locking/atomic: delete !ARCH_ATOMIC remnants

Now that all architectures implement ARCH_ATOMIC, we can make it
mandatory, removing the Kconfig symbol and logic for !ARCH_ATOMIC.

There should be no f

locking/atomic: delete !ARCH_ATOMIC remnants

Now that all architectures implement ARCH_ATOMIC, we can make it
mandatory, removing the Kconfig symbol and logic for !ARCH_ATOMIC.

There should be no functional change as a result of this patch.

Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210525140232.53872-33-mark.rutland@arm.com

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locking/atomic: make ARCH_ATOMIC a Kconfig symbol

Subsequent patches will move architectures over to the ARCH_ATOMIC API,
after preparing the asm-generic atomic implementations to function with
or w

locking/atomic: make ARCH_ATOMIC a Kconfig symbol

Subsequent patches will move architectures over to the ARCH_ATOMIC API,
after preparing the asm-generic atomic implementations to function with
or without ARCH_ATOMIC.

As some architectures use the asm-generic implementations exclusively
(and don't have a local atomic.h), and to avoid the risk that
ARCH_ATOMIC isn't defined in some cases we expect, let's make the
ARCH_ATOMIC macro a Kconfig symbol instead, so that we can guarantee it
is consistently available where needed.

There should be no functional change as a result of this patch.

Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210525140232.53872-2-mark.rutland@arm.com

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mm/vmalloc: hugepage vmalloc mappings

Support huge page vmalloc mappings. Config option HAVE_ARCH_HUGE_VMALLOC
enables support on architectures that define HAVE_ARCH_HUGE_VMAP and
supports PMD size

mm/vmalloc: hugepage vmalloc mappings

Support huge page vmalloc mappings. Config option HAVE_ARCH_HUGE_VMALLOC
enables support on architectures that define HAVE_ARCH_HUGE_VMAP and
supports PMD sized vmap mappings.

vmalloc will attempt to allocate PMD-sized pages if allocating PMD size or
larger, and fall back to small pages if that was unsuccessful.

Architectures must ensure that any arch specific vmalloc allocations that
require PAGE_SIZE mappings (e.g., module allocations vs strict module rwx)
use the VM_NOHUGE flag to inhibit larger mappings.

This can result in more internal fragmentation and memory overhead for a
given allocation, an option nohugevmalloc is added to disable at boot.

[colin.king@canonical.com: fix read of uninitialized pointer area]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210318155955.18220-1-colin.king@canonical.com

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210317062402.533919-14-npiggin@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Ding Tianhong <dingtianhong@huawei.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Uladzislau Rezki (Sony) <urezki@gmail.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

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kbuild: check the minimum assembler version in Kconfig

Documentation/process/changes.rst defines the minimum assembler version
(binutils version), but we have never checked it in the build time.

Kb

kbuild: check the minimum assembler version in Kconfig

Documentation/process/changes.rst defines the minimum assembler version
(binutils version), but we have never checked it in the build time.

Kbuild never invokes 'as' directly because all assembly files in the
kernel tree are *.S, hence must be preprocessed. I do not expect
raw assembly source files (*.s) would be added to the kernel tree.

Therefore, we always use $(CC) as the assembler driver, and commit
aa824e0c962b ("kbuild: remove AS variable") removed 'AS'. However,
we are still interested in the version of the assembler acting behind.

As usual, the --version option prints the version string.

$ as --version | head -n 1
GNU assembler (GNU Binutils for Ubuntu) 2.35.1

But, we do not have $(AS). So, we can add the -Wa prefix so that
$(CC) passes --version down to the backing assembler.

$ gcc -Wa,--version | head -n 1
gcc: fatal error: no input files
compilation terminated.

OK, we need to input something to satisfy gcc.

$ gcc -Wa,--version -c -x assembler /dev/null -o /dev/null | head -n 1
GNU assembler (GNU Binutils for Ubuntu) 2.35.1

The combination of Clang and GNU assembler works in the same way:

$ clang -no-integrated-as -Wa,--version -c -x assembler /dev/null -o /dev/null | head -n 1
GNU assembler (GNU Binutils for Ubuntu) 2.35.1

Clang with the integrated assembler fails like this:

$ clang -integrated-as -Wa,--version -c -x assembler /dev/null -o /dev/null | head -n 1
clang: error: unsupported argument '--version' to option 'Wa,'

For the last case, checking the error message is fragile. If the
proposal for -Wa,--version support [1] is accepted, this may not be
even an error in the future.

One easy way is to check if -integrated-as is present in the passed
arguments. We did not pass -integrated-as to CLANG_FLAGS before, but
we can make it explicit.

Nathan pointed out -integrated-as is the default for all of the
architectures/targets that the kernel cares about, but it goes
along with "explicit is better than implicit" policy. [2]

With all this in my mind, I implemented scripts/as-version.sh to
check the assembler version in Kconfig time.

$ scripts/as-version.sh gcc
GNU 23501
$ scripts/as-version.sh clang -no-integrated-as
GNU 23501
$ scripts/as-version.sh clang -integrated-as
LLVM 0

[1]: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/1320
[2]: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-kbuild/20210307044253.v3h47ucq6ng25iay@archlinux-ax161/

Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>

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landlock: Support filesystem access-control

Using Landlock objects and ruleset, it is possible to tag inodes
according to a process's domain. To enable an unprivileged process to
express a file hie

landlock: Support filesystem access-control

Using Landlock objects and ruleset, it is possible to tag inodes
according to a process's domain. To enable an unprivileged process to
express a file hierarchy, it first needs to open a directory (or a file)
and pass this file descriptor to the kernel through
landlock_add_rule(2). When checking if a file access request is
allowed, we walk from the requested dentry to the real root, following
the different mount layers. The access to each "tagged" inodes are
collected according to their rule layer level, and ANDed to create
access to the requested file hierarchy. This makes possible to identify
a lot of files without tagging every inodes nor modifying the
filesystem, while still following the view and understanding the user
has from the filesystem.

Add a new ARCH_EPHEMERAL_INODES for UML because it currently does not
keep the same struct inodes for the same inodes whereas these inodes are
in use.

This commit adds a minimal set of supported filesystem access-control
which doesn't enable to restrict all file-related actions. This is the
result of multiple discussions to minimize the code of Landlock to ease
review. Thanks to the Landlock design, extending this access-control
without breaking user space will not be a problem. Moreover, seccomp
filters can be used to restrict the use of syscall families which may
not be currently handled by Landlock.

Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Anton Ivanov <anton.ivanov@cambridgegreys.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210422154123.13086-8-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>

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add support for Clang CFI

This change adds support for Clang’s forward-edge Control Flow
Integrity (CFI) checking. With CONFIG_CFI_CLANG, the compiler
injects a runtime check before each indirect fu

add support for Clang CFI

This change adds support for Clang’s forward-edge Control Flow
Integrity (CFI) checking. With CONFIG_CFI_CLANG, the compiler
injects a runtime check before each indirect function call to ensure
the target is a valid function with the correct static type. This
restricts possible call targets and makes it more difficult for
an attacker to exploit bugs that allow the modification of stored
function pointers. For more details, see:

https://clang.llvm.org/docs/ControlFlowIntegrity.html

Clang requires CONFIG_LTO_CLANG to be enabled with CFI to gain
visibility to possible call targets. Kernel modules are supported
with Clang’s cross-DSO CFI mode, which allows checking between
independently compiled components.

With CFI enabled, the compiler injects a __cfi_check() function into
the kernel and each module for validating local call targets. For
cross-module calls that cannot be validated locally, the compiler
calls the global __cfi_slowpath_diag() function, which determines
the target module and calls the correct __cfi_check() function. This
patch includes a slowpath implementation that uses __module_address()
to resolve call targets, and with CONFIG_CFI_CLANG_SHADOW enabled, a
shadow map that speeds up module look-ups by ~3x.

Clang implements indirect call checking using jump tables and
offers two methods of generating them. With canonical jump tables,
the compiler renames each address-taken function to <function>.cfi
and points the original symbol to a jump table entry, which passes
__cfi_check() validation. This isn’t compatible with stand-alone
assembly code, which the compiler doesn’t instrument, and would
result in indirect calls to assembly code to fail. Therefore, we
default to using non-canonical jump tables instead, where the compiler
generates a local jump table entry <function>.cfi_jt for each
address-taken function, and replaces all references to the function
with the address of the jump table entry.

Note that because non-canonical jump table addresses are local
to each component, they break cross-module function address
equality. Specifically, the address of a global function will be
different in each module, as it's replaced with the address of a local
jump table entry. If this address is passed to a different module,
it won’t match the address of the same function taken there. This
may break code that relies on comparing addresses passed from other
components.

CFI checking can be disabled in a function with the __nocfi attribute.
Additionally, CFI can be disabled for an entire compilation unit by
filtering out CC_FLAGS_CFI.

By default, CFI failures result in a kernel panic to stop a potential
exploit. CONFIG_CFI_PERMISSIVE enables a permissive mode, where the
kernel prints out a rate-limited warning instead, and allows execution
to continue. This option is helpful for locating type mismatches, but
should only be enabled during development.

Signed-off-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210408182843.1754385-2-samitolvanen@google.com

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stack: Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall

This provides the ability for architectures to enable kernel stack base
address offset randomization. This feature is controlled by the b

stack: Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall

This provides the ability for architectures to enable kernel stack base
address offset randomization. This feature is controlled by the boot
param "randomize_kstack_offset=on/off", with its default value set by
CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET_DEFAULT.

This feature is based on the original idea from the last public release
of PaX's RANDKSTACK feature: https://pax.grsecurity.net/docs/randkstack.txt
All the credit for the original idea goes to the PaX team. Note that
the design and implementation of this upstream randomize_kstack_offset
feature differs greatly from the RANDKSTACK feature (see below).

Reasoning for the feature:

This feature aims to make harder the various stack-based attacks that
rely on deterministic stack structure. We have had many such attacks in
past (just to name few):

https://jon.oberheide.org/files/infiltrate12-thestackisback.pdf
https://jon.oberheide.org/files/stackjacking-infiltrate11.pdf
https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2016/06/exploiting-recursion-in-linux-kernel_20.html

As Linux kernel stack protections have been constantly improving
(vmap-based stack allocation with guard pages, removal of thread_info,
STACKLEAK), attackers have had to find new ways for their exploits
to work. They have done so, continuing to rely on the kernel's stack
determinism, in situations where VMAP_STACK and THREAD_INFO_IN_TASK_STRUCT
were not relevant. For example, the following recent attacks would have
been hampered if the stack offset was non-deterministic between syscalls:

https://repositorio-aberto.up.pt/bitstream/10216/125357/2/374717.pdf
(page 70: targeting the pt_regs copy with linear stack overflow)

https://a13xp0p0v.github.io/2020/02/15/CVE-2019-18683.html
(leaked stack address from one syscall as a target during next syscall)

The main idea is that since the stack offset is randomized on each system
call, it is harder for an attack to reliably land in any particular place
on the thread stack, even with address exposures, as the stack base will
change on the next syscall. Also, since randomization is performed after
placing pt_regs, the ptrace-based approach[1] to discover the randomized
offset during a long-running syscall should not be possible.

Design description:

During most of the kernel's execution, it runs on the "thread stack",
which is pretty deterministic in its structure: it is fixed in size,
and on every entry from userspace to kernel on a syscall the thread
stack starts construction from an address fetched from the per-cpu
cpu_current_top_of_stack variable. The first element to be pushed to the
thread stack is the pt_regs struct that stores all required CPU registers
and syscall parameters. Finally the specific syscall function is called,
with the stack being used as the kernel executes the resulting request.

The goal of randomize_kstack_offset feature is to add a random offset
after the pt_regs has been pushed to the stack and before the rest of the
thread stack is used during the syscall processing, and to change it every
time a process issues a syscall. The source of randomness is currently
architecture-defined (but x86 is using the low byte of rdtsc()). Future
improvements for different entropy sources is possible, but out of scope
for this patch. Further more, to add more unpredictability, new offsets
are chosen at the end of syscalls (the timing of which should be less
easy to measure from userspace than at syscall entry time), and stored
in a per-CPU variable, so that the life of the value does not stay
explicitly tied to a single task.

As suggested by Andy Lutomirski, the offset is added using alloca()
and an empty asm() statement with an output constraint, since it avoids
changes to assembly syscall entry code, to the unwinder, and provides
correct stack alignment as defined by the compiler.

In order to make this available by default with zero performance impact
for those that don't want it, it is boot-time selectable with static
branches. This way, if the overhead is not wanted, it can just be
left turned off with no performance impact.

The generated assembly for x86_64 with GCC looks like this:

...
ffffffff81003977: 65 8b 05 02 ea 00 7f mov %gs:0x7f00ea02(%rip),%eax
# 12380 <kstack_offset>
ffffffff8100397e: 25 ff 03 00 00 and $0x3ff,%eax
ffffffff81003983: 48 83 c0 0f add $0xf,%rax
ffffffff81003987: 25 f8 07 00 00 and $0x7f8,%eax
ffffffff8100398c: 48 29 c4 sub %rax,%rsp
ffffffff8100398f: 48 8d 44 24 0f lea 0xf(%rsp),%rax
ffffffff81003994: 48 83 e0 f0 and $0xfffffffffffffff0,%rax
...

As a result of the above stack alignment, this patch introduces about
5 bits of randomness after pt_regs is spilled to the thread stack on
x86_64, and 6 bits on x86_32 (since its has 1 fewer bit required for
stack alignment). The amount of entropy could be adjusted based on how
much of the stack space we wish to trade for security.

My measure of syscall performance overhead (on x86_64):

lmbench: /usr/lib/lmbench/bin/x86_64-linux-gnu/lat_syscall -N 10000 null
randomize_kstack_offset=y Simple syscall: 0.7082 microseconds
randomize_kstack_offset=n Simple syscall: 0.7016 microseconds

So, roughly 0.9% overhead growth for a no-op syscall, which is very
manageable. And for people that don't want this, it's off by default.

There are two gotchas with using the alloca() trick. First,
compilers that have Stack Clash protection (-fstack-clash-protection)
enabled by default (e.g. Ubuntu[3]) add pagesize stack probes to
any dynamic stack allocations. While the randomization offset is
always less than a page, the resulting assembly would still contain
(unreachable!) probing routines, bloating the resulting assembly. To
avoid this, -fno-stack-clash-protection is unconditionally added to
the kernel Makefile since this is the only dynamic stack allocation in
the kernel (now that VLAs have been removed) and it is provably safe
from Stack Clash style attacks.

The second gotcha with alloca() is a negative interaction with
-fstack-protector*, in that it sees the alloca() as an array allocation,
which triggers the unconditional addition of the stack canary function
pre/post-amble which slows down syscalls regardless of the static
branch. In order to avoid adding this unneeded check and its associated
performance impact, architectures need to carefully remove uses of
-fstack-protector-strong (or -fstack-protector) in the compilation units
that use the add_random_kstack() macro and to audit the resulting stack
mitigation coverage (to make sure no desired coverage disappears). No
change is visible for this on x86 because the stack protector is already
unconditionally disabled for the compilation unit, but the change is
required on arm64. There is, unfortunately, no attribute that can be
used to disable stack protector for specific functions.

Comparison to PaX RANDKSTACK feature:

The RANDKSTACK feature randomizes the location of the stack start
(cpu_current_top_of_stack), i.e. including the location of pt_regs
structure itself on the stack. Initially this patch followed the same
approach, but during the recent discussions[2], it has been determined
to be of a little value since, if ptrace functionality is available for
an attacker, they can use PTRACE_PEEKUSR/PTRACE_POKEUSR to read/write
different offsets in the pt_regs struct, observe the cache behavior of
the pt_regs accesses, and figure out the random stack offset. Another
difference is that the random offset is stored in a per-cpu variable,
rather than having it be per-thread. As a result, these implementations
differ a fair bit in their implementation details and results, though
obviously the intent is similar.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/kernel-hardening/2236FBA76BA1254E88B949DDB74E612BA4BC57C1@IRSMSX102.ger.corp.intel.com/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/kernel-hardening/20190329081358.30497-1-elena.reshetova@intel.com/
[3] https://lists.ubuntu.com/archives/ubuntu-devel/2019-June/040741.html

Co-developed-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210401232347.2791257-4-keescook@chromium.org

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kbuild: remove LLVM=1 test from HAS_LTO_CLANG

As Documentation/kbuild/llvm.rst notes, LLVM=1 switches the default of
tools, but you can still override CC, LD, etc. individually. This LLVM=1
check is

kbuild: remove LLVM=1 test from HAS_LTO_CLANG

As Documentation/kbuild/llvm.rst notes, LLVM=1 switches the default of
tools, but you can still override CC, LD, etc. individually. This LLVM=1
check is unneeded because each tool is already checked separately.

"make CC=clang LD=ld.lld NM=llvm-nm AR=llvm-ar LLVM_IAS=1 menuconfig"
should be able to enable Clang LTO.

Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>

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kbuild: Allow LTO to be selected with KASAN_HW_TAGS

While LTO with KASAN is normally not useful, hardware tag-based KASAN
can be used also in production kernels with ARM64_MTE. Therefore, allow
KASA

kbuild: Allow LTO to be selected with KASAN_HW_TAGS

While LTO with KASAN is normally not useful, hardware tag-based KASAN
can be used also in production kernels with ARM64_MTE. Therefore, allow
KASAN_HW_TAGS to be selected together with HAS_LTO_CLANG.

Reported-by: Alistair Delva <adelva@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>

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preempt: Introduce CONFIG_PREEMPT_DYNAMIC

Preemption mode selection is currently hardcoded on Kconfig choices.
Introduce a dedicated option to tune preemption flavour at boot time,

This will be onl

preempt: Introduce CONFIG_PREEMPT_DYNAMIC

Preemption mode selection is currently hardcoded on Kconfig choices.
Introduce a dedicated option to tune preemption flavour at boot time,

This will be only available on architectures efficiently supporting
static calls in order not to tempt with the feature against additional
overhead that might be prohibitive or undesirable.

CONFIG_PREEMPT_DYNAMIC is automatically selected by CONFIG_PREEMPT if
the architecture provides the necessary support (CONFIG_STATIC_CALL_INLINE,
CONFIG_GENERIC_ENTRY, and provide with __preempt_schedule_function() /
__preempt_schedule_notrace_function()).

Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
[peterz: relax requirement to HAVE_STATIC_CALL]
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210118141223.123667-5-frederic@kernel.org

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s390,alpha: switch to 64-bit ino_t

s390 and alpha are the only 64 bit architectures with a 32-bit ino_t.
Since this is quite unusual this causes bugs from time to time.

See e.g. commit ebce3eb2f7ef

s390,alpha: switch to 64-bit ino_t

s390 and alpha are the only 64 bit architectures with a 32-bit ino_t.
Since this is quite unusual this causes bugs from time to time.

See e.g. commit ebce3eb2f7ef ("ceph: fix inode number handling on
arches with 32-bit ino_t") for an example.

This (obviously) also prevents s390 and alpha to use 64-bit ino_t for
tmpfs. See commit b85a7a8bb573 ("tmpfs: disallow CONFIG_TMPFS_INODE64
on s390").

Therefore switch both s390 and alpha to 64-bit ino_t. This should only
have an effect on the ustat system call. To prevent ABI breakage
define struct ustat compatible to the old layout and change
sys_ustat() accordingly.

Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>

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softirq: Move __ARCH_HAS_DO_SOFTIRQ to Kconfig

To prepare for inlining do_softirq_own_stack() replace
__ARCH_HAS_DO_SOFTIRQ with a Kconfig switch and select it in the affected
architectures.

This a

softirq: Move __ARCH_HAS_DO_SOFTIRQ to Kconfig

To prepare for inlining do_softirq_own_stack() replace
__ARCH_HAS_DO_SOFTIRQ with a Kconfig switch and select it in the affected
architectures.

This allows in the next step to move the function prototype and the inline
stub into a seperate asm-generic header file which is required to avoid
include recursion.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210210002513.181713427@linutronix.de

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drivers: Remove CONFIG_OPROFILE support

The "oprofile" user-space tools don't use the kernel OPROFILE support
any more, and haven't in a long time. User-space has been converted to
the perf interfac

drivers: Remove CONFIG_OPROFILE support

The "oprofile" user-space tools don't use the kernel OPROFILE support
any more, and haven't in a long time. User-space has been converted to
the perf interfaces.

Remove kernel's old oprofile support.

Suggested-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Robert Richter <rric@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org> #RCU
Acked-by: William Cohen <wcohen@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

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arch/Kconfig: update a broken file reference

Commit adab66b71abf ("Revert: "ring-buffer: Remove HAVE_64BIT_ALIGNED_ACCESS"")
added the config HAVE_64BIT_ALIGNED_ACCESS back into arch/Kconfig with th

arch/Kconfig: update a broken file reference

Commit adab66b71abf ("Revert: "ring-buffer: Remove HAVE_64BIT_ALIGNED_ACCESS"")
added the config HAVE_64BIT_ALIGNED_ACCESS back into arch/Kconfig with this
revert. In the meantime, commit c9b54d6f362c ("docs: move other kAPI
documents to core-api") changed ./Documentation/unaligned-memory-access.txt
to ./Documentation/core-api/unaligned-memory-access.rst.

Fortunately, ./scripts/documentation-file-ref-check detects this and warns
about this broken reference.

Update the file reference in arch/Kconfig.

Fixes: adab66b71abf ("Revert: "ring-buffer: Remove HAVE_64BIT_ALIGNED_ACCESS"")
Signed-off-by: Lukas Bulwahn <lukas.bulwahn@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210119095326.13896-1-lukas.bulwahn@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>

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kbuild: lto: fix module versioning

With CONFIG_MODVERSIONS, version information is linked into each
compilation unit that exports symbols. With LTO, we cannot use this
method as all C code is compil

kbuild: lto: fix module versioning

With CONFIG_MODVERSIONS, version information is linked into each
compilation unit that exports symbols. With LTO, we cannot use this
method as all C code is compiled into LLVM bitcode instead. This
change collects symbol versions into .symversions files and merges
them in link-vmlinux.sh where they are all linked into vmlinux.o at
the same time.

Signed-off-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201211184633.3213045-4-samitolvanen@google.com

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kbuild: add support for Clang LTO

This change adds build system support for Clang's Link Time
Optimization (LTO). With -flto, instead of ELF object files, Clang
produces LLVM bitcode, which is compi

kbuild: add support for Clang LTO

This change adds build system support for Clang's Link Time
Optimization (LTO). With -flto, instead of ELF object files, Clang
produces LLVM bitcode, which is compiled into native code at link
time, allowing the final binary to be optimized globally. For more
details, see:

https://llvm.org/docs/LinkTimeOptimization.html

The Kconfig option CONFIG_LTO_CLANG is implemented as a choice,
which defaults to LTO being disabled. To use LTO, the architecture
must select ARCH_SUPPORTS_LTO_CLANG and support:

- compiling with Clang,
- compiling all assembly code with Clang's integrated assembler,
- and linking with LLD.

While using CONFIG_LTO_CLANG_FULL results in the best runtime
performance, the compilation is not scalable in time or
memory. CONFIG_LTO_CLANG_THIN enables ThinLTO, which allows
parallel optimization and faster incremental builds. ThinLTO is
used by default if the architecture also selects
ARCH_SUPPORTS_LTO_CLANG_THIN:

https://clang.llvm.org/docs/ThinLTO.html

To enable LTO, LLVM tools must be used to handle bitcode files, by
passing LLVM=1 and LLVM_IAS=1 options to make:

$ make LLVM=1 LLVM_IAS=1 defconfig
$ scripts/config -e LTO_CLANG_THIN
$ make LLVM=1 LLVM_IAS=1

To prepare for LTO support with other compilers, common parts are
gated behind the CONFIG_LTO option, and LTO can be disabled for
specific files by filtering out CC_FLAGS_LTO.

Signed-off-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201211184633.3213045-3-samitolvanen@google.com

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[amd64] clean PRSTATUS_SIZE/SET_PR_FPVALID up properly

To get rid of hardcoded size/offset in those macros we need to have
a definition of i386 variant of struct elf_prstatus. However, we can't
do

[amd64] clean PRSTATUS_SIZE/SET_PR_FPVALID up properly

To get rid of hardcoded size/offset in those macros we need to have
a definition of i386 variant of struct elf_prstatus. However, we can't
do that in asm/compat.h - the types needed for that are not there and
adding an include of asm/user32.h into asm/compat.h would cause a lot
of mess.

That could be conveniently done in elfcore-compat.h, but currently there
is nowhere to put arch-dependent parts of it - no asm/elfcore-compat.h.
So we introduce a new file (asm/elfcore-compat.h, present on architectures
that have CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_ELFCORE_COMPAT set, currently only on x86),
have it pulled by linux/elfcore-compat.h and move the definitions there.

As a side benefit, we don't need to worry about accidental inclusion of
that file into binfmt_elf.c itself, so we don't need the dance with
COMPAT_PRSTATUS_SIZE, etc. - only fs/compat_binfmt_elf.c will see
that header.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

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fanotify: Fix sys_fanotify_mark() on native x86-32

Commit

121b32a58a3a ("x86/entry/32: Use IA32-specific wrappers for syscalls taking 64-bit arguments")

converted native x86-32 which take 64-bit

fanotify: Fix sys_fanotify_mark() on native x86-32

Commit

121b32a58a3a ("x86/entry/32: Use IA32-specific wrappers for syscalls taking 64-bit arguments")

converted native x86-32 which take 64-bit arguments to use the
compat handlers to allow conversion to passing args via pt_regs.
sys_fanotify_mark() was however missed, as it has a general compat
handler. Add a config option that will use the syscall wrapper that
takes the split args for native 32-bit.

[ bp: Fix typo in Kconfig help text. ]

Fixes: 121b32a58a3a ("x86/entry/32: Use IA32-specific wrappers for syscalls taking 64-bit arguments")
Reported-by: Paweł Jasiak <pawel@jasiak.xyz>
Signed-off-by: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201130223059.101286-1-brgerst@gmail.com

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kasan: allow VMAP_STACK for HW_TAGS mode

Even though hardware tag-based mode currently doesn't support checking
vmalloc allocations, it doesn't use shadow memory and works with
VMAP_STACK as is. Cha

kasan: allow VMAP_STACK for HW_TAGS mode

Even though hardware tag-based mode currently doesn't support checking
vmalloc allocations, it doesn't use shadow memory and works with
VMAP_STACK as is. Change VMAP_STACK definition accordingly.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/ecdb2a1658ebd88eb276dee2493518ac0e82de41.1606162397.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/I3552cbc12321dec82cd7372676e9372a2eb452ac
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Tested-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com>
Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com>
Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

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arch, mm: restore dependency of __kernel_map_pages() on DEBUG_PAGEALLOC

The design of DEBUG_PAGEALLOC presumes that __kernel_map_pages() must
never fail. With this assumption is wouldn't be safe to

arch, mm: restore dependency of __kernel_map_pages() on DEBUG_PAGEALLOC

The design of DEBUG_PAGEALLOC presumes that __kernel_map_pages() must
never fail. With this assumption is wouldn't be safe to allow general
usage of this function.

Moreover, some architectures that implement __kernel_map_pages() have this
function guarded by #ifdef DEBUG_PAGEALLOC and some refuse to map/unmap
pages when page allocation debugging is disabled at runtime.

As all the users of __kernel_map_pages() were converted to use
debug_pagealloc_map_pages() it is safe to make it available only when
DEBUG_PAGEALLOC is set.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201109192128.960-4-rppt@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Albert Ou <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: "Edgecombe, Rick P" <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>
Cc: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@rjwysocki.net>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

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arm, arm64: move free_unused_memmap() to generic mm

ARM and ARM64 free unused parts of the memory map just before the
initialization of the page allocator. To allow holes in the memory map both
arch

arm, arm64: move free_unused_memmap() to generic mm

ARM and ARM64 free unused parts of the memory map just before the
initialization of the page allocator. To allow holes in the memory map both
architectures overload pfn_valid() and define HAVE_ARCH_PFN_VALID.

Allowing holes in the memory map for FLATMEM may be useful for small
machines, such as ARC and m68k and will enable those architectures to cease
using DISCONTIGMEM and still support more than one memory bank.

Move the functions that free unused memory map to generic mm and enable
them in case HAVE_ARCH_PFN_VALID=y.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201101170454.9567-10-rppt@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> [arm64]
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Greg Ungerer <gerg@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: John Paul Adrian Glaubitz <glaubitz@physik.fu-berlin.de>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Cc: Meelis Roos <mroos@linux.ee>
Cc: Michael Schmitz <schmitzmic@gmail.com>
Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

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mm: speedup mremap on 1GB or larger regions

Android needs to move large memory regions for garbage collection. The GC
requires moving physical pages of multi-gigabyte heap using mremap.
During this

mm: speedup mremap on 1GB or larger regions

Android needs to move large memory regions for garbage collection. The GC
requires moving physical pages of multi-gigabyte heap using mremap.
During this move, the application threads have to be paused for
correctness. It is critical to keep this pause as short as possible to
avoid jitters during user interaction.

Optimize mremap for >= 1GB-sized regions by moving at the PUD/PGD level if
the source and destination addresses are PUD-aligned. For
CONFIG_PGTABLE_LEVELS == 3, moving at the PUD level in effect moves PGD
entries, since the PUD entry is “folded back” onto the PGD entry. Add
HAVE_MOVE_PUD so that architectures where moving at the PUD level isn't
supported/tested can turn this off by not selecting the config.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201014005320.2233162-4-kaleshsingh@google.com
Signed-off-by: Kalesh Singh <kaleshsingh@google.com>
Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Cc: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Geffon <bgeffon@google.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Cc: Gavin Shan <gshan@redhat.com>
Cc: Hassan Naveed <hnaveed@wavecomp.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jia He <justin.he@arm.com>
Cc: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org>
Cc: Lokesh Gidra <lokeshgidra@google.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Cc: Mina Almasry <almasrymina@google.com>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@google.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ralph Campbell <rcampbell@nvidia.com>
Cc: Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
Cc: Sandipan Das <sandipan@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: SeongJae Park <sjpark@amazon.de>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com>
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Zi Yan <ziy@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

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arch/Kconfig: fix spelling mistakes

There are a few spelling mistakes in the Kconfig comments and help text.
Fix these.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201207155004.171962-1-colin.king@canonical.

arch/Kconfig: fix spelling mistakes

There are a few spelling mistakes in the Kconfig comments and help text.
Fix these.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201207155004.171962-1-colin.king@canonical.com
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

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Revert: "ring-buffer: Remove HAVE_64BIT_ALIGNED_ACCESS"

It was believed that metag was the only architecture that required the ring
buffer to keep 8 byte words aligned on 8 byte architectures, and w

Revert: "ring-buffer: Remove HAVE_64BIT_ALIGNED_ACCESS"

It was believed that metag was the only architecture that required the ring
buffer to keep 8 byte words aligned on 8 byte architectures, and with its
removal, it was assumed that the ring buffer code did not need to handle
this case. It appears that sparc64 also requires this.

The following was reported on a sparc64 boot up:

kernel: futex hash table entries: 65536 (order: 9, 4194304 bytes, linear)
kernel: Running postponed tracer tests:
kernel: Testing tracer function:
kernel: Kernel unaligned access at TPC[552a20] trace_function+0x40/0x140
kernel: Kernel unaligned access at TPC[552a24] trace_function+0x44/0x140
kernel: Kernel unaligned access at TPC[552a20] trace_function+0x40/0x140
kernel: Kernel unaligned access at TPC[552a24] trace_function+0x44/0x140
kernel: Kernel unaligned access at TPC[552a20] trace_function+0x40/0x140
kernel: PASSED

Need to put back the 64BIT aligned code for the ring buffer.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/CADxRZqzXQRYgKc=y-KV=S_yHL+Y8Ay2mh5ezeZUnpRvg+syWKw@mail.gmail.com

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 86b3de60a0b6 ("ring-buffer: Remove HAVE_64BIT_ALIGNED_ACCESS")
Reported-by: Anatoly Pugachev <matorola@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>

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s390/vtime: Use the generic IRQ entry accounting

s390 has its own version of IRQ entry accounting because it doesn't
account the idle time the same way the other architectures do. Only
the actual id

s390/vtime: Use the generic IRQ entry accounting

s390 has its own version of IRQ entry accounting because it doesn't
account the idle time the same way the other architectures do. Only
the actual idle sleep time is accounted as idle time, the rest of the
idle task execution is accounted as system time.

Make the generic IRQ entry accounting aware of architectures that have
their own way of accounting idle time and convert s390 to use it.

This prepares s390 to get involved in further consolidations of IRQ
time accounting.

Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201202115732.27827-3-frederic@kernel.org

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