History log of /openbmc/linux/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c (Results 201 – 225 of 310)
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# d3e1086c 02-Dec-2020 David Brazdil <dbrazdil@google.com>

KVM: arm64: Init MAIR/TCR_EL2 from params struct

MAIR_EL2 and TCR_EL2 are currently initialized from their _EL1 values.
This will not work once KVM starts intercepting PSCI ON/SUSPEND SMCs
and initi

KVM: arm64: Init MAIR/TCR_EL2 from params struct

MAIR_EL2 and TCR_EL2 are currently initialized from their _EL1 values.
This will not work once KVM starts intercepting PSCI ON/SUSPEND SMCs
and initializing EL2 state before EL1 state.

Obtain the EL1 values during KVM init and store them in the init params
struct. The struct will stay in memory and can be used when booting new
cores.

Take the opportunity to move copying the T0SZ value from idmap_t0sz in
KVM init rather than in .hyp.idmap.text. This avoids the need for the
idmap_t0sz symbol alias.

Signed-off-by: David Brazdil <dbrazdil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201202184122.26046-12-dbrazdil@google.com

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# 63fec243 02-Dec-2020 David Brazdil <dbrazdil@google.com>

KVM: arm64: Move hyp-init params to a per-CPU struct

Once we start initializing KVM on newly booted cores before the rest of
the kernel, parameters to __do_hyp_init will need to be provided by EL2
r

KVM: arm64: Move hyp-init params to a per-CPU struct

Once we start initializing KVM on newly booted cores before the rest of
the kernel, parameters to __do_hyp_init will need to be provided by EL2
rather than EL1. At that point it will not be possible to pass its three
arguments directly because PSCI_CPU_ON only supports one context
argument.

Refactor __do_hyp_init to accept its parameters in a struct. This
prepares the code for KVM booting cores as well as removes any limits on
the number of __do_hyp_init arguments.

Signed-off-by: David Brazdil <dbrazdil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201202184122.26046-11-dbrazdil@google.com

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# 5be1d622 02-Dec-2020 David Brazdil <dbrazdil@google.com>

KVM: arm64: Remove vector_ptr param of hyp-init

KVM precomputes the hyp VA of __kvm_hyp_host_vector, essentially a
constant (minus ASLR), before passing it to __kvm_hyp_init.
Now that we have altern

KVM: arm64: Remove vector_ptr param of hyp-init

KVM precomputes the hyp VA of __kvm_hyp_host_vector, essentially a
constant (minus ASLR), before passing it to __kvm_hyp_init.
Now that we have alternatives for converting kimg VA to hyp VA, replace
this with computing the constant inside __kvm_hyp_init, thus removing
the need for an argument.

Signed-off-by: David Brazdil <dbrazdil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201202184122.26046-10-dbrazdil@google.com

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# 3eb681fb 02-Dec-2020 David Brazdil <dbrazdil@google.com>

KVM: arm64: Add ARM64_KVM_PROTECTED_MODE CPU capability

Expose the boolean value whether the system is running with KVM in
protected mode (nVHE + kernel param). CPU capability was selected over
a gl

KVM: arm64: Add ARM64_KVM_PROTECTED_MODE CPU capability

Expose the boolean value whether the system is running with KVM in
protected mode (nVHE + kernel param). CPU capability was selected over
a global variable to allow use in alternatives.

Signed-off-by: David Brazdil <dbrazdil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201202184122.26046-3-dbrazdil@google.com

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# d8b369c4 02-Dec-2020 David Brazdil <dbrazdil@google.com>

KVM: arm64: Add kvm-arm.mode early kernel parameter

Add an early parameter that allows users to select the mode of operation
for KVM/arm64.

For now, the only supported value is "protected". By pass

KVM: arm64: Add kvm-arm.mode early kernel parameter

Add an early parameter that allows users to select the mode of operation
for KVM/arm64.

For now, the only supported value is "protected". By passing this flag
users opt into the hypervisor placing additional restrictions on the
host kernel. These allow the hypervisor to spawn guests whose state is
kept private from the host. Restrictions will include stage-2 address
translation to prevent host from accessing guest memory, filtering its
SMC calls, etc.

Without this parameter, the default behaviour remains selecting VHE/nVHE
based on hardware support and CONFIG_ARM64_VHE.

Signed-off-by: David Brazdil <dbrazdil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201202184122.26046-2-dbrazdil@google.com

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# 4f1df628 26-Nov-2020 Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>

KVM: arm64: Advertise ID_AA64PFR0_EL1.CSV3=1 if the CPUs are Meltdown-safe

Cores that predate the introduction of ID_AA64PFR0_EL1.CSV3 to
the ARMv8 architecture have this field set to 0, even of som

KVM: arm64: Advertise ID_AA64PFR0_EL1.CSV3=1 if the CPUs are Meltdown-safe

Cores that predate the introduction of ID_AA64PFR0_EL1.CSV3 to
the ARMv8 architecture have this field set to 0, even of some of
them are not affected by the vulnerability.

The kernel maintains a list of unaffected cores (A53, A55 and a few
others) so that it doesn't impose an expensive mitigation uncessarily.

As we do for CSV2, let's expose the CSV3 property to guests that run
on HW that is effectively not vulnerable. This can be reset to zero
by writing to the ID register from userspace, ensuring that VMs can
be migrated despite the new property being set.

Reported-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>

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# 36fb4cd5 18-Nov-2020 Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>

KVM: arm64: Remove kvm_arch_vm_ioctl_check_extension()

kvm_arch_vm_ioctl_check_extension() is only called from
kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension(), so we can inline it and remove the extra
function.

Sig

KVM: arm64: Remove kvm_arch_vm_ioctl_check_extension()

kvm_arch_vm_ioctl_check_extension() is only called from
kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension(), so we can inline it and remove the extra
function.

Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201118194402.2892-3-will@kernel.org

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# 4f6a36fe 13-Nov-2020 Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>

KVM: arm64: Remove redundant hyp vectors entry

The hyp vectors entry corresponding to HYP_VECTOR_DIRECT (i.e. when
neither Spectre-v2 nor Spectre-v3a are present) is unused, as we can
simply dispatc

KVM: arm64: Remove redundant hyp vectors entry

The hyp vectors entry corresponding to HYP_VECTOR_DIRECT (i.e. when
neither Spectre-v2 nor Spectre-v3a are present) is unused, as we can
simply dispatch straight to __kvm_hyp_vector in this case.

Remove the redundant vector, and massage the logic for resolving a slot
to a vectors entry.

Reported-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201113113847.21619-11-will@kernel.org

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# c4792b6d 13-Nov-2020 Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>

arm64: spectre: Rename ARM64_HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS to ARM64_SPECTRE_V3A

Since ARM64_HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS is really a mitigation for Spectre-v3a,
rename it accordingly for consistency with the v2 and v4 m

arm64: spectre: Rename ARM64_HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS to ARM64_SPECTRE_V3A

Since ARM64_HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS is really a mitigation for Spectre-v3a,
rename it accordingly for consistency with the v2 and v4 mitigation.

Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201113113847.21619-9-will@kernel.org

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# b881cdce 13-Nov-2020 Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>

KVM: arm64: Allocate hyp vectors statically

The EL2 vectors installed when a guest is running point at one of the
following configurations for a given CPU:

- Straight at __kvm_hyp_vector
- A tr

KVM: arm64: Allocate hyp vectors statically

The EL2 vectors installed when a guest is running point at one of the
following configurations for a given CPU:

- Straight at __kvm_hyp_vector
- A trampoline containing an SMC sequence to mitigate Spectre-v2 and
then a direct branch to __kvm_hyp_vector
- A dynamically-allocated trampoline which has an indirect branch to
__kvm_hyp_vector
- A dynamically-allocated trampoline containing an SMC sequence to
mitigate Spectre-v2 and then an indirect branch to __kvm_hyp_vector

The indirect branches mean that VA randomization at EL2 isn't trivially
bypassable using Spectre-v3a (where the vector base is readable by the
guest).

Rather than populate these vectors dynamically, configure everything
statically and use an enumerated type to identify the vector "slot"
corresponding to one of the configurations above. This both simplifies
the code, but also makes it much easier to implement at EL2 later on.

Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
[maz: fixed double call to kvm_init_vector_slots() on nVHE]
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201113113847.21619-8-will@kernel.org

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# 6279017e 13-Nov-2020 Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>

KVM: arm64: Move BP hardening helpers into spectre.h

The BP hardening helpers are an integral part of the Spectre-v2
mitigation, so move them into asm/spectre.h and inline the
arm64_get_bp_hardening

KVM: arm64: Move BP hardening helpers into spectre.h

The BP hardening helpers are an integral part of the Spectre-v2
mitigation, so move them into asm/spectre.h and inline the
arm64_get_bp_hardening_data() function at the same time.

Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201113113847.21619-6-will@kernel.org

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# 07cf8aa9 13-Nov-2020 Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>

KVM: arm64: Make BP hardening globals static instead

Branch predictor hardening of the hyp vectors is partially driven by a
couple of global variables ('__kvm_bp_vect_base' and
'__kvm_harden_el2_vec

KVM: arm64: Make BP hardening globals static instead

Branch predictor hardening of the hyp vectors is partially driven by a
couple of global variables ('__kvm_bp_vect_base' and
'__kvm_harden_el2_vector_slot'). However, these are only used within a
single compilation unit, so internalise them there instead.

Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201113113847.21619-5-will@kernel.org

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# 042c76a9 13-Nov-2020 Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>

KVM: arm64: Move kvm_get_hyp_vector() out of header file

kvm_get_hyp_vector() has only one caller, so move it out of kvm_mmu.h
and inline it into a new function, cpu_set_hyp_vector(), for setting
th

KVM: arm64: Move kvm_get_hyp_vector() out of header file

kvm_get_hyp_vector() has only one caller, so move it out of kvm_mmu.h
and inline it into a new function, cpu_set_hyp_vector(), for setting
the vector.

Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201113113847.21619-4-will@kernel.org

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# de5bcdb4 13-Nov-2020 Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>

KVM: arm64: Tidy up kvm_map_vector()

The bulk of the work in kvm_map_vector() is conditional on the
ARM64_HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS capability, so return early if that is not set
and make the code a bit ea

KVM: arm64: Tidy up kvm_map_vector()

The bulk of the work in kvm_map_vector() is conditional on the
ARM64_HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS capability, so return early if that is not set
and make the code a bit easier to read.

Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201113113847.21619-3-will@kernel.org

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# 8934c845 13-Nov-2020 Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>

KVM: arm64: Remove redundant Spectre-v2 code from kvm_map_vector()

'__kvm_bp_vect_base' is only used when dealing with the hardened vectors
so remove the redundant assignments in kvm_map_vectors().

KVM: arm64: Remove redundant Spectre-v2 code from kvm_map_vector()

'__kvm_bp_vect_base' is only used when dealing with the hardened vectors
so remove the redundant assignments in kvm_map_vectors().

Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201113113847.21619-2-will@kernel.org

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# 6ac4a5ac 02-Nov-2020 Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>

KVM: arm64: Drop kvm_coproc.h

kvm_coproc.h used to serve as a compatibility layer for the files
shared between the 32 and 64 bit ports.

Another one bites the dust...

Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <m

KVM: arm64: Drop kvm_coproc.h

kvm_coproc.h used to serve as a compatibility layer for the files
shared between the 32 and 64 bit ports.

Another one bites the dust...

Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>

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# 325e8f9e 07-Apr-2021 Alexandru Elisei <alexandru.elisei@arm.com>

KVM: arm64: Initialize VCPU mdcr_el2 before loading it

[ Upstream commit 263d6287da1433aba11c5b4046388f2cdf49675c ]

When a VCPU is created, the kvm_vcpu struct is initialized to zero in
kvm_vm_ioct

KVM: arm64: Initialize VCPU mdcr_el2 before loading it

[ Upstream commit 263d6287da1433aba11c5b4046388f2cdf49675c ]

When a VCPU is created, the kvm_vcpu struct is initialized to zero in
kvm_vm_ioctl_create_vcpu(). On VHE systems, the first time
vcpu.arch.mdcr_el2 is loaded on hardware is in vcpu_load(), before it is
set to a sensible value in kvm_arm_setup_debug() later in the run loop. The
result is that KVM executes for a short time with MDCR_EL2 set to zero.

This has several unintended consequences:

* Setting MDCR_EL2.HPMN to 0 is constrained unpredictable according to ARM
DDI 0487G.a, page D13-3820. The behavior specified by the architecture
in this case is for the PE to behave as if MDCR_EL2.HPMN is set to a
value less than or equal to PMCR_EL0.N, which means that an unknown
number of counters are now disabled by MDCR_EL2.HPME, which is zero.

* The host configuration for the other debug features controlled by
MDCR_EL2 is temporarily lost. This has been harmless so far, as Linux
doesn't use the other fields, but that might change in the future.

Let's avoid both issues by initializing the VCPU's mdcr_el2 field in
kvm_vcpu_vcpu_first_run_init(), thus making sure that the MDCR_EL2 register
has a consistent value after each vcpu_load().

Fixes: d5a21bcc2995 ("KVM: arm64: Move common VHE/non-VHE trap config in separate functions")
Signed-off-by: Alexandru Elisei <alexandru.elisei@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210407144857.199746-3-alexandru.elisei@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

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# e7afadd0 15-Mar-2021 Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>

KVM: arm64: Ensure I-cache isolation between vcpus of a same VM

Commit 01dc9262ff5797b675c32c0c6bc682777d23de05 upstream.

It recently became apparent that the ARMv8 architecture has interesting
rul

KVM: arm64: Ensure I-cache isolation between vcpus of a same VM

Commit 01dc9262ff5797b675c32c0c6bc682777d23de05 upstream.

It recently became apparent that the ARMv8 architecture has interesting
rules regarding attributes being used when fetching instructions
if the MMU is off at Stage-1.

In this situation, the CPU is allowed to fetch from the PoC and
allocate into the I-cache (unless the memory is mapped with
the XN attribute at Stage-2).

If we transpose this to vcpus sharing a single physical CPU,
it is possible for a vcpu running with its MMU off to influence
another vcpu running with its MMU on, as the latter is expected to
fetch from the PoU (and self-patching code doesn't flush below that
level).

In order to solve this, reuse the vcpu-private TLB invalidation
code to apply the same policy to the I-cache, nuking it every time
the vcpu runs on a physical CPU that ran another vcpu of the same
VM in the past.

This involve renaming __kvm_tlb_flush_local_vmid() to
__kvm_flush_cpu_context(), and inserting a local i-cache invalidation
there.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210303164505.68492-1-maz@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

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# 23711a5e 10-Nov-2020 Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>

KVM: arm64: Allow setting of ID_AA64PFR0_EL1.CSV2 from userspace

We now expose ID_AA64PFR0_EL1.CSV2=1 to guests running on hosts
that are immune to Spectre-v2, but that don't have this field set,
mo

KVM: arm64: Allow setting of ID_AA64PFR0_EL1.CSV2 from userspace

We now expose ID_AA64PFR0_EL1.CSV2=1 to guests running on hosts
that are immune to Spectre-v2, but that don't have this field set,
most likely because they predate the specification.

However, this prevents the migration of guests that have started on
a host the doesn't fake this CSV2 setting to one that does, as KVM
rejects the write to ID_AA64PFR0_EL2 on the grounds that it isn't
what is already there.

In order to fix this, allow userspace to set this field as long as
this doesn't result in a promising more than what is already there
(setting CSV2 to 0 is acceptable, but setting it to 1 when it is
already set to 0 isn't).

Fixes: e1026237f9067 ("KVM: arm64: Set CSV2 for guests on hardware unaffected by Spectre-v2")
Reported-by: Peng Liang <liangpeng10@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201110141308.451654-2-maz@kernel.org

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Revision tags: v5.8.17
# 22f55384 27-Oct-2020 Qais Yousef <qais.yousef@arm.com>

KVM: arm64: Handle Asymmetric AArch32 systems

On a system without uniform support for AArch32 at EL0, it is possible
for the guest to force run AArch32 at EL0 and potentially cause an
illegal except

KVM: arm64: Handle Asymmetric AArch32 systems

On a system without uniform support for AArch32 at EL0, it is possible
for the guest to force run AArch32 at EL0 and potentially cause an
illegal exception if running on a core without AArch32. Add an extra
check so that if we catch the guest doing that, then we prevent it from
running again by resetting vcpu->arch.target and return
ARM_EXCEPTION_IL.

We try to catch this misbehaviour as early as possible and not rely on
an illegal exception occuring to signal the problem. Attempting to run a
32bit app in the guest will produce an error from QEMU if the guest
exits while running in AArch32 EL0.

Tested on Juno by instrumenting the host to fake asym aarch32 and
instrumenting KVM to make the asymmetry visible to the guest.

[will: Incorporated feedback from Marc]

Signed-off-by: Qais Yousef <qais.yousef@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201021104611.2744565-2-qais.yousef@arm.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201027215118.27003-2-will@kernel.org

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# 96d389ca 28-Oct-2020 Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>

arm64: Add workaround for Arm Cortex-A77 erratum 1508412

On Cortex-A77 r0p0 and r1p0, a sequence of a non-cacheable or device load
and a store exclusive or PAR_EL1 read can cause a deadlock.

The wo

arm64: Add workaround for Arm Cortex-A77 erratum 1508412

On Cortex-A77 r0p0 and r1p0, a sequence of a non-cacheable or device load
and a store exclusive or PAR_EL1 read can cause a deadlock.

The workaround requires a DMB SY before and after a PAR_EL1 register
read. In addition, it's possible an interrupt (doing a device read) or
KVM guest exit could be taken between the DMB and PAR read, so we
also need a DMB before returning from interrupt and before returning to
a guest.

A deadlock is still possible with the workaround as KVM guests must also
have the workaround. IOW, a malicious guest can deadlock an affected
systems.

This workaround also depends on a firmware counterpart to enable the h/w
to insert DMB SY after load and store exclusive instructions. See the
errata document SDEN-1152370 v10 [1] for more information.

[1] https://static.docs.arm.com/101992/0010/Arm_Cortex_A77_MP074_Software_Developer_Errata_Notice_v10.pdf

Signed-off-by: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Cc: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Julien Thierry <julien.thierry.kdev@gmail.com>
Cc: kvmarm@lists.cs.columbia.edu
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201028182839.166037-2-robh@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>

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Revision tags: v5.8.16, v5.8.15, v5.9, v5.8.14, v5.8.13, v5.8.12, v5.8.11
# a3bb9c3a 22-Sep-2020 David Brazdil <dbrazdil@google.com>

kvm: arm64: Remove unnecessary hyp mappings

With all nVHE per-CPU variables being part of the hyp per-CPU region,
mapping them individual is not necessary any longer. They are mapped to hyp
as part

kvm: arm64: Remove unnecessary hyp mappings

With all nVHE per-CPU variables being part of the hyp per-CPU region,
mapping them individual is not necessary any longer. They are mapped to hyp
as part of the overall per-CPU region.

Signed-off-by: David Brazdil <dbrazdil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrew Scull <ascull@google.com>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200922204910.7265-11-dbrazdil@google.com

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# 30c95391 22-Sep-2020 David Brazdil <dbrazdil@google.com>

kvm: arm64: Set up hyp percpu data for nVHE

Add hyp percpu section to linker script and rename the corresponding ELF
sections of hyp/nvhe object files. This moves all nVHE-specific percpu
variables

kvm: arm64: Set up hyp percpu data for nVHE

Add hyp percpu section to linker script and rename the corresponding ELF
sections of hyp/nvhe object files. This moves all nVHE-specific percpu
variables to the new hyp percpu section.

Allocate sufficient amount of memory for all percpu hyp regions at global KVM
init time and create corresponding hyp mappings.

The base addresses of hyp percpu regions are kept in a dynamically allocated
array in the kernel.

Add NULL checks in PMU event-reset code as it may run before KVM memory is
initialized.

Signed-off-by: David Brazdil <dbrazdil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200922204910.7265-10-dbrazdil@google.com

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# 2a1198c9 22-Sep-2020 David Brazdil <dbrazdil@google.com>

kvm: arm64: Create separate instances of kvm_host_data for VHE/nVHE

Host CPU context is stored in a global per-cpu variable `kvm_host_data`.
In preparation for introducing independent per-CPU region

kvm: arm64: Create separate instances of kvm_host_data for VHE/nVHE

Host CPU context is stored in a global per-cpu variable `kvm_host_data`.
In preparation for introducing independent per-CPU region for nVHE hyp,
create two separate instances of `kvm_host_data`, one for VHE and one
for nVHE.

Signed-off-by: David Brazdil <dbrazdil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200922204910.7265-9-dbrazdil@google.com

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# df4c8214 22-Sep-2020 David Brazdil <dbrazdil@google.com>

kvm: arm64: Duplicate arm64_ssbd_callback_required for nVHE hyp

Hyp keeps track of which cores require SSBD callback by accessing a
kernel-proper global variable. Create an nVHE symbol of the same n

kvm: arm64: Duplicate arm64_ssbd_callback_required for nVHE hyp

Hyp keeps track of which cores require SSBD callback by accessing a
kernel-proper global variable. Create an nVHE symbol of the same name
and copy the value from kernel proper to nVHE as KVM is being enabled
on a core.

Done in preparation for separating percpu memory owned by kernel
proper and nVHE.

Signed-off-by: David Brazdil <dbrazdil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200922204910.7265-8-dbrazdil@google.com

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