x86/debug: Remove perpetually broken, unmaintainable dwarf annotations

So the dwarf2 annotations in low level assembly code have
become an increasing hindrance: unreadable, messy macros

x86/debug: Remove perpetually broken, unmaintainable dwarf annotations

So the dwarf2 annotations in low level assembly code have
become an increasing hindrance: unreadable, messy macros
mixed into some of the most security sensitive code paths
of the Linux kernel.

These debug info annotations don't even buy the upstream
kernel anything: dwarf driven stack unwinding has caused
problems in the past so it's out of tree, and the upstream
kernel only uses the much more robust framepointers based
stack unwinding method.

In addition to that there's a steady, slow bitrot going
on with these annotations, requiring frequent fixups.
There's no tooling and no functionality upstream that
keeps it correct.

So burn down the sick forest, allowing new, healthier growth:

27 files changed, 350 insertions(+), 1101 deletions(-)

Someone who has the willingness and time to do this
properly can attempt to reintroduce dwarf debuginfo in x86
assembly code plus dwarf unwinding from first principles,
with the following conditions:

- it should be maximally readable, and maximally low-key to
'ordinary' code reading and maintenance.

- find a build time method to insert dwarf annotations
automatically in the most common cases, for pop/push
instructions that manipulate the stack pointer. This could
be done for example via a preprocessing step that just
looks for common patterns - plus special annotations for
the few cases where we want to depart from the default.
We have hundreds of CFI annotations, so automating most of
that makes sense.

- it should come with build tooling checks that ensure that
CFI annotations are sensible. We've seen such efforts from
the framepointer side, and there's no reason it couldn't be
done on the dwarf side.

Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Frédéric Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

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x86/asm/uaccess: Get rid of copy_user_nocache_64.S

Move __copy_user_nocache() to arch/x86/lib/copy_user_64.S and
kill the containing file.

No functionality change.

Sign

x86/asm/uaccess: Get rid of copy_user_nocache_64.S

Move __copy_user_nocache() to arch/x86/lib/copy_user_64.S and
kill the containing file.

No functionality change.

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1431538944-27724-4-git-send-email-bp@alien8.de
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

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x86/asm/uaccess: Unify the ALIGN_DESTINATION macro

Pull it up into the header and kill duplicate versions.
Separately, both macros are identical:

35948b2bd3431aee7149e85cfe4bec

x86/asm/uaccess: Unify the ALIGN_DESTINATION macro

Pull it up into the header and kill duplicate versions.
Separately, both macros are identical:

35948b2bd3431aee7149e85cfe4becbc /tmp/a
35948b2bd3431aee7149e85cfe4becbc /tmp/b

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1431538944-27724-3-git-send-email-bp@alien8.de
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

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x86/lib/copy_user_64.S: Convert to ALTERNATIVE_2

Use the asm macro and drop the locally grown version.

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>

x86/alternatives: Make JMPs more robust

Up until now we had to pay attention to relative JMPs in alternatives
about how their relative offset gets computed so that the jump target
is

x86/alternatives: Make JMPs more robust

Up until now we had to pay attention to relative JMPs in alternatives
about how their relative offset gets computed so that the jump target
is still correct. Or, as it is the case for near CALLs (opcode e8), we
still have to go and readjust the offset at patching time.

What is more, the static_cpu_has_safe() facility had to forcefully
generate 5-byte JMPs since we couldn't rely on the compiler to generate
properly sized ones so we had to force the longest ones. Worse than
that, sometimes it would generate a replacement JMP which is longer than
the original one, thus overwriting the beginning of the next instruction
at patching time.

So, in order to alleviate all that and make using JMPs more
straight-forward we go and pad the original instruction in an
alternative block with NOPs at build time, should the replacement(s) be
longer. This way, alternatives users shouldn't pay special attention
so that original and replacement instruction sizes are fine but the
assembler would simply add padding where needed and not do anything
otherwise.

As a second aspect, we go and recompute JMPs at patching time so that we
can try to make 5-byte JMPs into two-byte ones if possible. If not, we
still have to recompute the offsets as the replacement JMP gets put far
away in the .altinstr_replacement section leading to a wrong offset if
copied verbatim.

For example, on a locally generated kernel image

old insn VA: 0xffffffff810014bd, CPU feat: X86_FEATURE_ALWAYS, size: 2
__switch_to:
ffffffff810014bd: eb 21 jmp ffffffff810014e0
repl insn: size: 5
ffffffff81d0b23c: e9 b1 62 2f ff jmpq ffffffff810014f2

gets corrected to a 2-byte JMP:

apply_alternatives: feat: 3*32+21, old: (ffffffff810014bd, len: 2), repl: (ffffffff81d0b23c, len: 5)
alt_insn: e9 b1 62 2f ff
recompute_jumps: next_rip: ffffffff81d0b241, tgt_rip: ffffffff810014f2, new_displ: 0x00000033, ret len: 2
converted to: eb 33 90 90 90

and a 5-byte JMP:

old insn VA: 0xffffffff81001516, CPU feat: X86_FEATURE_ALWAYS, size: 2
__switch_to:
ffffffff81001516: eb 30 jmp ffffffff81001548
repl insn: size: 5
ffffffff81d0b241: e9 10 63 2f ff jmpq ffffffff81001556

gets shortened into a two-byte one:

apply_alternatives: feat: 3*32+21, old: (ffffffff81001516, len: 2), repl: (ffffffff81d0b241, len: 5)
alt_insn: e9 10 63 2f ff
recompute_jumps: next_rip: ffffffff81d0b246, tgt_rip: ffffffff81001556, new_displ: 0x0000003e, ret len: 2
converted to: eb 3e 90 90 90

... and so on.

This leads to a net win of around

40ish replacements * 3 bytes savings =~ 120 bytes of I$

on an AMD guest which means some savings of precious instruction cache
bandwidth. The padding to the shorter 2-byte JMPs are single-byte NOPs
which on smart microarchitectures means discarding NOPs at decode time
and thus freeing up execution bandwidth.

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>

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x86/alternatives: Add instruction padding

Up until now we have always paid attention to make sure the length of
the new instruction replacing the old one is at least less or equal to

x86/alternatives: Add instruction padding

Up until now we have always paid attention to make sure the length of
the new instruction replacing the old one is at least less or equal to
the length of the old instruction. If the new instruction is longer, at
the time it replaces the old instruction it will overwrite the beginning
of the next instruction in the kernel image and cause your pants to
catch fire.

So instead of having to pay attention, teach the alternatives framework
to pad shorter old instructions with NOPs at buildtime - but only in the
case when

len(old instruction(s)) < len(new instruction(s))

and add nothing in the >= case. (In that case we do add_nops() when
patching).

This way the alternatives user shouldn't have to care about instruction
sizes and simply use the macros.

Add asm ALTERNATIVE* flavor macros too, while at it.

Also, we need to save the pad length in a separate struct alt_instr
member for NOP optimization and the way to do that reliably is to carry
the pad length instead of trying to detect whether we're looking at
single-byte NOPs or at pathological instruction offsets like e9 90 90 90
90, for example, which is a valid instruction.

Thanks to Michael Matz for the great help with toolchain questions.

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>

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x86/lib/copy_user_64.S: Remove FIX_ALIGNMENT define

It is unconditionally enabled so remove it. No object file change.

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>

x86-64, copy_user: Use leal to produce 32-bit results

When we are using lea to produce a 32-bit result, we can use the leal
form, rather than using leaq and worry about truncation elsewh

x86-64, copy_user: Use leal to produce 32-bit results

When we are using lea to produce a 32-bit result, we can use the leal
form, rather than using leaq and worry about truncation elsewhere.

Make the leal explicit, both to be more obvious and since that is what
gcc generates and thus is less likely to trigger obscure gas bugs.

Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1384634221-6006-1-git-send-email-fenghua.yu@intel.com
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>

show more ...

x86-64, copy_user: Remove zero byte check before copy user buffer.

Operation of rep movsb instruction handles zero byte copy. As pointed out by
Linus, there is no need to check zero size

x86-64, copy_user: Remove zero byte check before copy user buffer.

Operation of rep movsb instruction handles zero byte copy. As pointed out by
Linus, there is no need to check zero size in kernel. Removing this redundant
check saves a few cycles in copy user functions.

Reported-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1384634221-6006-1-git-send-email-fenghua.yu@intel.com
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>

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x86, smap: Add STAC and CLAC instructions to control user space access

When Supervisor Mode Access Prevention (SMAP) is enabled, access to
userspace from the kernel is controlled by the

x86, smap: Add STAC and CLAC instructions to control user space access

When Supervisor Mode Access Prevention (SMAP) is enabled, access to
userspace from the kernel is controlled by the AC flag. To make the
performance of manipulating that flag acceptable, there are two new
instructions, STAC and CLAC, to set and clear it.

This patch adds those instructions, via alternative(), when the SMAP
feature is enabled. It also adds X86_EFLAGS_AC unconditionally to the
SYSCALL entry mask; there is simply no reason to make that one
conditional.

Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1348256595-29119-9-git-send-email-hpa@linux.intel.com

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x86, extable: Remove open-coded exception table entries in arch/x86/lib/copy_user_64.S

Remove open-coded exception table entries in arch/x86/lib/copy_user_64.S,
and replace them with _AS

x86, extable: Remove open-coded exception table entries in arch/x86/lib/copy_user_64.S

Remove open-coded exception table entries in arch/x86/lib/copy_user_64.S,
and replace them with _ASM_EXTABLE() macros; this will allow us to
change the format and type of the exception table entries.

Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: David Daney <david.daney@cavium.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CA%2B55aFyijf43qSu3N9nWHEBwaGbb7T2Oq9A=9EyR=Jtyqfq_cQ@mail.gmail.com

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x86, 64-bit: Fix copy_[to/from]_user() checks for the userspace address limit

As reported in BZ #30352:

https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=30352

there's a kernel

x86, 64-bit: Fix copy_[to/from]_user() checks for the userspace address limit

As reported in BZ #30352:

https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=30352

there's a kernel bug related to reading the last allowed page on x86_64.

The _copy_to_user() and _copy_from_user() functions use the following
check for address limit:

if (buf + size >= limit)
fail();

while it should be more permissive:

if (buf + size > limit)
fail();

That's because the size represents the number of bytes being
read/write from/to buf address AND including the buf address.
So the copy function will actually never touch the limit
address even if "buf + size == limit".

Following program fails to use the last page as buffer
due to the wrong limit check:

#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <assert.h>

#define PAGE_SIZE (4096)
#define LAST_PAGE ((void*)(0x7fffffffe000))

int main()
{
int fds[2], err;
void * ptr = mmap(LAST_PAGE, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_FIXED, -1, 0);
assert(ptr == LAST_PAGE);
err = socketpair(AF_LOCAL, SOCK_STREAM, 0, fds);
assert(err == 0);
err = send(fds[0], ptr, PAGE_SIZE, 0);
perror("send");
assert(err == PAGE_SIZE);
err = recv(fds[1], ptr, PAGE_SIZE, MSG_WAITALL);
perror("recv");
assert(err == PAGE_SIZE);
return 0;
}

The other place checking the addr limit is the access_ok() function,
which is working properly. There's just a misleading comment
for the __range_not_ok() macro - which this patch fixes as well.

The last page of the user-space address range is a guard page and
Brian Gerst observed that the guard page itself due to an erratum on K8 cpus
(#121 Sequential Execution Across Non-Canonical Boundary Causes Processor
Hang).

However, the test code is using the last valid page before the guard page.
The bug is that the last byte before the guard page can't be read
because of the off-by-one error. The guard page is left in place.

This bug would normally not show up because the last page is
part of the process stack and never accessed via syscalls.

Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1305210630-7136-1-git-send-email-jolsa@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>

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x86, mem: copy_user_64.S: Support copy_to/from_user by enhanced REP MOVSB/STOSB

Support copy_to_user/copy_from_user() by enhanced REP MOVSB/STOSB.
On processors supporting enhanced REP M

x86, mem: copy_user_64.S: Support copy_to/from_user by enhanced REP MOVSB/STOSB

Support copy_to_user/copy_from_user() by enhanced REP MOVSB/STOSB.
On processors supporting enhanced REP MOVSB/STOSB, the alternative
copy_user_enhanced_fast_string function using enhanced rep movsb overrides the
original function and the fast string function.

Signed-off-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1305671358-14478-7-git-send-email-fenghua.yu@intel.com
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>

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x86: Fix common misspellings

They were generated by 'codespell' and then manually reviewed.

Signed-off-by: Lucas De Marchi <lucas.demarchi@profusion.mobi>
Cc: trivial@kernel.org

x86: Fix common misspellings

They were generated by 'codespell' and then manually reviewed.

Signed-off-by: Lucas De Marchi <lucas.demarchi@profusion.mobi>
Cc: trivial@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1300389856-1099-3-git-send-email-lucas.demarchi@profusion.mobi>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>

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x86, alternatives: Fix one more open-coded 8-bit alternative number

Fix a missing case of an 8-bit alternative number, buried inside an
assembly macro.

Signed-off-by: H. Peter A

x86, alternatives: Fix one more open-coded 8-bit alternative number

Fix a missing case of an 8-bit alternative number, buried inside an
assembly macro.

Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Reported-by: Yinghai Lu <yinhai@kernel.org>
Cc: Suresh Siddha <suresh.b.siddha@intel.com>
LKML-Reference: <4C3BDDA3.2060900@kernel.org>

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x86-64: Modify copy_user_generic() alternatives mechanism

In order to avoid unnecessary chains of branches, rather than
implementing copy_user_generic() as a function consisting of
j

x86-64: Modify copy_user_generic() alternatives mechanism

In order to avoid unnecessary chains of branches, rather than
implementing copy_user_generic() as a function consisting of
just a single (possibly patched) branch, instead properly deal
with patching call instructions in the alternative instructions
framework, and move the patching into the callers.

As a follow-on, one could also introduce something like
__EXPORT_SYMBOL_ALT() to avoid patching call sites in modules.

Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com>
Cc: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
LKML-Reference: <4B2BB8180200007800026AE7@vpn.id2.novell.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>

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x86: Add missing might_fault() checks to copy_{to,from}_user()

On x86-64, copy_[to|from]_user() rely on assembly routines that
never call might_fault(), making us missing various lockdep

x86: Add missing might_fault() checks to copy_{to,from}_user()

On x86-64, copy_[to|from]_user() rely on assembly routines that
never call might_fault(), making us missing various lockdep
checks.

This doesn't apply to __copy_from,to_user() that explicitly
handle these calls, neither is it a problem in x86-32 where
copy_to,from_user() rely on the "__" prefixed versions that
also call might_fault().

Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
LKML-Reference: <1258382538-30979-1-git-send-email-fweisbec@gmail.com>
[ v2: fix module export ]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>

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x86-64: __copy_from_user_inatomic() adjustments

This v2.6.26 commit:

ad2fc2c: x86: fix copy_user on x86

rendered __copy_from_user_inatomic() identical to
copy_user_

x86-64: __copy_from_user_inatomic() adjustments

This v2.6.26 commit:

ad2fc2c: x86: fix copy_user on x86

rendered __copy_from_user_inatomic() identical to
copy_user_generic(), yet didn't make the former just call the
latter from an inline function.

Furthermore, this v2.6.19 commit:

b885808: [PATCH] Add proper sparse __user casts to __copy_to_user_inatomic

converted the return type of __copy_to_user_inatomic() from
unsigned long to int, but didn't do the same to
__copy_from_user_inatomic().

Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: <v.mayatskih@gmail.com>
LKML-Reference: <4AFD5778020000780001F8F4@vpn.id2.novell.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>

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x86: Use __builtin_object_size() to validate the buffer size for copy_from_user()

gcc (4.x) supports the __builtin_object_size() builtin, which
reports the size of an object that a point

x86: Use __builtin_object_size() to validate the buffer size for copy_from_user()

gcc (4.x) supports the __builtin_object_size() builtin, which
reports the size of an object that a pointer point to, when known
at compile time. If the buffer size is not known at compile time, a
constant -1 is returned.

This patch uses this feature to add a sanity check to
copy_from_user(); if the target buffer is known to be smaller than
the copy size, the copy is aborted and a WARNing is emitted in
memory debug mode.

These extra checks compile away when the object size is not known,
or if both the buffer size and the copy length are constants.

Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
LKML-Reference: <20090926143301.2c396b94@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>

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x86: Add missing annotation to arch/x86/lib/copy_user_64.S::copy_to_user

While examining symbol generation in perf_counter tools, I
noticed that copy_to_user() had no size in vmlinux's s

x86: Add missing annotation to arch/x86/lib/copy_user_64.S::copy_to_user

While examining symbol generation in perf_counter tools, I
noticed that copy_to_user() had no size in vmlinux's symtab.

Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Acked-by: Alexander van Heukelum <heukelum@fastmail.fm>
Acked-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
LKML-Reference: <1246512440.13293.3.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>

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x86: wrong register was used in align macro

New ALIGN_DESTINATION macro has sad typo: r8d register was used instead
of ecx in fixup section. This can be considered as a regression.

x86: wrong register was used in align macro

New ALIGN_DESTINATION macro has sad typo: r8d register was used instead
of ecx in fixup section. This can be considered as a regression.

Register ecx was also wrongly loaded with value in r8d in
copy_user_nocache routine.

Signed-off-by: Vitaly Mayatskikh <v.mayatskih@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

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x86: fix compile error in current tip.git

Gas 2.15 complains about 32-bit registers being used in lea.

AS arch/x86/lib/copy_user_64.o
/local/scratch-2/jeremy/hg/xen/parav

x86: fix compile error in current tip.git

Gas 2.15 complains about 32-bit registers being used in lea.

AS arch/x86/lib/copy_user_64.o
/local/scratch-2/jeremy/hg/xen/paravirt/linux/arch/x86/lib/copy_user_64.S: Assembler messages:
/local/scratch-2/jeremy/hg/xen/paravirt/linux/arch/x86/lib/copy_user_64.S:188: Error: `(%edx,%ecx,8)' is not a valid 64 bit base/index expression
/local/scratch-2/jeremy/hg/xen/paravirt/linux/arch/x86/lib/copy_user_64.S:257: Error: `(%edx,%ecx,8)' is not a valid 64 bit base/index expression
AS arch/x86/lib/copy_user_nocache_64.o
/local/scratch-2/jeremy/hg/xen/paravirt/linux/arch/x86/lib/copy_user_nocache_64.S: Assembler messages:
/local/scratch-2/jeremy/hg/xen/paravirt/linux/arch/x86/lib/copy_user_nocache_64.S:107: Error: `(%edx,%ecx,8)' is not a valid 64 bit base/index expression

Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com>
Cc: Vitaly Mayatskikh <v.mayatskih@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>

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x86: fix copy_user on x86

Switch copy_user_generic_string(), copy_user_generic_unrolled() and
__copy_user_nocache() from custom tail handlers to generic
copy_user_tail_handle().

x86: fix copy_user on x86

Switch copy_user_generic_string(), copy_user_generic_unrolled() and
__copy_user_nocache() from custom tail handlers to generic
copy_user_tail_handle().

Signed-off-by: Vitaly Mayatskikh <v.mayatskih@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>

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x86: rename threadinfo to TI.

This is for consistency with i386.

Signed-off-by: Glauber Costa <gcosta@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by

x86: rename threadinfo to TI.

This is for consistency with i386.

Signed-off-by: Glauber Costa <gcosta@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>

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x86-64: Fix "bytes left to copy" return value for copy_from_user()

Most users by far do not care about the exact return value (they only
really care about whether the copy succeeded in i

x86-64: Fix "bytes left to copy" return value for copy_from_user()

Most users by far do not care about the exact return value (they only
really care about whether the copy succeeded in its entirety or not),
but a few special core routines actually care deeply about exactly how
many bytes were copied from user space.

And the unrolled versions of the x86-64 user copy routines would
sometimes report that it had copied more bytes than it actually had.

Very few uses actually have partial copies to begin with, but to make
this bug even harder to trigger, most x86 CPU's use the "rep string"
instructions for normal user copies, and that version didn't have this
issue.

To make it even harder to hit, the one user of this that really cared
about the return value (and used the uncached version of the copy that
doesn't use the "rep string" instructions) was the generic write
routine, which pre-populated its source, once more hiding the problem by
avoiding the exception case that triggers the bug.

In other words, very special thanks to Bron Gondwana who not only
triggered this, but created a test-program to show it, and bisected the
behavior down to commit 08291429cfa6258c4cd95d8833beb40f828b194e ("mm:
fix pagecache write deadlocks") which changed the access pattern just
enough that you can now trigger it with 'writev()' with multiple
iovec's.

That commit itself was not the cause of the bug, it just allowed all the
stars to align just right that you could trigger the problem.

[ Side note: this is just the minimal fix to make the copy routines
(with __copy_from_user_inatomic_nocache as the particular version that
was involved in showing this) have the right return values.

We really should improve on the exceptional case further - to make the
copy do a byte-accurate copy up to the exact page limit that causes it
to fail. As it is, the callers have to do extra work to handle the
limit case gracefully. ]

Reported-by: Bron Gondwana <brong@fastmail.fm>
Cc: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

(which didn't have this problem), and since
most users that do the carethis was very hard to trigger, but

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