Revision tags: v4.17.18, v4.18.4, v4.18.3, v4.17.17, v4.18.2, v4.17.16, v4.17.15, v4.18.1, v4.18, v4.17.14, v4.17.13, v4.17.12, v4.17.11, v4.17.10 |
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#
1e175d2e |
| 25-Jul-2018 |
Sam Bobroff <sam.bobroff@au1.ibm.com> |
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Pack VCORE IDs to access full VCPU ID space
It is not currently possible to create the full number of possible VCPUs (KVM_MAX_VCPUS) on Power9 with KVM-HV when the guest uses fe
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Pack VCORE IDs to access full VCPU ID space
It is not currently possible to create the full number of possible VCPUs (KVM_MAX_VCPUS) on Power9 with KVM-HV when the guest uses fewer threads per core than its core stride (or "VSMT mode"). This is because the VCORE ID and XIVE offsets grow beyond KVM_MAX_VCPUS even though the VCPU ID is less than KVM_MAX_VCPU_ID.
To address this, "pack" the VCORE ID and XIVE offsets by using knowledge of the way the VCPU IDs will be used when there are fewer guest threads per core than the core stride. The primary thread of each core will always be used first. Then, if the guest uses more than one thread per core, these secondary threads will sequentially follow the primary in each core.
So, the only way an ID above KVM_MAX_VCPUS can be seen, is if the VCPUs are being spaced apart, so at least half of each core is empty, and IDs between KVM_MAX_VCPUS and (KVM_MAX_VCPUS * 2) can be mapped into the second half of each core (4..7, in an 8-thread core).
Similarly, if IDs above KVM_MAX_VCPUS * 2 are seen, at least 3/4 of each core is being left empty, and we can map down into the second and third quarters of each core (2, 3 and 5, 6 in an 8-thread core).
Lastly, if IDs above KVM_MAX_VCPUS * 4 are seen, only the primary threads are being used and 7/8 of the core is empty, allowing use of the 1, 5, 3 and 7 thread slots.
(Strides less than 8 are handled similarly.)
This allows the VCORE ID or offset to be calculated quickly from the VCPU ID or XIVE server numbers, without access to the VCPU structure.
[paulus@ozlabs.org - tidied up comment a little, changed some WARN_ONCE to pr_devel, wrapped line, fixed id check.]
Signed-off-by: Sam Bobroff <sam.bobroff@au1.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
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Revision tags: v4.17.9, v4.17.8, v4.17.7, v4.17.6, v4.17.5, v4.17.4, v4.17.3, v4.17.2, v4.17.1, v4.17, v4.16 |
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#
ed7158ba |
| 22-Feb-2018 |
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> |
treewide/trivial: Remove ';;$' typo noise
On lkml suggestions were made to split up such trivial typo fixes into per subsystem patches:
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c +++ b/arch/x86/boo
treewide/trivial: Remove ';;$' typo noise
On lkml suggestions were made to split up such trivial typo fixes into per subsystem patches:
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c @@ -439,7 +439,7 @@ setup_uga32(void **uga_handle, unsigned long size, u32 *width, u32 *height) struct efi_uga_draw_protocol *uga = NULL, *first_uga; efi_guid_t uga_proto = EFI_UGA_PROTOCOL_GUID; unsigned long nr_ugas; - u32 *handles = (u32 *)uga_handle;; + u32 *handles = (u32 *)uga_handle; efi_status_t status = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; int i;
This patch is the result of the following script:
$ sed -i 's/;;$/;/g' $(git grep -E ';;$' | grep "\.[ch]:" | grep -vwE 'for|ia64' | cut -d: -f1 | sort | uniq)
... followed by manual review to make sure it's all good.
Splitting this up is just crazy talk, let's get over with this and just do it.
Reported-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Revision tags: v4.15 |
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#
9b9b13a6 |
| 11-Jan-2018 |
Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> |
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Keep XIVE escalation interrupt masked unless ceded
This works on top of the single escalation support. When in single escalation, with this change, we will keep the escalation i
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Keep XIVE escalation interrupt masked unless ceded
This works on top of the single escalation support. When in single escalation, with this change, we will keep the escalation interrupt disabled unless the VCPU is in H_CEDE (idle). In any other case, we know the VCPU will be rescheduled and thus there is no need to take escalation interrupts in the host whenever a guest interrupt fires.
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
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#
2267ea76 |
| 11-Jan-2018 |
Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> |
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Don't use existing "prodded" flag for XIVE escalations
The prodded flag is only cleared at the beginning of H_CEDE, so every time we have an escalation, we will cause the *next*
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Don't use existing "prodded" flag for XIVE escalations
The prodded flag is only cleared at the beginning of H_CEDE, so every time we have an escalation, we will cause the *next* H_CEDE to return immediately.
Instead use a dedicated "irq_pending" flag to indicate that a guest interrupt is pending for the VCPU. We don't reuse the existing exception bitmap so as to avoid expensive atomic ops.
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
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#
bf4159da |
| 11-Jan-2018 |
Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> |
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Enable use of the new XIVE "single escalation" feature
That feature, provided by Power9 DD2.0 and later, when supported by newer OPAL versions, allows us to sacrifice a queue (p
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Enable use of the new XIVE "single escalation" feature
That feature, provided by Power9 DD2.0 and later, when supported by newer OPAL versions, allows us to sacrifice a queue (priority 7) in favor of merging all the escalation interrupts of the queues of a single VP into a single interrupt.
This reduces the number of host interrupts used up by KVM guests especially when those guests use multiple priorities.
It will also enable a future change to control the masking of the escalation interrupts more precisely to avoid spurious ones.
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
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#
c424c108 |
| 11-Jan-2018 |
Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> |
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Add more info about XIVE queues in debugfs
Add details about enabled queues and escalation interrupts.
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Signed-o
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Add more info about XIVE queues in debugfs
Add details about enabled queues and escalation interrupts.
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
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#
7333b5ac |
| 12-Dec-2017 |
Laurent Vivier <lvivier@redhat.com> |
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Fix pending_pri value in kvmppc_xive_get_icp()
When we migrate a VM from a POWER8 host (XICS) to a POWER9 host (XICS-on-XIVE), we have an error:
qemu-kvm: Unable to restore KVM
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Fix pending_pri value in kvmppc_xive_get_icp()
When we migrate a VM from a POWER8 host (XICS) to a POWER9 host (XICS-on-XIVE), we have an error:
qemu-kvm: Unable to restore KVM interrupt controller state \ (0xff000000) for CPU 0: Invalid argument
This is because kvmppc_xics_set_icp() checks the new state is internaly consistent, and especially:
... 1129 if (xisr == 0) { 1130 if (pending_pri != 0xff) 1131 return -EINVAL; ...
On the other side, kvmppc_xive_get_icp() doesn't set neither the pending_pri value, nor the xisr value (set to 0) (and kvmppc_xive_set_icp() ignores the pending_pri value)
As xisr is 0, pending_pri must be set to 0xff.
Fixes: 5af50993850a ("KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Native usage of the XIVE interrupt controller") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.12+ Signed-off-by: Laurent Vivier <lvivier@redhat.com> Acked-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
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#
dc1c4165 |
| 12-Dec-2017 |
Cédric Le Goater <clg@kaod.org> |
KVM: PPC: Book3S: fix XIVE migration of pending interrupts
When restoring a pending interrupt, we are setting the Q bit to force a retrigger in xive_finish_unmask(). But we also need to force an EOI
KVM: PPC: Book3S: fix XIVE migration of pending interrupts
When restoring a pending interrupt, we are setting the Q bit to force a retrigger in xive_finish_unmask(). But we also need to force an EOI in this case to reach the same initial state : P=1, Q=0.
This can be done by not setting 'old_p' for pending interrupts which will inform xive_finish_unmask() that an EOI needs to be sent.
Fixes: 5af50993850a ("KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Native usage of the XIVE interrupt controller") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.12+ Suggested-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Signed-off-by: Cédric Le Goater <clg@kaod.org> Reviewed-by: Laurent Vivier <lvivier@redhat.com> Tested-by: Laurent Vivier <lvivier@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
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#
5bb866de |
| 04-Dec-2017 |
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> |
ppc: for put_user() pull linux/uaccess.h, not asm/uaccess.h
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Revision tags: v4.13.16, v4.14, v4.13.5 |
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#
2fb1e946 |
| 26-Sep-2017 |
Sam Bobroff <sam.bobroff@au1.ibm.com> |
KVM: PPC: Book3S: Fix server always zero from kvmppc_xive_get_xive()
In KVM's XICS-on-XIVE emulation, kvmppc_xive_get_xive() returns the value of state->guest_server as "server". However, this value
KVM: PPC: Book3S: Fix server always zero from kvmppc_xive_get_xive()
In KVM's XICS-on-XIVE emulation, kvmppc_xive_get_xive() returns the value of state->guest_server as "server". However, this value is not set by it's counterpart kvmppc_xive_set_xive(). When the guest uses this interface to migrate interrupts away from a CPU that is going offline, it sees all interrupts as belonging to CPU 0, so they are left assigned to (now) offline CPUs.
This patch removes the guest_server field from the state, and returns act_server in it's place (that is, the CPU actually handling the interrupt, which may differ from the one requested).
Fixes: 5af50993850a ("KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Native usage of the XIVE interrupt controller") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sam Bobroff <sam.bobroff@au1.ibm.com> Acked-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
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#
d222af07 |
| 06-Sep-2017 |
Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> |
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Don't access XIVE PIPR register using byte accesses
The XIVE interrupt controller on POWER9 machines doesn't support byte accesses to any register in the thread management area
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Don't access XIVE PIPR register using byte accesses
The XIVE interrupt controller on POWER9 machines doesn't support byte accesses to any register in the thread management area other than the CPPR (current processor priority register). In particular, when reading the PIPR (pending interrupt priority register), we need to do a 32-bit or 64-bit load.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.13 Fixes: 2c4fb78f78b6 ("KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Workaround POWER9 DD1.0 bug causing IPB bit loss") Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
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Revision tags: v4.13, v4.12 |
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#
00c14757 |
| 30-Jun-2017 |
Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org> |
KVM: PPC: Book3S: Fix typo in XICS-on-XIVE state saving code
This fixes a typo where the wrong loop index was used to index the kvmppc_xive_vcpu.queues[] array in xive_pre_save_scan(). The variable
KVM: PPC: Book3S: Fix typo in XICS-on-XIVE state saving code
This fixes a typo where the wrong loop index was used to index the kvmppc_xive_vcpu.queues[] array in xive_pre_save_scan(). The variable i contains the vcpu number; we need to index queues[] using j, which iterates from 0 to KVMPPC_XIVE_Q_COUNT-1.
The effect of this bug is that things that save the interrupt controller state, such as "virsh dump", on a VM with more than 8 vCPUs, result in xive_pre_save_queue() getting called on a bogus queue structure, usually resulting in a crash like this:
[ 501.821107] Unable to handle kernel paging request for data at address 0x00000084 [ 501.821212] Faulting instruction address: 0xc008000004c7c6f8 [ 501.821234] Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1] [ 501.821305] SMP NR_CPUS=1024 [ 501.821307] NUMA [ 501.821376] PowerNV [ 501.821470] Modules linked in: vhost_net vhost tap xt_CHECKSUM ipt_MASQUERADE nf_nat_masquerade_ipv4 ip6t_rpfilter ip6t_REJECT nf_reject_ipv6 nf_conntrack_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv6 xt_conntrack ip_set nfnetlink ebtable_nat ebtable_broute bridge stp llc ip6table_mangle ip6table_security ip6table_raw iptable_nat nf_conntrack_ipv4 nf_defrag_ipv4 nf_nat_ipv4 nf_nat nf_conntrack libcrc32c iptable_mangle iptable_security iptable_raw ebtable_filter ebtables ip6table_filter ip6_tables ses enclosure scsi_transport_sas ipmi_powernv ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler powernv_op_panel kvm_hv nfsd auth_rpcgss oid_registry nfs_acl lockd grace sunrpc kvm tg3 ptp pps_core [ 501.822477] CPU: 3 PID: 3934 Comm: live_migration Not tainted 4.11.0-4.git8caa70f.el7.centos.ppc64le #1 [ 501.822633] task: c0000003f9e3ae80 task.stack: c0000003f9ed4000 [ 501.822745] NIP: c008000004c7c6f8 LR: c008000004c7c628 CTR: 0000000030058018 [ 501.822877] REGS: c0000003f9ed7980 TRAP: 0300 Not tainted (4.11.0-4.git8caa70f.el7.centos.ppc64le) [ 501.823030] MSR: 9000000000009033 <SF,HV,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> [ 501.823047] CR: 28022244 XER: 00000000 [ 501.823203] CFAR: c008000004c7c77c DAR: 0000000000000084 DSISR: 40000000 SOFTE: 1 [ 501.823203] GPR00: c008000004c7c628 c0000003f9ed7c00 c008000004c91450 00000000000000ff [ 501.823203] GPR04: c0000003f5580000 c0000003f559bf98 9000000000009033 0000000000000000 [ 501.823203] GPR08: 0000000000000084 0000000000000000 00000000000001e0 9000000000001003 [ 501.823203] GPR12: c00000000008a7d0 c00000000fdc1b00 000000000a9a0000 0000000000000000 [ 501.823203] GPR16: 00000000402954e8 000000000a9a0000 0000000000000004 0000000000000000 [ 501.823203] GPR20: 0000000000000008 c000000002e8f180 c000000002e8f1e0 0000000000000001 [ 501.823203] GPR24: 0000000000000008 c0000003f5580008 c0000003f4564018 c000000002e8f1e8 [ 501.823203] GPR28: 00003ff6e58bdc28 c0000003f4564000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 [ 501.825441] NIP [c008000004c7c6f8] xive_get_attr+0x3b8/0x5b0 [kvm] [ 501.825671] LR [c008000004c7c628] xive_get_attr+0x2e8/0x5b0 [kvm] [ 501.825887] Call Trace: [ 501.825991] [c0000003f9ed7c00] [c008000004c7c628] xive_get_attr+0x2e8/0x5b0 [kvm] (unreliable) [ 501.826312] [c0000003f9ed7cd0] [c008000004c62ec4] kvm_device_ioctl_attr+0x64/0xa0 [kvm] [ 501.826581] [c0000003f9ed7d20] [c008000004c62fcc] kvm_device_ioctl+0xcc/0xf0 [kvm] [ 501.826843] [c0000003f9ed7d40] [c000000000350c70] do_vfs_ioctl+0xd0/0x8c0 [ 501.827060] [c0000003f9ed7de0] [c000000000351534] SyS_ioctl+0xd4/0xf0 [ 501.827282] [c0000003f9ed7e30] [c00000000000b8e0] system_call+0x38/0xfc [ 501.827496] Instruction dump: [ 501.827632] 419e0078 3b760008 e9160008 83fb000c 83db0010 80fb0008 2f280000 60000000 [ 501.827901] 60000000 60420000 419a0050 7be91764 <7d284c2c> 552a0ffe 7f8af040 419e003c [ 501.828176] ---[ end trace 2d0529a5bbbbafed ]---
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 5af50993850a ("KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Native usage of the XIVE interrupt controller") Acked-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
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Revision tags: v4.10.17, v4.10.16, v4.10.15, v4.10.14, v4.10.13, v4.10.12, v4.10.11, v4.10.10, v4.10.9 |
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#
5af50993 |
| 05-Apr-2017 |
Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> |
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Native usage of the XIVE interrupt controller
This patch makes KVM capable of using the XIVE interrupt controller to provide the standard PAPR "XICS" style hypercalls. It is nec
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Native usage of the XIVE interrupt controller
This patch makes KVM capable of using the XIVE interrupt controller to provide the standard PAPR "XICS" style hypercalls. It is necessary for proper operations when the host uses XIVE natively.
This has been lightly tested on an actual system, including PCI pass-through with a TG3 device.
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> [mpe: Cleanup pr_xxx(), unsplit pr_xxx() strings, etc., fix build failures by adding KVM_XIVE which depends on KVM_XICS and XIVE, and adding empty stubs for the kvm_xive_xxx() routines, fixup subject, integrate fixes from Paul for building PR=y HV=n] Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
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#
f54db39f |
| 30-Nov-2020 |
Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org> |
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: XIVE: Fix vCPU id sanity check Commit 062cfab7069f ("KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: XIVE: Make VP block size configurable") updated kvmppc_xive_vcpu_id_valid() in a way that
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: XIVE: Fix vCPU id sanity check Commit 062cfab7069f ("KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: XIVE: Make VP block size configurable") updated kvmppc_xive_vcpu_id_valid() in a way that allows userspace to trigger an assertion in skiboot and crash the host: [ 696.186248988,3] XIVE[ IC 08 ] eq_blk != vp_blk (0 vs. 1) for target 0x4300008c/0 [ 696.186314757,0] Assert fail: hw/xive.c:2370:0 [ 696.186342458,0] Aborting! xive-kvCPU 0043 Backtrace: S: 0000000031e2b8f0 R: 0000000030013840 .backtrace+0x48 S: 0000000031e2b990 R: 000000003001b2d0 ._abort+0x4c S: 0000000031e2ba10 R: 000000003001b34c .assert_fail+0x34 S: 0000000031e2ba90 R: 0000000030058984 .xive_eq_for_target.part.20+0xb0 S: 0000000031e2bb40 R: 0000000030059fdc .xive_setup_silent_gather+0x2c S: 0000000031e2bc20 R: 000000003005a334 .opal_xive_set_vp_info+0x124 S: 0000000031e2bd20 R: 00000000300051a4 opal_entry+0x134 --- OPAL call token: 0x8a caller R1: 0xc000001f28563850 --- XIVE maintains the interrupt context state of non-dispatched vCPUs in an internal VP structure. We allocate a bunch of those on startup to accommodate all possible vCPUs. Each VP has an id, that we derive from the vCPU id for efficiency: static inline u32 kvmppc_xive_vp(struct kvmppc_xive *xive, u32 server) { return xive->vp_base + kvmppc_pack_vcpu_id(xive->kvm, server); } The KVM XIVE device used to allocate KVM_MAX_VCPUS VPs. This was limitting the number of concurrent VMs because the VP space is limited on the HW. Since most of the time, VMs run with a lot less vCPUs, commit 062cfab7069f ("KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: XIVE: Make VP block size configurable") gave the possibility for userspace to tune the size of the VP block through the KVM_DEV_XIVE_NR_SERVERS attribute. The check in kvmppc_pack_vcpu_id() was changed from cpu < KVM_MAX_VCPUS * xive->kvm->arch.emul_smt_mode to cpu < xive->nr_servers * xive->kvm->arch.emul_smt_mode The previous check was based on the fact that the VP block had KVM_MAX_VCPUS entries and that kvmppc_pack_vcpu_id() guarantees that packed vCPU ids are below KVM_MAX_VCPUS. We've changed the size of the VP block, but kvmppc_pack_vcpu_id() has nothing to do with it and it certainly doesn't ensure that the packed vCPU ids are below xive->nr_servers. kvmppc_xive_vcpu_id_valid() might thus return true when the VM was configured with a non-standard VSMT mode, even if the packed vCPU id is higher than what we expect. We end up using an unallocated VP id, which confuses OPAL. The assert in OPAL is probably abusive and should be converted to a regular error that the kernel can handle, but we shouldn't really use broken VP ids in the first place. Fix kvmppc_xive_vcpu_id_valid() so that it checks the packed vCPU id is below xive->nr_servers, which is explicitly what we want. Fixes: 062cfab7069f ("KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: XIVE: Make VP block size configurable") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.5+ Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org> Reviewed-by: Cédric Le Goater <clg@kaod.org> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/160673876747.695514.1809676603724514920.stgit@bahia.lan
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#
6a316321 |
| 03-Jul-2019 |
Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org> |
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: XIVE: Fix typo in comment Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/15621913
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: XIVE: Fix typo in comment Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/156219139988.578018.1046848908285019838.stgit@bahia.lan
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#
efe5ddca |
| 27-Sep-2019 |
Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org> |
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: XIVE: Allow userspace to set the # of VPs Add a new attribute to both XIVE and XICS-on-XIVE KVM devices so that userspace can tell how many interrupt servers it need
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: XIVE: Allow userspace to set the # of VPs Add a new attribute to both XIVE and XICS-on-XIVE KVM devices so that userspace can tell how many interrupt servers it needs. If a VM needs less than the current default of KVM_MAX_VCPUS (2048), we can allocate less VPs in OPAL. Combined with a core stride (VSMT) that matches the number of guest threads per core, this may substantially increases the number of VMs that can run concurrently with an in-kernel XIVE device. Since the legacy XIVE KVM device is exposed to userspace through the XICS KVM API, a new attribute group is added to it for this purpose. While here, fix the syntax of the existing KVM_DEV_XICS_GRP_SOURCES in the XICS documentation. Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org> Reviewed-by: Cédric Le Goater <clg@kaod.org> Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
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#
062cfab7 |
| 27-Sep-2019 |
Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org> |
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: XIVE: Make VP block size configurable The XIVE VP is an internal structure which allow the XIVE interrupt controller to maintain the interrupt context state of vCPUs
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: XIVE: Make VP block size configurable The XIVE VP is an internal structure which allow the XIVE interrupt controller to maintain the interrupt context state of vCPUs non dispatched on HW threads. When a guest is started, the XIVE KVM device allocates a block of XIVE VPs in OPAL, enough to accommodate the highest possible vCPU id KVM_MAX_VCPU_ID (16384) packed down to KVM_MAX_VCPUS (2048). With a guest's core stride of 8 and a threading mode of 1 (QEMU's default), a VM must run at least 256 vCPUs to actually need such a range of VPs. A POWER9 system has a limited XIVE VP space : 512k and KVM is currently wasting this HW resource with large VP allocations, especially since a typical VM likely runs with a lot less vCPUs. Make the size of the VP block configurable. Add an nr_servers field to the XIVE structure and a function to set it for this purpose. Split VP allocation out of the device create function. Since the VP block isn't used before the first vCPU connects to the XIVE KVM device, allocation is now performed by kvmppc_xive_connect_vcpu(). This gives the opportunity to set nr_servers in between: kvmppc_xive_create() / kvmppc_xive_native_create() . . kvmppc_xive_set_nr_servers() . . kvmppc_xive_connect_vcpu() / kvmppc_xive_native_connect_vcpu() The connect_vcpu() functions check that the vCPU id is below nr_servers and if it is the first vCPU they allocate the VP block. This is protected against a concurrent update of nr_servers by kvmppc_xive_set_nr_servers() with the xive->lock mutex. Also, the block is allocated once for the device lifetime: nr_servers should stay constant otherwise connect_vcpu() could generate a boggus VP id and likely crash OPAL. It is thus forbidden to update nr_servers once the block is allocated. If the VP allocation fail, return ENOSPC which seems more appropriate to report the depletion of system wide HW resource than ENOMEM or ENXIO. A VM using a stride of 8 and 1 thread per core with 32 vCPUs would hence only need 256 VPs instead of 2048. If the stride is set to match the number of threads per core, this goes further down to 32. This will be exposed to userspace by a subsequent patch. Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org> Reviewed-by: Cédric Le Goater <clg@kaod.org> Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
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8db29ea2 |
| 27-Sep-2019 |
Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org> |
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: XIVE: Compute the VP id in a common helper Reduce code duplication by consolidating the checking of vCPU ids and VP ids to a common helper used by both legacy and na
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: XIVE: Compute the VP id in a common helper Reduce code duplication by consolidating the checking of vCPU ids and VP ids to a common helper used by both legacy and native XIVE KVM devices. And explain the magic with a comment. Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org> Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
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8a4e7597 |
| 27-Sep-2019 |
Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org> |
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: XIVE: Show VP id in debugfs Print out the VP id of each connected vCPU, this allow to see: - the VP block base in which OPAL encodes information that may be us
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: XIVE: Show VP id in debugfs Print out the VP id of each connected vCPU, this allow to see: - the VP block base in which OPAL encodes information that may be useful when debugging - the packed vCPU id which may differ from the raw vCPU id if the latter is >= KVM_MAX_VCPUS (2048) Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org> Reviewed-by: Cédric Le Goater <clg@kaod.org> Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
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e7d71c94 |
| 27-Sep-2019 |
Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org> |
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: XIVE: Set kvm->arch.xive when VPs are allocated If we cannot allocate the XIVE VPs in OPAL, the creation of a XIVE or XICS-on-XIVE device is aborted as expected, but
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: XIVE: Set kvm->arch.xive when VPs are allocated If we cannot allocate the XIVE VPs in OPAL, the creation of a XIVE or XICS-on-XIVE device is aborted as expected, but we leave kvm->arch.xive set forever since the release method isn't called in this case. Any subsequent tentative to create a XIVE or XICS-on-XIVE for this VM will thus always fail (DoS). This is a problem for QEMU since it destroys and re-creates these devices when the VM is reset: the VM would be restricted to using the much slower emulated XIVE or XICS forever. As an alternative to adding rollback, do not assign kvm->arch.xive before making sure the XIVE VPs are allocated in OPAL. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.2 Fixes: 5422e95103cf ("KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: XIVE: Replace the 'destroy' method by a 'release' method") Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org> Reviewed-by: Cédric Le Goater <clg@kaod.org> Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
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#
12ade69c |
| 27-Sep-2019 |
Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org> |
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: XIVE: Ensure VP isn't already in use Connecting a vCPU to a XIVE KVM device means establishing a 1:1 association between a vCPU id and the offset (VP id) of a VP
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: XIVE: Ensure VP isn't already in use Connecting a vCPU to a XIVE KVM device means establishing a 1:1 association between a vCPU id and the offset (VP id) of a VP structure within a fixed size block of VPs. We currently try to enforce the 1:1 relationship by checking that a vCPU with the same id isn't already connected. This is good but unfortunately not enough because we don't map VP ids to raw vCPU ids but to packed vCPU ids, and the packing function kvmppc_pack_vcpu_id() isn't bijective by design. We got away with it because QEMU passes vCPU ids that fit well in the packing pattern. But nothing prevents userspace to come up with a forged vCPU id resulting in a packed id collision which causes the KVM device to associate two vCPUs to the same VP. This greatly confuses the irq layer and ultimately crashes the kernel, as shown below. Example: a guest with 1 guest thread per core, a core stride of 8 and 300 vCPUs has vCPU ids 0,8,16...2392. If QEMU is patched to inject at some point an invalid vCPU id 348, which is the packed version of itself and 2392, we get: genirq: Flags mismatch irq 199. 00010000 (kvm-2-2392) vs. 00010000 (kvm-2-348) CPU: 24 PID: 88176 Comm: qemu-system-ppc Not tainted 5.3.0-xive-nr-servers-5.3-gku+ #38 Call Trace: [c000003f7f9937e0] [c000000000c0110c] dump_stack+0xb0/0xf4 (unreliable) [c000003f7f993820] [c0000000001cb480] __setup_irq+0xa70/0xad0 [c000003f7f9938d0] [c0000000001cb75c] request_threaded_irq+0x13c/0x260 [c000003f7f993940] [c00800000d44e7ac] kvmppc_xive_attach_escalation+0x104/0x270 [kvm] [c000003f7f9939d0] [c00800000d45013c] kvmppc_xive_connect_vcpu+0x424/0x620 [kvm] [c000003f7f993ac0] [c00800000d444428] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl+0x260/0x448 [kvm] [c000003f7f993b90] [c00800000d43593c] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x154/0x7c8 [kvm] [c000003f7f993d00] [c0000000004840f0] do_vfs_ioctl+0xe0/0xc30 [c000003f7f993db0] [c000000000484d44] ksys_ioctl+0x104/0x120 [c000003f7f993e00] [c000000000484d88] sys_ioctl+0x28/0x80 [c000003f7f993e20] [c00000000000b278] system_call+0x5c/0x68 xive-kvm: Failed to request escalation interrupt for queue 0 of VCPU 2392 ------------[ cut here ]------------ remove_proc_entry: removing non-empty directory 'irq/199', leaking at least 'kvm-2-348' WARNING: CPU: 24 PID: 88176 at /home/greg/Work/linux/kernel-kvm-ppc/fs/proc/generic.c:684 remove_proc_entry+0x1ec/0x200 Modules linked in: kvm_hv kvm dm_mod vhost_net vhost tap xt_CHECKSUM iptable_mangle xt_MASQUERADE iptable_nat nf_nat xt_conntrack nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 ipt_REJECT nf_reject_ipv4 tun bridge stp llc ebtable_filter ebtables ip6table_filter ip6_tables iptable_filter squashfs loop fuse i2c_dev sg ofpart ocxl powernv_flash at24 xts mtd uio_pdrv_genirq vmx_crypto opal_prd ipmi_powernv uio ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler ibmpowernv ib_iser rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm ib_core iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi ip_tables ext4 mbcache jbd2 raid10 raid456 async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor xor async_tx raid6_pq libcrc32c raid1 raid0 linear sd_mod ast i2c_algo_bit drm_vram_helper ttm drm_kms_helper syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops drm ahci libahci libata tg3 drm_panel_orientation_quirks [last unloaded: kvm] CPU: 24 PID: 88176 Comm: qemu-system-ppc Not tainted 5.3.0-xive-nr-servers-5.3-gku+ #38 NIP: c00000000053b0cc LR: c00000000053b0c8 CTR: c0000000000ba3b0 REGS: c000003f7f9934b0 TRAP: 0700 Not tainted (5.3.0-xive-nr-servers-5.3-gku+) MSR: 9000000000029033 <SF,HV,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 48228222 XER: 20040000 CFAR: c000000000131a50 IRQMASK: 0 GPR00: c00000000053b0c8 c000003f7f993740 c0000000015ec500 0000000000000057 GPR04: 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 000049fb98484262 0000000000001bcf GPR08: 0000000000000007 0000000000000007 0000000000000001 9000000000001033 GPR12: 0000000000008000 c000003ffffeb800 0000000000000000 000000012f4ce5a1 GPR16: 000000012ef5a0c8 0000000000000000 000000012f113bb0 0000000000000000 GPR20: 000000012f45d918 c000003f863758b0 c000003f86375870 0000000000000006 GPR24: c000003f86375a30 0000000000000007 c0002039373d9020 c0000000014c4a48 GPR28: 0000000000000001 c000003fe62a4f6b c00020394b2e9fab c000003fe62a4ec0 NIP [c00000000053b0cc] remove_proc_entry+0x1ec/0x200 LR [c00000000053b0c8] remove_proc_entry+0x1e8/0x200 Call Trace: [c000003f7f993740] [c00000000053b0c8] remove_proc_entry+0x1e8/0x200 (unreliable) [c000003f7f9937e0] [c0000000001d3654] unregister_irq_proc+0x114/0x150 [c000003f7f993880] [c0000000001c6284] free_desc+0x54/0xb0 [c000003f7f9938c0] [c0000000001c65ec] irq_free_descs+0xac/0x100 [c000003f7f993910] [c0000000001d1ff8] irq_dispose_mapping+0x68/0x80 [c000003f7f993940] [c00800000d44e8a4] kvmppc_xive_attach_escalation+0x1fc/0x270 [kvm] [c000003f7f9939d0] [c00800000d45013c] kvmppc_xive_connect_vcpu+0x424/0x620 [kvm] [c000003f7f993ac0] [c00800000d444428] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl+0x260/0x448 [kvm] [c000003f7f993b90] [c00800000d43593c] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x154/0x7c8 [kvm] [c000003f7f993d00] [c0000000004840f0] do_vfs_ioctl+0xe0/0xc30 [c000003f7f993db0] [c000000000484d44] ksys_ioctl+0x104/0x120 [c000003f7f993e00] [c000000000484d88] sys_ioctl+0x28/0x80 [c000003f7f993e20] [c00000000000b278] system_call+0x5c/0x68 Instruction dump: 2c230000 41820008 3923ff78 e8e900a0 3c82ff69 3c62ff8d 7fa6eb78 7fc5f378 3884f080 3863b948 4bbf6925 60000000 <0fe00000> 4bffff7c fba10088 4bbf6e41 ---[ end trace b925b67a74a1d8d1 ]--- BUG: Kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0x00000010 Faulting instruction address: 0xc00800000d44fc04 Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1] LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Radix MMU=Hash SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA PowerNV Modules linked in: kvm_hv kvm dm_mod vhost_net vhost tap xt_CHECKSUM iptable_mangle xt_MASQUERADE iptable_nat nf_nat xt_conntrack nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 ipt_REJECT nf_reject_ipv4 tun bridge stp llc ebtable_filter ebtables ip6table_filter ip6_tables iptable_filter squashfs loop fuse i2c_dev sg ofpart ocxl powernv_flash at24 xts mtd uio_pdrv_genirq vmx_crypto opal_prd ipmi_powernv uio ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler ibmpowernv ib_iser rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm ib_core iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi ip_tables ext4 mbcache jbd2 raid10 raid456 async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor xor async_tx raid6_pq libcrc32c raid1 raid0 linear sd_mod ast i2c_algo_bit drm_vram_helper ttm drm_kms_helper syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops drm ahci libahci libata tg3 drm_panel_orientation_quirks [last unloaded: kvm] CPU: 24 PID: 88176 Comm: qemu-system-ppc Tainted: G W 5.3.0-xive-nr-servers-5.3-gku+ #38 NIP: c00800000d44fc04 LR: c00800000d44fc00 CTR: c0000000001cd970 REGS: c000003f7f9938e0 TRAP: 0300 Tainted: G W (5.3.0-xive-nr-servers-5.3-gku+) MSR: 9000000000009033 <SF,HV,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 24228882 XER: 20040000 CFAR: c0000000001cd9ac DAR: 0000000000000010 DSISR: 40000000 IRQMASK: 0 GPR00: c00800000d44fc00 c000003f7f993b70 c00800000d468300 0000000000000000 GPR04: 00000000000000c7 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 c000003ffacd06d8 GPR08: 0000000000000000 c000003ffacd0738 0000000000000000 fffffffffffffffd GPR12: 0000000000000040 c000003ffffeb800 0000000000000000 000000012f4ce5a1 GPR16: 000000012ef5a0c8 0000000000000000 000000012f113bb0 0000000000000000 GPR20: 000000012f45d918 00007ffffe0d9a80 000000012f4f5df0 000000012ef8c9f8 GPR24: 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 c000003fe4501ed0 c000003f8b1d0000 GPR28: c0000033314689c0 c000003fe4501c00 c000003fe4501e70 c000003fe4501e90 NIP [c00800000d44fc04] kvmppc_xive_cleanup_vcpu+0xfc/0x210 [kvm] LR [c00800000d44fc00] kvmppc_xive_cleanup_vcpu+0xf8/0x210 [kvm] Call Trace: [c000003f7f993b70] [c00800000d44fc00] kvmppc_xive_cleanup_vcpu+0xf8/0x210 [kvm] (unreliable) [c000003f7f993bd0] [c00800000d450bd4] kvmppc_xive_release+0xdc/0x1b0 [kvm] [c000003f7f993c30] [c00800000d436a98] kvm_device_release+0xb0/0x110 [kvm] [c000003f7f993c70] [c00000000046730c] __fput+0xec/0x320 [c000003f7f993cd0] [c000000000164ae0] task_work_run+0x150/0x1c0 [c000003f7f993d30] [c000000000025034] do_notify_resume+0x304/0x440 [c000003f7f993e20] [c00000000000dcc4] ret_from_except_lite+0x70/0x74 Instruction dump: 3bff0008 7fbfd040 419e0054 847e0004 2fa30000 419effec e93d0000 8929203c 2f890000 419effb8 4800821d e8410018 <e9230010> e9490008 9b2a0039 7c0004ac ---[ end trace b925b67a74a1d8d2 ]--- Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception This affects both XIVE and XICS-on-XIVE devices since the beginning. Check the VP id instead of the vCPU id when a new vCPU is connected. The allocation of the XIVE CPU structure in kvmppc_xive_connect_vcpu() is moved after the check to avoid the need for rollback. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.12+ Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org> Reviewed-by: Cédric Le Goater <clg@kaod.org> Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
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da15c03b |
| 13-Aug-2019 |
Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org> |
powerpc/xive: Implement get_irqchip_state method for XIVE to fix shutdown race Testing has revealed the existence of a race condition where a XIVE interrupt being shut down can be in one
powerpc/xive: Implement get_irqchip_state method for XIVE to fix shutdown race Testing has revealed the existence of a race condition where a XIVE interrupt being shut down can be in one of the XIVE interrupt queues (of which there are up to 8 per CPU, one for each priority) at the point where free_irq() is called. If this happens, can return an interrupt number which has been shut down. This can lead to various symptoms: - irq_to_desc(irq) can be NULL. In this case, no end-of-interrupt function gets called, resulting in the CPU's elevated interrupt priority (numerically lowered CPPR) never gets reset. That then means that the CPU stops processing interrupts, causing device timeouts and other errors in various device drivers. - The irq descriptor or related data structures can be in the process of being freed as the interrupt code is using them. This typically leads to crashes due to bad pointer dereferences. This race is basically what commit 62e0468650c3 ("genirq: Add optional hardware synchronization for shutdown", 2019-06-28) is intended to fix, given a get_irqchip_state() method for the interrupt controller being used. It works by polling the interrupt controller when an interrupt is being freed until the controller says it is not pending. With XIVE, the PQ bits of the interrupt source indicate the state of the interrupt source, and in particular the P bit goes from 0 to 1 at the point where the hardware writes an entry into the interrupt queue that this interrupt is directed towards. Normally, the code will then process the interrupt and do an end-of-interrupt (EOI) operation which will reset PQ to 00 (assuming another interrupt hasn't been generated in the meantime). However, there are situations where the code resets P even though a queue entry exists (for example, by setting PQ to 01, which disables the interrupt source), and also situations where the code leaves P at 1 after removing the queue entry (for example, this is done for escalation interrupts so they cannot fire again until they are explicitly re-enabled). The code already has a 'saved_p' flag for the interrupt source which indicates that a queue entry exists, although it isn't maintained consistently. This patch adds a 'stale_p' flag to indicate that P has been left at 1 after processing a queue entry, and adds code to set and clear saved_p and stale_p as necessary to maintain a consistent indication of whether a queue entry may or may not exist. With this, we can implement xive_get_irqchip_state() by looking at stale_p, saved_p and the ESB PQ bits for the interrupt. There is some additional code to handle escalation interrupts properly; because they are enabled and disabled in KVM assembly code, which does not have access to the xive_irq_data struct for the escalation interrupt. Hence, stale_p may be incorrect when the escalation interrupt is freed in kvmppc_xive_{,native_}cleanup_vcpu(). Fortunately, we can fix it up by looking at vcpu->arch.xive_esc_on, with some careful attention to barriers in order to ensure the correct result if xive_esc_irq() races with kvmppc_xive_cleanup_vcpu(). Finally, this adds code to make noise on the console (pr_crit and WARN_ON(1)) if we find an interrupt queue entry for an interrupt which does not have a descriptor. While this won't catch the race reliably, if it does get triggered it will be an indication that the race is occurring and needs to be debugged. Fixes: 243e25112d06 ("powerpc/xive: Native exploitation of the XIVE interrupt controller") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.12+ Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190813100648.GE9567@blackberry
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8d4ba9c9 |
| 13-Aug-2019 |
Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org> |
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Don't push XIVE context when not using XIVE device At present, when running a guest on POWER9 using HV KVM but not using an in-kernel interrupt controller (XICS or X
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Don't push XIVE context when not using XIVE device At present, when running a guest on POWER9 using HV KVM but not using an in-kernel interrupt controller (XICS or XIVE), for example if QEMU is run with the kernel_irqchip=off option, the guest entry code goes ahead and tries to load the guest context into the XIVE hardware, even though no context has been set up. To fix this, we check that the "CAM word" is non-zero before pushing it to the hardware. The CAM word is initialized to a non-zero value in kvmppc_xive_connect_vcpu() and kvmppc_xive_native_connect_vcpu(), and is now cleared in kvmppc_xive_{,native_}cleanup_vcpu. Fixes: 5af50993850a ("KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Native usage of the XIVE interrupt controller") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.12+ Reported-by: Cédric Le Goater <clg@kaod.org> Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org> Reviewed-by: Cédric Le Goater <clg@kaod.org> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190813100100.GC9567@blackberry
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237aed48 |
| 06-Aug-2019 |
Cédric Le Goater <clg@kaod.org> |
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: XIVE: Free escalation interrupts before disabling the VP When a vCPU is brought done, the XIVE VP (Virtual Processor) is first disabled and then the event notificati
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: XIVE: Free escalation interrupts before disabling the VP When a vCPU is brought done, the XIVE VP (Virtual Processor) is first disabled and then the event notification queues are freed. When freeing the queues, we check for possible escalation interrupts and free them also. But when a XIVE VP is disabled, the underlying XIVE ENDs also are disabled in OPAL. When an END (Event Notification Descriptor) is disabled, its ESB pages (ESn and ESe) are disabled and loads return all 1s. Which means that any access on the ESB page of the escalation interrupt will return invalid values. When an interrupt is freed, the shutdown handler computes a 'saved_p' field from the value returned by a load in xive_do_source_set_mask(). This value is incorrect for escalation interrupts for the reason described above. This has no impact on Linux/KVM today because we don't make use of it but we will introduce in future changes a xive_get_irqchip_state() handler. This handler will use the 'saved_p' field to return the state of an interrupt and 'saved_p' being incorrect, softlockup will occur. Fix the vCPU cleanup sequence by first freeing the escalation interrupts if any, then disable the XIVE VP and last free the queues. Fixes: 90c73795afa2 ("KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Add a new KVM device for the XIVE native exploitation mode") Fixes: 5af50993850a ("KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Native usage of the XIVE interrupt controller") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.12+ Signed-off-by: Cédric Le Goater <clg@kaod.org> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190806172538.5087-1-clg@kaod.org
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#
9798f4ea |
| 18-Jul-2019 |
Cédric Le Goater <clg@kaod.org> |
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: XIVE: fix rollback when kvmppc_xive_create fails The XIVE device structure is now allocated in kvmppc_xive_get_device() and kfree'd in kvmppc_core_destroy_vm(). In c
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: XIVE: fix rollback when kvmppc_xive_create fails The XIVE device structure is now allocated in kvmppc_xive_get_device() and kfree'd in kvmppc_core_destroy_vm(). In case of an OPAL error when allocating the XIVE VPs, the kfree() call in kvmppc_xive_*create() will result in a double free and corrupt the host memory. Fixes: 5422e95103cf ("KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: XIVE: Replace the 'destroy' method by a 'release' method") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.2+ Signed-off-by: Cédric Le Goater <clg@kaod.org> Tested-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/6ea6998b-a890-2511-01d1-747d7621eb19@kaod.org
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