have no license information of any form

- Have EXPORT_.*_SYMBOL_

treewide: Add SPDX license identifier for missed files

Add SPDX license identifiers to all files which:

- Have no license information of any form

- Have EXPORT_.*_SYMBOL_GPL inside which was used in the
initial scan/conversion to ignore the file

These files fall under the project license, GPL v2 only. The resulting SPDX
license identifier is:

GPL-2.0-only

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

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Revision tags: v5.1.3, v5.1.2, v5.1.1, v5.0.14, v5.1, v5.0.13, v5.0.12, v5.0.11, v5.0.10, v5.0.9, v5.0.8, v5.0.7, v5.0.6, v5.0.5, v5.0.4, v5.0.3, v4.19.29, v5.0.2, v4.19.28, v5.0.1, v4.19.27, v5.0, v4.19.26, v4.19.25, v4.19.24, v4.19.23, v4.19.22, v4.19.21, v4.19.20, v4.19.19, v4.19.18, v4.19.17, v4.19.16, v4.19.15, v4.19.14, v4.19.13, v4.19.12, v4.19.11, v4.19.10, v4.19.9, v4.19.8, v4.19.7, v4.19.6, v4.19.5, v4.19.4, v4.18.20, v4.19.3, v4.18.19, v4.19.2, v4.18.18, v4.18.17, v4.19.1, v4.19, v4.18.16, v4.18.15, v4.18.14, v4.18.13, v4.18.12, v4.18.11, v4.18.10, v4.18.9, v4.18.7, v4.18.6, v4.18.5, v4.17.18, v4.18.4, v4.18.3, v4.17.17, v4.18.2, v4.17.16, v4.17.15, v4.18.1, v4.18, v4.17.14, v4.17.13, v4.17.12, v4.17.11, v4.17.10, v4.17.9, v4.17.8, v4.17.7, v4.17.6, v4.17.5, v4.17.4, v4.17.3, v4.17.2, v4.17.1, v4.17, v4.16, v4.15
# 66717260 29-Nov-2017 Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>

posix_acl: convert posix_acl.a_refcount from atomic_t to refcount_t

atomic_t variables are currently used to implement reference
counters with the following properties:
- counter is

posix_acl: convert posix_acl.a_refcount from atomic_t to refcount_t

atomic_t variables are currently used to implement reference
counters with the following properties:
- counter is initialized to 1 using atomic_set()
- a resource is freed upon counter reaching zero
- once counter reaches zero, its further
increments aren't allowed
- counter schema uses basic atomic operations
(set, inc, inc_not_zero, dec_and_test, etc.)

Such atomic variables should be converted to a newly provided
refcount_t type and API that prevents accidental counter overflows
and underflows. This is important since overflows and underflows
can lead to use-after-free situation and be exploitable.

The variable posix_acl.a_refcount is used as pure reference counter.
Convert it to refcount_t and fix up the operations.

**Important note for maintainers:

Some functions from refcount_t API defined in lib/refcount.c
have different memory ordering guarantees than their atomic
counterparts.
The full comparison can be seen in
https://lkml.org/lkml/2017/11/15/57 and it is hopefully soon
in state to be merged to the documentation tree.
Normally the differences should not matter since refcount_t provides
enough guarantees to satisfy the refcounting use cases, but in
some rare cases it might matter.
Please double check that you don't have some undocumented
memory guarantees for this variable usage.

For the posix_acl.a_refcount it might make a difference
in following places:
- get_cached_acl(): increment in refcount_inc_not_zero() only
guarantees control dependency on success vs. fully ordered
atomic counterpart. However this operation is performed under
rcu_read_lock(), so this should be fine.
- posix_acl_release(): decrement in refcount_dec_and_test() only
provides RELEASE ordering and control dependency on success
vs. fully ordered atomic counterpart

Suggested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Hans Liljestrand <ishkamiel@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>

show more ...


Revision tags: v4.13.16, v4.14, v4.13.5, v4.13, v4.12, v4.10.17, v4.10.16, v4.10.15, v4.10.14, v4.10.13, v4.10.12, v4.10.11, v4.10.10, v4.10.9, v4.10.8, v4.10.7, v4.10.6, v4.10.5, v4.10.4, v4.10.3, v4.10.2, v4.10.1, v4.10
# 5b825c3a 02-Feb-2017 Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

sched/headers: Prepare to remove <linux/cred.h> inclusion from <linux/sched.h>

Add #include <linux/cred.h> dependencies to all .c files rely on sched.h
doing that for them.

Note

sched/headers: Prepare to remove <linux/cred.h> inclusion from <linux/sched.h>

Add #include <linux/cred.h> dependencies to all .c files rely on sched.h
doing that for them.

Note that even if the count where we need to add extra headers seems high,
it's still a net win, because <linux/sched.h> is included in over
2,200 files ...

Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

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# 497de07d 08-Jan-2017 Gu Zheng <guzheng1@huawei.com>

tmpfs: clear S_ISGID when setting posix ACLs

This change was missed the tmpfs modification in In CVE-2016-7097
commit 073931017b49 ("posix_acl: Clear SGID bit when setting
file permi

tmpfs: clear S_ISGID when setting posix ACLs

This change was missed the tmpfs modification in In CVE-2016-7097
commit 073931017b49 ("posix_acl: Clear SGID bit when setting
file permissions")
It can test by xfstest generic/375, which failed to clear
setgid bit in the following test case on tmpfs:

touch $testfile
chown 100:100 $testfile
chmod 2755 $testfile
_runas -u 100 -g 101 -- setfacl -m u::rwx,g::rwx,o::rwx $testfile

Signed-off-by: Gu Zheng <guzheng1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

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# 101105b1 10-Oct-2016 Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs

Pull more vfs updates from Al Viro:
">rename2() work from Miklos + current_time() from Deepa"

Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs

Pull more vfs updates from Al Viro:
">rename2() work from Miklos + current_time() from Deepa"

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
fs: Replace current_fs_time() with current_time()
fs: Replace CURRENT_TIME_SEC with current_time() for inode timestamps
fs: Replace CURRENT_TIME with current_time() for inode timestamps
fs: proc: Delete inode time initializations in proc_alloc_inode()
vfs: Add current_time() api
vfs: add note about i_op->rename changes to porting
fs: rename "rename2" i_op to "rename"
vfs: remove unused i_op->rename
fs: make remaining filesystems use .rename2
libfs: support RENAME_NOREPLACE in simple_rename()
fs: support RENAME_NOREPLACE for local filesystems
ncpfs: fix unused variable warning

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# e55f1d1d 08-Oct-2016 Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Merge remote-tracking branch 'jk/vfs' into work.misc


# f334bcd9 08-Oct-2016 Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Merge remote-tracking branch 'ovl/misc' into work.misc


Revision tags: v4.9, openbmc-4.4-20161121-1, v4.4.33, v4.4.32, v4.4.31, v4.4.30, v4.4.29, v4.4.28, v4.4.27, v4.7.10, openbmc-4.4-20161021-1, v4.7.9, v4.4.26, v4.7.8, v4.4.25, v4.4.24, v4.7.7, v4.8, v4.4.23, v4.7.6
# 2211d5ba 27-Sep-2016 Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>

posix_acl: xattr representation cleanups

Remove the unnecessary typedefs and the zero-length a_entries array in
struct posix_acl_xattr_header.

Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher

posix_acl: xattr representation cleanups

Remove the unnecessary typedefs and the zero-length a_entries array in
struct posix_acl_xattr_header.

Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

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Revision tags: v4.7.5, v4.4.22, v4.4.21, v4.7.4
# 078cd827 14-Sep-2016 Deepa Dinamani <deepa.kernel@gmail.com>

fs: Replace CURRENT_TIME with current_time() for inode timestamps

CURRENT_TIME macro is not appropriate for filesystems as it
doesn't use the right granularity for filesystem timestamps.

fs: Replace CURRENT_TIME with current_time() for inode timestamps

CURRENT_TIME macro is not appropriate for filesystems as it
doesn't use the right granularity for filesystem timestamps.
Use current_time() instead.

CURRENT_TIME is also not y2038 safe.

This is also in preparation for the patch that transitions
vfs timestamps to use 64 bit time and hence make them
y2038 safe. As part of the effort current_time() will be
extended to do range checks. Hence, it is necessary for all
file system timestamps to use current_time(). Also,
current_time() will be transitioned along with vfs to be
y2038 safe.

Note that whenever a single call to current_time() is used
to change timestamps in different inodes, it is because they
share the same time granularity.

Signed-off-by: Deepa Dinamani <deepa.kernel@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Felipe Balbi <balbi@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Steven Whitehouse <swhiteho@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@lab.ntt.co.jp>
Acked-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

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# 07393101 19-Sep-2016 Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>

posix_acl: Clear SGID bit when setting file permissions

When file permissions are modified via chmod(2) and the user is not in
the owning group or capable of CAP_FSETID, the setgid bit i

posix_acl: Clear SGID bit when setting file permissions

When file permissions are modified via chmod(2) and the user is not in
the owning group or capable of CAP_FSETID, the setgid bit is cleared in
inode_change_ok(). Setting a POSIX ACL via setxattr(2) sets the file
permissions as well as the new ACL, but doesn't clear the setgid bit in
a similar way; this allows to bypass the check in chmod(2). Fix that.

References: CVE-2016-7097
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>

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# beaf226b 16-Sep-2016 Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>

posix_acl: don't ignore return value of posix_acl_create_masq()

Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Cc: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>


# a867d734 29-Jul-2016 Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace

Pull userns vfs updates from Eric Biederman:
"This tree contains some very long awaited

Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace

Pull userns vfs updates from Eric Biederman:
"This tree contains some very long awaited work on generalizing the
user namespace support for mounting filesystems to include filesystems
with a backing store. The real world target is fuse but the goal is
to update the vfs to allow any filesystem to be supported. This
patchset is based on a lot of code review and testing to approach that
goal.

While looking at what is needed to support the fuse filesystem it
became clear that there were things like xattrs for security modules
that needed special treatment. That the resolution of those concerns
would not be fuse specific. That sorting out these general issues
made most sense at the generic level, where the right people could be
drawn into the conversation, and the issues could be solved for
everyone.

At a high level what this patchset does a couple of simple things:

- Add a user namespace owner (s_user_ns) to struct super_block.

- Teach the vfs to handle filesystem uids and gids not mapping into
to kuids and kgids and being reported as INVALID_UID and
INVALID_GID in vfs data structures.

By assigning a user namespace owner filesystems that are mounted with
only user namespace privilege can be detected. This allows security
modules and the like to know which mounts may not be trusted. This
also allows the set of uids and gids that are communicated to the
filesystem to be capped at the set of kuids and kgids that are in the
owning user namespace of the filesystem.

One of the crazier corner casees this handles is the case of inodes
whose i_uid or i_gid are not mapped into the vfs. Most of the code
simply doesn't care but it is easy to confuse the inode writeback path
so no operation that could cause an inode write-back is permitted for
such inodes (aka only reads are allowed).

This set of changes starts out by cleaning up the code paths involved
in user namespace permirted mounts. Then when things are clean enough
adds code that cleanly sets s_user_ns. Then additional restrictions
are added that are possible now that the filesystem superblock
contains owner information.

These changes should not affect anyone in practice, but there are some
parts of these restrictions that are changes in behavior.

- Andy's restriction on suid executables that does not honor the
suid bit when the path is from another mount namespace (think
/proc/[pid]/fd/) or when the filesystem was mounted by a less
privileged user.

- The replacement of the user namespace implicit setting of MNT_NODEV
with implicitly setting SB_I_NODEV on the filesystem superblock
instead.

Using SB_I_NODEV is a stronger form that happens to make this state
user invisible. The user visibility can be managed but it caused
problems when it was introduced from applications reasonably
expecting mount flags to be what they were set to.

There is a little bit of work remaining before it is safe to support
mounting filesystems with backing store in user namespaces, beyond
what is in this set of changes.

- Verifying the mounter has permission to read/write the block device
during mount.

- Teaching the integrity modules IMA and EVM to handle filesystems
mounted with only user namespace root and to reduce trust in their
security xattrs accordingly.

- Capturing the mounters credentials and using that for permission
checks in d_automount and the like. (Given that overlayfs already
does this, and we need the work in d_automount it make sense to
generalize this case).

Furthermore there are a few changes that are on the wishlist:

- Get all filesystems supporting posix acls using the generic posix
acls so that posix_acl_fix_xattr_from_user and
posix_acl_fix_xattr_to_user may be removed. [Maintainability]

- Reducing the permission checks in places such as remount to allow
the superblock owner to perform them.

- Allowing the superblock owner to chown files with unmapped uids and
gids to something that is mapped so the files may be treated
normally.

I am not considering even obvious relaxations of permission checks
until it is clear there are no more corner cases that need to be
locked down and handled generically.

Many thanks to Seth Forshee who kept this code alive, and putting up
with me rewriting substantial portions of what he did to handle more
corner cases, and for his diligent testing and reviewing of my
changes"

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: (30 commits)
fs: Call d_automount with the filesystems creds
fs: Update i_[ug]id_(read|write) to translate relative to s_user_ns
evm: Translate user/group ids relative to s_user_ns when computing HMAC
dquot: For now explicitly don't support filesystems outside of init_user_ns
quota: Handle quota data stored in s_user_ns in quota_setxquota
quota: Ensure qids map to the filesystem
vfs: Don't create inodes with a uid or gid unknown to the vfs
vfs: Don't modify inodes with a uid or gid unknown to the vfs
cred: Reject inodes with invalid ids in set_create_file_as()
fs: Check for invalid i_uid in may_follow_link()
vfs: Verify acls are valid within superblock's s_user_ns.
userns: Handle -1 in k[ug]id_has_mapping when !CONFIG_USER_NS
fs: Refuse uid/gid changes which don't map into s_user_ns
selinux: Add support for unprivileged mounts from user namespaces
Smack: Handle labels consistently in untrusted mounts
Smack: Add support for unprivileged mounts from user namespaces
fs: Treat foreign mounts as nosuid
fs: Limit file caps to the user namespace of the super block
userns: Remove the now unnecessary FS_USERNS_DEV_MOUNT flag
userns: Remove implicit MNT_NODEV fragility.
...

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Revision tags: v4.7.3, v4.4.20, v4.7.2, v4.4.19, openbmc-4.4-20160819-1, v4.7.1, v4.4.18, v4.4.17, openbmc-4.4-20160804-1, v4.4.16, v4.7, openbmc-4.4-20160722-1, openbmc-20160722-1, openbmc-20160713-1, v4.4.15, v4.6.4
# 0d4d717f 27-Jun-2016 Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>

vfs: Verify acls are valid within superblock's s_user_ns.

Update posix_acl_valid to verify that an acl is within a user namespace.

Update the callers of posix_acl_valid to pass in a

vfs: Verify acls are valid within superblock's s_user_ns.

Update posix_acl_valid to verify that an acl is within a user namespace.

Update the callers of posix_acl_valid to pass in an appropriate
user namespace. For posix_acl_xattr_set and v9fs_xattr_set_acl pass in
inode->i_sb->s_user_ns to posix_acl_valid. For md_unpack_acl pass in
&init_user_ns as no inode or superblock is in sight.

Acked-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>

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Revision tags: v4.6.3, v4.4.14
# 485e71e8 22-Jun-2016 Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>

posix_acl: Add set_posix_acl

Factor out part of posix_acl_xattr_set into a common function that takes
a posix_acl, which nfsd can also call.

The prototype already exists in incl

posix_acl: Add set_posix_acl

Factor out part of posix_acl_xattr_set into a common function that takes
a posix_acl, which nfsd can also call.

The prototype already exists in include/linux/posix_acl.h.

Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>

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